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Introduction
The Great Recession led to large and persistent drops in real output. At the
same time many proxies for uncertainty jumped up.1 Policymakers believe that
uncertainty was an important factor explaining the dynamics during the re-
cession of 08/09 and in the Eurozone crisis. For example, in 2009, the Chief
Economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Olivier Blanchard wrote
that uncertainty “affects consumption and investment decisions, and is largely
behind the dramatic collapse in demand” (see Blanchard, 2009). In 2014, Mario
Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), noted that uncertainty
“is weighing on business investment and slowing the rate at which workers are
being rehired” (see Draghi, 2014). These claims raise two main questions. First,
how do we measure uncertainty, a variable that is not directly observable? Sec-
ond, how are increases in uncertainty transmitted to the economy?
The present work contributes to the literature on uncertainty by using empir-
ical methods to measure uncertainty and volatility, and empirical and theoret-
ical methods to analyze two transmission channels through which uncertainty
is linked to the business cycle. The first chapter looks into the problem of
measuring inflation uncertainty and proposes to use common information con-
tained in a variety of different uncertainty proxies. In the second chapter, we
develop measures of firm-specific volatility and quantify the effect of heightened
volatility on the price setting behavior of firms and analyze whether this link
1 See, e.g., Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013), Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013), Born,
Breuer, and Elstner (2014), Bloom (2009), Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten,
and Terry (2012), Henzel and Rengel (2014), Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015).
ix
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changes the effectiveness of monetary policy. The third chapter compares the
effects of heightened idiosyncratic uncertainty on credit spreads in bank-based
and market-based financial systems.
Chapter 1.2 The first chapter deals with the problem of measuring inflation
uncertainty. Any individual proxy for inflation uncertainty relies on specific as-
sumptions that are most likely not fulfilled completely. Therefore, proxies most
likely suffer from idiosyncratic measurement errors. To reduce these problems,
we use a principal component analysis to extract common information contained
in different measures. To this end, we rely on the most commonly used proxies for
inflation uncertainty. These include survey disagreement and the realized fore-
cast error variance derived from a panel of professional forecasters and proxies
derived from model-based approaches such as GARCH and stochastic volatility.
In addition, we present several measures derived from a large number of forecast
models.
We show that the first principal component provides an adequate indica-
tor of inflation uncertainty because it condenses the information common to all
measures and, therefore, overcomes the problem of idiosyncratic measurement
errors. Notably, each individual measure contributes to the indicator with a sim-
ilar weight. The common component remains virtually unaffected if we exclude
one of the measures. Furthermore, analyzing the part of the dynamics that is
not captured by the first principal component, we are able to see to which extent
the individual measures deliver contradictory signals. We find that some caution
is warranted with disagreement measures derived from survey data and forecast
models, because the idiosyncratic parts of these measures tend to move in oppo-
site directions over the business cycle. Using only one individual disagreement
measure, therefore, may be misleading particularly during turbulent times.
Central banks are regularly confronted with demands to increase the inflation
target. Keeping in mind that inflation uncertainty comes with costs that go
beyond the costs of inflation (for example, nominal contracts become riskier), we
use our indicator to analyze the link between inflation uncertainty and inflation.
Our results support the Friedman-Ball hypothesis – higher inflation rates lead
to higher inflation uncertainty. This suggests that raising inflation would imply
additional costs, which are related to the increase in inflation uncertainty, that
2 This chapter is based on the paper “Inflation Uncertainty Revisited: A proposal for robust
measurement”, jointly written with Steffen Henzel and Elisabeth Wieland. The paper is
published in Empirical Economics (Grimme, Henzel, and Wieland, 2014).
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need to be considered. By contrast, using the individual uncertainty proxies
one at a time reveals contradictory results with respect to the Friedman-Ball
hypothesis. Therefore, the measurement errors in the individual proxies do have
an influence on the dynamics of the uncertainty measures following a sudden
increase in inflation.
Chapter 2.3 This chapter analyzes whether idiosyncratic volatility affects
the price setting of firms and thus the transmission of monetary policy into the
real economy. One reason why monetary policy has an effect on real variables
in the short run is that prices are sticky. If heightened volatility changes the
degree of price stickiness, this would affect the effectiveness of monetary policy.
We follow two strategies to construct firm-level volatility measures from the
IFO Business Climate Survey. Based on qualitative survey questions, we con-
struct expectation errors at the firm level and take the absolute value of these
errors as a proxy for idiosyncratic volatility. For a subset of firm responses
we construct a quantitative volatility measure. The second strategy relies on
the same qualitative and quantitative expectation errors but uses a firm-specific
rolling window standard deviation. All four measures are highly correlated.
From the IFO Business Climate Survey we also have information on the price
setting at the firm level. This enables us to estimate a probit model in which we
asses to what extent an increase in firm-specific volatility affects the frequency
of price adjustment. We find that heightened volatility increases the frequency
of price changes, however the effect is rather moderate. The tripling of volatility
during the recession of 08/09 leads to an increase in the quarterly likelihood of
a price change from 31.6% to 32.3%.
What do the effects we find at the micro-level imply for the effectiveness of
monetary policy? To answer this question we use a standard New Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with Calvo-type price
setting. The empirical exercise gives us an elasticity for the probability of a price
change with respect to an increase in firm-level volatility. We use this elasticity
to calibrate a change in the Calvo parameter in the DSGE model to capture a
change in idiosyncratic volatility. We find that during a time in which volatility
triples a 25 basis point cut in the nominal interest rate would have lost about
1.6% of its effect on real output on impact. In the 08/09 recession we observe
3 The chapter is based on the CEPR Discussion Paper “Time-Varying Business Volatility,
Price Setting, and the Real Effects of Monetary Policy”, jointly written with Rüdiger Bach-
mann, Benjamin Born and Steffen Elstner (Bachmann, Born, Elstner, and Grimme, 2013).
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an overall increase in the share of firms adjusting prices by about 7 percentage
points. This number implies that after a monetary stimulus of 25 basis points
the total loss in effectiveness amounts to almost 17%. Therefore, changes in price
flexibility are potentially an important driver for the effectiveness of monetary
policy, however, we find that firm-level volatility does not contribute much to
these price changes.
Chapter 3. This chapter takes an empirical and theoretical look at the
relationship between idiosyncratic uncertainty and credit spreads. It analyzes
whether credit spreads behave differently in bank-based and market-based finan-
cial systems following an uncertainty shock. An increase in uncertainty about
idiosyncratic productivity increases the probability of firm default and lenders
demand a higher risk premium from borrowers. We analyze whether banks act
differently than the capital market in times of heightened uncertainty. In con-
trast to the capital market, banks are able to form long-term relationships with
borrowers, through these relationships banks get to know borrowers better and
acquire additional information. To preserve these relationships, banks smooth
loan rates over the business cycle to protect firms from fluctuations in market
rates (Berger and Udell, 1992).
Empirically, the contribution of the paper is to analyze whether credit spreads
on corporate bonds behave differently in response to uncertainty shocks than
credit spreads on bank loans. We follow Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013)
and use survey data from the Philadelphia Fed’s Business Outlook Survey and
the IFO Business Climate Survey to construct idiosyncratic uncertainty mea-
sures for the United States and Germany, respectively. For each country we
calculate two credit spreads. The market spread is computed as the difference
between corporate bond yields and government bond yields, the bank spread is
the difference between bank loan rates and government bond yields. Vector au-
toregressions show that after a surprise increase in uncertainty, market spreads
increase more than bank spreads. This is due to the fact that corporate bond
yields increase while bank loan rates decrease. Therefore, economies, which are
characterized by firms relying mainly on financial markets for external finance,
like the United States, are confronted with relatively higher external financing
costs than bank-based financial systems, like Germany, in times of heightened
uncertainty.
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The theoretical part of the chapter has two contributions. First, we check
whether a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem produces in-
creasing or decreasing lending rates in response to an uncertainty shock. This
type of model is used by many papers in the literature on uncertainty and finan-
cial frictions (see, e.g., Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014). Employing two
different calibration strategies, one solely for Germany, the other encompassing a
wide range of values for each parameter, we find that the model predicts increas-
ing lending rates. Following an uncertainty shock, default risk increases, which
leads to a higher risk premium. Therefore, this model supports the response of
capital markets to heightened uncertainty.
Second, we formulate a stylized partial equilibrium model with costly state
verification that contains the possibility to form bank-borrower relationships.
Having formed a lending relationship, the bank faces lower information asym-
metries. If the reduction in these asymmetries is sufficiently large, the relation-
ship bank has an incentive to offer relatively low lending rates in times of high
uncertainty. A low lending rate counteracts the increase in the probability of
firm default, which makes it more likely that, after uncertainty vanished, the
bank can exploit the fact that it has more information about the borrower than
other lenders and demand comparatively high loan rates.
In sum, we conclude in this chapter that the effects of uncertainty shocks
on the cost of external finance are dampened to some extent by the banking
system. Therefore, if credit costs for firms do not increase much, uncertainty
transmitted through the credit cost channel might be less of a concern for the
conduct of monetary policy in bank-based financial systems.

CHAPTER 1
Inflation Uncertainty Revisited: A Proposal for Robust
Measurement
Any measure of unobserved inflation uncertainty relies on specific assumptions
which are most likely not fulfilled completely. This calls into question whether
an individual measure delivers a reliable signal. To reduce idiosyncratic mea-
surement error, we propose using common information contained in different
measures derived from survey data, a variety of forecast models, and volatility
models. We show that all measures are driven by a common component, which
constitutes an indicator for inflation uncertainty. Moreover, our results suggest
that using only one individual disagreement measure may be misleading partic-
ularly during turbulent times. Finally, we study the Friedman-Ball hypothesis.
Using the indicator, we show that higher inflation is followed by higher uncer-
tainty. In contrast, we obtain contradictory results for the individual measures.
We also document that, after an inflationary shock, uncertainty decreases in the
first two months which is traceable to the energy component in CPI inflation.
1
2 Chapter 1. Inflation Uncertainty Revisited
1.1 Introduction
In the follow-up of the seminal speech of Friedman (1977), a still ongoing debate
has originated concerning the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty
(Ball, 1992, Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). Empirical testing of the causes
and consequences of increased inflation uncertainty necessitates a valid measure.
Given that inflation uncertainty is an unobserved variable, many different mea-
sures have been proposed in the literature. While some studies rely on survey-
based measures, others depend on volatility derived from time series models, or
use realized forecast errors. Each measure is derived from different assumptions
which are most likely not fulfilled completely. This calls into question whether
an individual measure delivers a reliable signal at any time. That is, any indi-
vidual measure most likely suffers from idiosyncratic measurement error. Hence,
empirical results concerning the relationship between inflation uncertainty and
inflation depend crucially on the choice of the uncertainty measure.4
In this study, we propose an approach to mitigate the idiosyncratic measure-
ment error problem. To this end, we derive the most commonly used measures
of inflation uncertainty. These include survey disagreement derived from a panel
of forecasters, realized forecast error variance, and model-based approaches such
as GARCH and stochastic volatility. Moreover, we present an approach which
relies on a variety of forecast models. We use these measures to construct an
indicator of inflation uncertainty that condenses the information contained in
all measures and overcomes the idiosyncratic measurement error problem.
We demonstrate that all measures are driven by a common component, which
we interpret as an indicator for inflation uncertainty. Notably, each individual
measure contributes to the indicator with a similar weight. The common com-
ponent thus remains virtually unaffected when we discard one of the measures.
Moreover, we document that individual measures have the tendency to drift
apart when uncertainty rises. That is, the measurement error problem seems
to be larger during “uncertain times”. Accordingly, using individual measures
to examine the relation between these two variables yields ambiguous results.
Such a finding emphasizes the benefits of the indicator approach.
Furthermore, the indicator approach helps us analyze to which extent indi-
vidual measures may deliver a misleading signal since it enables us to analyze
4 Mixed results with respect to the direction of causality are obtained inter alia by Grier
and Perry (1998, 2000), Grier, Henry, Olekalns, and Shields (2004), and Berument and
Dincer (2005). See also Davis and Kanago (2000) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007) and
the papers cited therein.
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the part of the dynamics which is not captured by the common component. In
particular, we discuss whether disagreement is a good proxy for uncertainty.5
For this purpose, we analyze disagreement in survey forecasts and disagreement
derived from a variety of forecast models. It appears that both disagreement
measures co-move with the other uncertainty measures and are to a large ex-
tent reflected in the common component. However, some caution is warranted
because our results also suggest that using only one individual disagreement
measure may be misleading particularly during turbulent times.
In a further step, we take advantage of our approach and study the rela-
tionship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. This topic has recently
regained relevance because several economists call for a temporary increase of
central banks’ inflation target to mitigate the problem of debt overhang and to
fight unemployment.6 Against this background, the Friedman-Ball hypothesis
suggests that high inflation rates may lead to increased inflation uncertainty
which brings about economic cost (see, for instance, Bernanke and Mishkin,
1997). Our results are in favor of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. We also doc-
ument that, after an inflationary shock, uncertainty decreases during the first
two months. Such a behavior appears to be traceable to the energy component
in the CPI since we do not observe a decrease following a shock to core inflation.
After a few months, uncertainty increases swiftly for all inflation-related shocks.
A few studies compare different approaches to measure inflation uncertainty.
For instance, Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996) contrast inflation uncertainty ob-
tained from subjective probability distributions from the U.S. Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters (SPF) with different model-based measures. They find no
significant correlation between both categories. Taking uncertainty measures
derived from the SPF as a benchmark, Giordani and Söderlind (2003) docu-
ment that model-based measures in general have problems in timely capturing
regime changes. Nonetheless, the standard deviation of a VAR estimated on
a rolling window tracks the time profile of SPF uncertainty quite well. Chua,
5 The relation between disagreement and uncertainty is the subject of an ongoing debate.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003)
find supportive results, yet other studies report only a weak relationship or reject disagree-
ment as a proxy (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987, Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski, 1988,
Rich and Butler, 1998, Döpke and Fritsche, 2006, Rich and Tracy, 2010). Lahiri and Sheng
(2010b) argue that disagreement is a reliable proxy for overall uncertainty if the forecast
environment is stable.
6 See, for instance, the IMF Staff Position Note by Olivier Blanchard et al. (SPN/10/03),
the comment by Ken Rogoff in the Financial Times on Aug 8, 2011, the address by Charles
L. Evans at the Outlook Luncheon on Dec 5, 2011, and the comment by Paul Krugman in
the NY Times on April 6, 2012.
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Kim, and Suardi (2011) identify a particular GARCH model that matches the
SPF measure closest.
All of the above studies take subjective densities of the SPF as the obser-
vational equivalent of inflation uncertainty. Although SPF is conducted on a
quarterly frequency, a time path for subjective uncertainty relating to forecasts
with a constant forecast horizon is available only on an annual basis. However,
uncertainty may emerge rather quickly. Against this background, recent studies
analyze the effects of uncertainty at a monthly frequency (Bloom, 2009, Knotek
and Khan, 2011, Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2013). To address this issue, our
measure of inflation uncertainty is derived on a monthly basis, yet we document
that our uncertainty indicator produces a time profile which is similar to yearly
SPF uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we in-
troduce survey-based measures as well as model-based measures. Moreover,
we present a “forecast-based” approach which relies on multiple forecast mod-
els. The relation between the different measures is analyzed in Section 1.3. In
Section 1.4, we investigate the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Individual Measures of Inflation
Uncertainty
1.2.1 Survey-Based Measures
First, we derive uncertainty measures from survey data. We use individual fore-
casts for CPI inflation from professional forecasters conducted by Consensus
Economics (CE). CE reports average annual growth rates of expected inflation
for the current and next calendar year. However, since the forecast horizon varies
for each month, the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts is strongly seasonal
and converges towards zero at the end of each year (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010a).
To obtain twelve-months-ahead inflation forecasts, we follow Dovern, Fritsche,
and Slacalek (2012) and calculate a weighted moving average of the annual fore-
casts. For each month m, the fixed horizon forecast is obtained by weighting the
two available point estimates according to their respective share in the forecast
horizon; i.e., 12−m+1
12
for the current year’s forecast and m−1
12
for the next year’s
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forecast. The sample period covers the period 1990:M1 to 2009:M12. The av-
erage number of fixed horizon forecasts ranges between 16 and 32 per period,
with a mean value of 25 observations.
The CE survey is advantageous because it polls professional forecasters who
should be well informed about the current state of the economy. Moreover,
individual data is provided and the names of the forecasters are given along-
side the numbers. Hence, there is a strong incentive to make a well-founded
prediction in order not to damage the forecaster’s reputation. Against this
background, Dovern and Weisser (2011) find that individual forecasts of U.S.
inflation are largely unbiased. Moreover, CE data has the advantage that it
runs on a monthly frequency. As uncertainty may move abruptly, many of the
effects we want to measure would be harder to identify in low frequency data.
Among others, Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Cukierman and Wachtel
(1982), and Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996) suggest using the root mean squared
error (rmses) as a measure of uncertainty. It is calculated by averaging the in-
dividual squared forecast errors in each period t:
rmsest =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
πt+12 − πei,t
)2
(1.1)
where πt+12 denotes realized 12-month ahead CPI inflation and π
e
i,t is the indi-
vidual point forecast from CE made at time t. As far as the timing is concerned,
we follow Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996). This implies that rmses is an ex-
post measure (see also Hartmann and Herwartz, 2014). That is, a forecast error
realized at time t+ 12 represents uncertainty at time t.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999), and Giordani and
Söderlind (2003) propose the cross-sectional dispersion of point forecasts (dis-
agreement) as a measure of uncertainty. Instead of using the cross-sectional
standard deviation of forecasts, we follow Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003)
and rely on the interquartile range (iqrs) since it is more robust to outliers. iqrs
is defined as the difference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles.7
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) point out that the distribution of fore-
casts may become multimodal if model uncertainty is high. This is the case, for
7 We also computed the standard deviation and the quasi-standard deviation of forecasts
(Giordani and Söderlind, 2003). The quasi-standard deviation is defined as half the differ-
ence between the 84th and 16th percentiles. With normally distributed data, this measure
equals the standard deviation. The correlation coefficient of these alternative dispersion
measures and iqrs amounts to 0.86 and 0.90, respectively.
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instance, around structural breaks. As dispersion neglects the form of the distri-
bution Rich and Tracy (2010), among others, suggest using a histogram-based
entropy (ents) which is computed as:
entst = −
( n∑
k=1
p(k)t[ln(p(k)t)]
)
(1.2)
where p(k) denotes the relative frequency of individual forecasts falling in a
certain interval k. For a given number of bins and a constant bin width, the
histogram-based entropy is maximized if the forecasts are distributed equally
among all bins. The entropy provides additional information beyond iqrs. Given
the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts, the entropy changes with the
shape of the histogram of forecasts. In particular, the normal distribution ex-
hibits a higher entropy than any other distribution of the same variance (Vasicek,
1976).
1.2.2 Forecast-Based Measures
As a complement to the survey-based measures, we propose a forecast-based
approach which relies on multiple forecast models. To simplify the analysis, we
use VAR models, which are a popular forecast device because of their ability
to generate multi-step predictions. A VAR model is also employed by Giordani
and Söderlind (2003). To obtain a time-varying uncertainty measure, they re-
cursively estimate a single VAR model and calculate a standard deviation of
the forecast error of inflation for each period. Chua, Kim, and Suardi (2011)
follow this idea by deriving error bands from the recursive bootstrapped VAR
approach proposed by Peng and Yang (2008). However, this approach comes
at the cost of being conditional on a specific forecast model which is assumed
to provide the correct description of the data. Moreover, the model is assumed
to be the same for all forecasters. Hence, model uncertainty is virtually absent
and forecaster diversity is neglected. Finally, uncertainty is derived from VAR
residuals which are assumed to be homoskedastic. In effect, this is not consistent
with the notion that uncertainty changes systematically over time. To overcome
these possible drawbacks, we do not use VAR residuals but point forecasts of a
variety of VAR models.
To obtain multiple forecast models, we select a number of activity variables
proposed by Stock and Watson (1999) to forecast U.S. inflation. The authors
identify different subgroups of variables. To keep the analysis tractable, we
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choose one representative from each of these subgroups. We end up with 15
variables, which are described in Table 1.5 in the appendix. To derive twelve-
months-ahead forecasts for inflation, we build a number of different VAR models.
Each VAR model is limited in size to avoid over-fitting problems (for a detailed
discussion see, for instance, Berg and Henzel (forthcoming), and Henzel and
Mayr (2013)). It comprises the target variable and up to four additional activ-
ity variables. Finally, we construct all VAR models that fulfill this criterion; i.e.,
we consider all possibilities to choose up to four variables out of the 15 activity
variables. The lag length of each VAR model is determined by BIC, and we
end up with a total number of 1.941 different inflation forecasts for each month.
The estimation is based on a rolling window covering 20 years of data.8 That
is, the first sample comprises observations beginning in 1970:M1 and ending in
1990:M1. Subsequently, we derive one-year-ahead forecasts for inflation. We
iterate through time until 2009:M12. Note that the estimation period contains
the disinflation period during the 1980s. Hence, inflation enters the VAR model
in first differences (Stock and Watson, 1999, 2007). Calculating RMSE as de-
fined in equation (1.1) yields a forecast-based measure of inflation uncertainty
(rmsef ). Forecast-based disagreement (iqrf ) is given by the dispersion among
the point forecasts measured by the interquartile range. According to equation
(1.2), we also calculate an entropy-based measure (entf ).
1.2.3 Model-Based Measures
Conditional Forecast Error Variance
ARCH models of many different shapes have been extensively used to model
inflation uncertainty in the U.S.9 A number of studies highlight the presence
of structural breaks in the inflation process.10 To account for such events like
changes in the monetary regime or the level of steady-state inflation, we follow
these studies and opt for a GARCH model with time-varying parameters. The
8 Giordani and Söderlind (2003) advocate the use of a “windowed” VAR â€“ in opposition
to a recursive VAR – where changes in the inflation process are quickly reflected in the
parameter estimates.
9 See, for instance, Engle (1983), Cosimano and Jansen (1988), Brunner and Hess (1993),
Grier and Perry (1996), Grier and Perry (2000), Elder (2004), Grier, Henry, Olekalns, and
Shields (2004) and Chang and He (2010).
10 See, for instance, Evans (1991), Evans and Wachtel (1993), Bhar and Hamori (2004), Beru-
ment, Kilinc, and Ozlale (2005), Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), and Caporale, Onorante,
and Paesani (2012).
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model is given by a signal equation (1.3), a state equation (1.4) and equation
(1.5) describing how conditional error variance evolves.
πt = [1 πt−1 πt−2] αt + et et ∼ N(0, ht) (1.3)
αt+1 = αt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, Q) (1.4)
ht = d+ φe
2
t−1 + γht−1 (1.5)
Here, αt is a vector of time-varying coefficients which follow a random walk.
We model inflation as an AR(2) process which meets the needs to reproduce
the cyclical behavior. ht describes conditional error variance which emerges
from a GARCH(1,1) process. Q is a homoskedastic covariance matrix of shocks
ηt. The estimation is based on a rolling window covering 20 years of monthly
data to replicate a forecast situation. In accordance with the forecast-based
measures introduced in the previous section, the first estimation window starts
in 1970:M1 and ends in 1990:M1. The Kalman filter provides an estimate for
the variance of the forecast error in the last period. Note that this variance
combines model uncertainty emerging from time-variation of the coefficients and
uncertainty emerging from the shock process ηt (see Evans, 1991, Caporale,
Onorante, and Paesani, 2012, for a detailed explanation). We successively
iterate through time until 2009:M12 and obtain an estimate for the variance of
the forecast error at each point in time which obtains the label garch.
Stochastic volatility
Stochastic volatility models are used in financial econometrics to model error
variance as a latent stochastic process (see, among others, Harvey, Ruiz, and
Shephard, 1994, Kim, Shephard, and Chib, 1998). Moreover, a stochastic volatil-
ity model is proposed as a forecast model for U.S. inflation by Stock and Watson
(2007). The variance of first moment shocks is assumed to be driven by an ex-
ogenous stochastic process. This is in contrast to ARCH models where error
variance is fully described by its own past. We follow Dovern, Fritsche, and
Slacalek (2012) and employ the model to measure inflation uncertainty. The
state-space representation is given by equations (1.6) to (1.10).
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πt = µt + et et ∼ N(0, σ2e,t) (1.6)
µt+1 = µt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η,t) (1.7)
log σ2e,t+1 = log σ
2
e,t + ν1,t (1.8)
log σ2η,t+1 = log σ
2
η,t + ν2,t (1.9)(
ν1,t
ν2,t
)
∼ N(0, γI2) (1.10)
Here, et is a short-term shock in the measurement equation (1.6) with variance
σ2e,t. Moreover, the permanent component of inflation µt follows a random walk
which is driven by a (level) shock ηt with variance σ
2
η,t. The model is estimated
with the Gibbs sampler. As in the case of garch, we use a rolling window covering
20 years of data. Hence, we only use information known to the researcher at
the time the estimate is provided. Finally, we follow the arguments of Ball and
Cecchetti (1990) and use the square root of the variance of permanent shocks
σ2η,t as the measure of inflation uncertainty. Subsequently, it is denoted by ucsv.
1.3 Characteristics of Uncertainty Measures
1.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
All measures presented in Section 1.2 require a number of assumptions to work
as good proxies for uncertainty. Most likely, these assumptions are not fulfilled
completely. For instance, deriving valid measures from survey-based approaches
assumes that the survey is conducted such that bias and measurement error
is small. Moreover, disagreement and entropy are valid proxies only if there
is a positive correlation between the dispersion of forecasts of respondents and
uncertainty of the participants. However, it might be the case that individual
forecasters are highly uncertain and, therefore, reluctant to deviate from the
other forecasters. rmse is an ex-post measure that captures realized forecast
error variance, and we assume that this differs from the subjective uncertainty
of the forecaster only by a random error. Measures inferred from the forecast-
based approach work as indicators for uncertainty if linear time series models
are a good approximation of the model used by individual forecasters. Finally,
model-based measures are conditional on a specific forecast model. Moreover,
this particular model is assumed to be the same for all forecasters, that is, there
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is no disagreement.11 In addition, garch provides the conditional variance which
is driven by forecast errors from previous periods. Hence, each measure proposed
in the literature is probably contaminated by idiosyncratic measurement error.
Thus, it should be beneficial to base the analysis on information contained in
all measures jointly.
We generate the eight individual uncertainty measures introduced in Section
1.2: three survey-based measures (iqrs, ents, rmses), three forecast-based mea-
sures (iqrf , entf , rmsef ), and two model-based measures (garch, ucsv). The
individual measures are depicted in Figure 1.1. All eight measures exhibit a
similar pattern, particularly during the recent economic crisis. However, there
are also periods when some of the measures diverge.
Figure 1.1: Survey-Based (iqrs, ents, rmses), Forecast-Based (iqrf , entf ,
rmsef ), and Model-Based (garch, ucsv) Measures of Inflation Uncertainty
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11 According to Lahiri and Sheng (2010b), overall forecast uncertainty is the sum of the
variance of future aggregate shocks and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. Model-based
measures capture only the uncertainty common to all fore-casters and neglect forecaster-
specific shocks which are responsible for the disagreement among different forecasters.
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In the following, we present some descriptive statistics to characterize the
individual measures. Figure 1.2 displays the autocorrelation of the eight un-
certainty measures on the main diagonal. It shows that the autocorrelation is
positive and significant at the 5% level for each measure. The lowest degree
of autocorrelation is found for survey disagreement whereas the most sluggish
measure is ucsv. In general, inflation uncertainty seems to be a persistent phe-
nomenon. Cross-correlations are given on the off-diagonal elements of Figure
1.2. We find that cross-correlations are high and significantly positive among all
series and throughout all leads and lags. We take this as a first indication that
all measures contain a common component. Also note that rmses and rmsef
tend to lead the other measures.
Figure 1.2: Cross-Correlations of Uncertainty Measures
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Notes: The bars represent cross-correlations corr(yi,t, yj,t+k) for each pair of variables, where
yi,t denotes the row i variable and yj,t+k is given in the column j. k varies between −12 and
+12. The 5% significance level is indicated by the horizontal line.
The extent of co-movement over time is revealed in Figure 1.3. Here, we
depict the evolution of the cross-sectional standard deviation between all mea-
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sures at each point in time (solid line). We observe that the standard deviation
fluctuates around a constant value during the first part of the sample, yet the
measures start to diverge towards the end of the sample. The co-movement
between all eight measures further decreases during the recent crisis. Figure
1.3 also depicts the cross-sectional mean of all eight measures, which is strongly
correlated with the cross-sectional standard deviation; the correlation coefficient
amounts to 0.68. Thus, during more turbulent times, individual measures have
the tendency to drift apart and measuring uncertainty becomes more challeng-
ing. It appears that a method attenuating the idiosyncratic measurement error
problem is particularly beneficial in times of high uncertainty.
Figure 1.3: Dispersion of Uncertainty Measures
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Notes: Individual uncertainty measures have been standardized before calculating the cross-
sectional standard deviation.
1.3.2 Common Characteristics
To eliminate the idiosyncratic components from the data, we can exploit the
commonalities among individual measures documented in the previous section.
That is, we use the cross-sectional dimension of the data to alleviate the idiosyn-
cratic measurement error problem. For this purpose, we conduct a Principal
Component Analysis. As mentioned above, the two variables rmses and rmsef
seem to lead the rest of the indicators. We obtain a maximum average cross
correlation at 8 and 5 lags, respectively. When estimating the common factors,
we follow Stock and Watson (2002) and account for the lead characteristics of
these variables. Table 1.1 shows the loading coefficients of the first three princi-
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pal components and the individual and cumulative variance proportions of those
components.
Table 1.1: Principal Component Analysis
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3
Eigenvalues 4.98 1.07 0.72
Variance Proportion 0.62 0.13 0.09
Cumulative Proportion 0.62 0.76 0.85
Loadings R2
iqrs 0.34 0.34 -0.44 0.59
ents 0.31 0.44 -0.51 0.48
rmses 0.36 -0.04 0.31 0.63
iqrf 0.33 -0.56 -0.23 0.56
entf 0.33 -0.57 -0.26 0.54
rmsef 0.37 0.10 0.20 0.70
garch 0.38 0.09 0.40 0.72
ucsv 0.39 0.17 0.35 0.76
Notes: R2 calculated from a regression of the respective individual uncertainty measure on
PC1.
The first principal component (PC1) accounts for the major part of the
dynamics of the data as it explains 62% of the total variation of the underlying
series. The second principal component (PC2) carries less information since it
explains only 13% of the variation. A scree test indicates that there are two
informative principal components in the dataset (the first two eigenvalues are
larger than one). Table 1.1 also shows that the contribution of the third principal
component is relatively small. We conclude that the bulk of the variation is
explained by two principal components and the following analysis thus focuses
on these two components.
From Table 1.1, we infer that all eight loading coefficients of PC1 are positive
and lie between 0.31 and 0.39. That is, the loadings are all similar in magnitude
and each of the proposed measures therefore carries information we can use to
estimate unobserved inflation uncertainty.12 This is also reflected by the fact
that PC1 has noticeable explanatory power for each of the individual measures.
As indicated by the R2 in Table 1.1, the variance share explained by PC1 varies
between 48% and 76%. Also note that PC1 is almost identical to a simple
12 Note that given the very similar factor loadings, PC1 remains virtually unaffected when we
exclude one measure from the analysis. Our results thus do not hinge on one individual
measure.
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average of the standardized individual measures since the loadings are similar.
In applied research, taking a simple average is thus sufficient to extract the
common component.13
The first principal component is shown in Figure 1.4. Following a rather
tranquil period with moderate movements, PC1 starts to rise beginning roughly
in 2007 followed by a surge towards the end of 2008, which coincides roughly
with the peak of the recent economic crisis. This is in line with, for instance,
Clark (2009) who documents that macroeconomic variability has recently been
increasing due to larger financial and oil price related shocks. Also note that a
large part of the surge in uncertainty is only temporary as PC1 quickly drops
to about half the value of the 2008-peak in the subsequent months.14
Figure 1.4: Uncertainty Indicator (PC1)
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To analyze the information content of PC1, we study the co-movement of
PC1 with economic variables that one would expect to be related to inflation
uncertainty. Contemporaneous correlations of PC1 and a collection of key vari-
ables are presented in Table 1.2. Results show that PC1 is closely linked to the
variability of nominal variables such as commodity prices, long-term interest
rates, and money. Similarly, variables representing financial market risk (vix,
13 The results in this paper remain unchanged when we replace PC1 with the average of the
standardized measures. The results are available upon request.
14 Due to the CE survey, the main analysis is limited to a sample beginning in 1990. Hence,
our sample covers a rather tranquil period as far as inflation is concerned. To see whether
the results also hold for periods of high and volatile inflation, we conduct the analysis for the
years 1970 to 1995 considering only the forecast-based and model-based approaches. Our
results also hold for the earlier time span. First, there appears to be a common component
which explains the majority of the variation in the data (58%). Second, all individual
measures contribute with a non-negligible weight. Third, the loadings are similar. Detailed
results are available upon request.
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ted spreads, corporate bond spreads, and squared returns) seem to rise with
PC1. Moreover, PC1 appears to be positively linked to the variability of pro-
duction growth. Finally, all variables representing the business cycle indicate
that inflation uncertainty is associated with economic contraction. We also ob-
serve a negative association with short-term interest rates which are, in general,
pro-cyclical over the business cycle. Notably, the correlation obtained for long-
term rates is somewhat lower compared to short-term rates. This is probably
due to the fact that the long-term interest rate is partly driven by the inflation
risk premium, which tends to increase along with inflation uncertainty.
1.3.3 Group-Specific Characteristics
We now shed some light on the idiosyncratic movements; i.e., the dynamics
which are specific to (some of) the individual measures. The informative part of
the idiosyncratic dynamics is reflected in the second principal component (PC2)
and we thus use it to analyze the group-specific characteristics. The loadings
associated with PC2 provide insight into the interrelation of the individual un-
certainty measures. We obtain positive loadings for survey disagreement iqrs
and ents (0.34 and 0.44). That is, survey disagreement is governed by notice-
able idiosyncratic movements. In contrast, PC2 loads negatively on the two
forecast-based disagreement measures iqrf and entf (−0.56 and −0.57). From
the opposite signs of the loadings, we infer that PC2 represents a factor that
drives survey-based and forecast-based measures into opposite directions; the
other measures do not contribute to PC2 significantly.
The left panel of Figure 1.5 depicts PC2, which is far from being white noise.
To identify situations where survey-based and forecast-based disagreement mea-
sures move less synchronized, we analyze the contemporaneous correlations of
PC2 to economic variables in Table 1.2. In opposition to PC1, PC2 tends to
co-move with the business cycle as we obtain a positive correlation with the
Purchasing Manager Index (pmi) and negative correlations with all unemploy-
ment related variables. Hence, the idiosyncratic part of iqrs and ents decreases
during a downswing while the idiosyncratic part of iqrf and entf tends to rise.
Similarly, a rise in commodity prices is associated with an increase in PC2,
probably reflecting the fact that these prices tend to co-move with the busi-
ness cycle. Overall, survey disagreement and the forecast-based disagreement
measures tend to drift apart during economic downturns.
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Table 1.2: Correlations of Principal Components with Economic and Financial
Variables
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2
Consumer
prices
(∆π)2 0.40 0.14
Commodity
prices
wti −0.13
(∆πcore)2 0.18 −0.14 ppicomm −0.19 0.23
Money
aggregate
∆M2 0.16 0.21 ppiind −0.19 0.20
(∆M2)2 0.33 0.15 crbreturn −0.32 0.28
Interest
rates
ffr −0.45 −0.24 (∆wti)2 0.21
r3M −0.48 −0.24 (∆ppicomm)2 0.47 0.16
r10Y −0.23 −0.33 (∆ppiind)2 0.43 0.15
∆ffr −0.27 (∆crbreturn)2 0.39 0.18
∆r3M −0.18
Business
activity
ism −0.47
∆r10Y ismprod −0.42
abs(∆ffr) −0.17 pmi −0.53 0.20
abs(∆r3M) −0.13 pmiprod −0.56 0.15
abs(∆r10Y ) 0.37 Consumer
climate
mhs −0.81
Financial
market
risk
vix 0.51 confidence −0.61
ted 0.30 Capacity
utilization
rate
cu −0.67
risk 0.35 −0.20 cuman −0.69
Stock
prices
sp500 cuexIT −0.74
dj
Production
and
employment
∆y −0.81
dj5000 ∆yman −0.82
sp5002 0.24 (∆y)2 0.55 −0.22
dj2 0.21 (∆yman)2 0.59 −0.20
dj50002 0.24 ∆empl −0.77
House
prices
house −0.64 0.18 ∆jobless 0.66 −0.17
∆house −0.17 ∆u 0.79 −0.16
(∆house)2 0.47 0.14 ur 0.55 −0.14
NBER
dates
recession 0.58 ∆ur 0.80 −0.15
Notes: Positive correlations are printed in bold and negative correlations are in lightface.
Correlations that are insignificant at the 5% level do not appear in the Table. A detailed
description of economic variables is given in Table 1.6 in appendix 1.B.
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Figure 1.5: Second Principal Component (PC2)
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Notes: In the right panel, the bold lines show a twelve month moving average of the second
principal component (black line, left axis) and the log of the corporate bond risk premium
(gray line, right axis). The thin lines represent the unfiltered data.
Moreover, PC2 decreases when the corporate bond risk premium (risk) or
the output variability increases. Note that both variables are indicators for
overall economic risk (see, for instance, Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2013).
As contemporaneous correlations neglect dynamic relations, we plot PC2 along
with the corporate risk premium in the right panel of Figure 1.5. For illustration
purposes, we smooth both series by taking a twelve-month centered moving
average. We observe that the risk premium and PC2 move in opposite directions.
The pronounced drop of PC2 around the year 2000 especially coincides with a
distinct increase of overall economic risk. Once the risk premium starts to come
down, PC2 escalates and remains at a high level while economic risk stays low
until 2007. Thus, survey-based and forecast-based disagreement measures tend
to drift apart during economically turbulent times such that the idiosyncratic
part of iqrs and ents decreases while the idiosyncratic part of iqrf and entf
mounts.
For an interpretation of the above findings, we draw attention to the concep-
tual ideas behind these measures. First, note that forecast-based and survey-
based disagreement measures are conceptually similar because both rely on a
number of different forecasts. In particular, we may interpret the multitude
of VAR models as a panel of forecasters where each forecaster uses a different
VAR model. A conceptual discrepancy arises from the fact that the forecast-
based approach provides a purely mechanistic way to deal with heterogeneous
information. As a consequence, forecasts from different VAR models almost in-
evitably diverge when indicators provide heterogeneous signals. By contrast, in
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a survey, the way information is combined into a forecast is to a non-negligible
extent governed by subjective elements. For instance, the choice of a particu-
lar forecast model, the weights attached to different pieces of information, or
judgmental adjustments may influence the forecast reported. If forecasters are
risk-averse, they may choose to stick to the consensus if uncertainty is high,
and forecast dispersion may decline. Thus, an explanation for the divergence of
survey-based disagreement and forecast-based disagreement is that forecasters
may cluster their forecasts around the consensus during turbulent times. This
typically does not happen to the forecast-based measures. Being a mechanistic
approach, forecast-based disagreement, in fact, appears to overstate “true” in-
flation uncertainty. Overall, our results suggest that using only one individual
disagreement measure may be misleading during turbulent times. Note that this
finding is also consistent with the theoretical considerations by Lahiri and Sheng
(2010b), who assume that individual forecast errors are driven by common and
idiosyncratic shocks. Under these assumptions, they show that disagreement is
a reliable proxy for overall uncertainty only during stable periods; i.e., whenever
the shocks common to all forecasters are small.
1.3.4 Comparison to SPF Inflation Uncertainty
Many studies use uncertainty measures based on the SPF (Zarnowitz and Lam-
bros, 1987, Lahiri, Teigland, and Zaporowski, 1988, Batchelor and Dua, 1993,
1996, Giordani and Söderlind, 2003, Chua, Kim, and Suardi, 2011). The reason
is that the SPF provides individual histograms of expected inflation. Due to this
specific survey design, we can derive for each forecaster i the individual standard
deviation σi of the inflation forecast. The average over individual standard de-
viations provides an obvious measure of overall inflation uncertainty (Giordani
and Söderlind, 2003).
Ideally, our uncertainty indicator presented in Section 1.3.2 should incorpo-
rate information from SPF uncertainty as well. However, this is not feasible since
the SPF is conducted quarterly. Furthermore, SPF predictive densities relate to
fixed-event forecasts. Hence, a one-year horizon is polled only in the first quarter
of a year. As the forecast horizon shrinks in the subsequent quarters of the year,
the uncertainty surrounding the respective forecast also declines. Nevertheless,
we compare PC1 to SPF uncertainty but have to restrict our comparison to
yearly observations. Since one-year-ahead SPF forecasts are usually published
at the end of the first quarter, we compare the value of SPF uncertainty with
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the value of PC1 in March of a respective year. To calculate forecaster-specific
uncertainty σi, we follow D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), and Lahiri and Sheng
(2010b) and use a non-parametric procedure. We obtain SPF uncertainty as the
average of individual standard deviations adding a Sheppard correction. Figure
1.6 depicts the resulting time series, which are both normalized to have mean
zero and standard deviation one.
Figure 1.6: Yearly Uncertainty Indicator (PC1) and SPF Uncertainty
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SPF uncertainty moves rather abruptly with a spike in the year 1991 fol-
lowed by a decline and an upward movement in the last decade. In contrast,
PC1 appears to be more persistent whereas the recent hike is more pronounced.
The first-order autocorrelation coefficient amounts to 0.41 for yearly data of
PC1 whereas it is practically zero (0.09) for SPF uncertainty. Nevertheless, our
uncertainty indicator and SPF uncertainty co-move at large, and the correlation
coefficient is 0.45. We also compare SPF uncertainty to the individual measures,
and we obtain a positive correlation for all measures. Moreover, PC1 has a higher
correlation with SPF uncertainty than most of the individual measures.15
Some limitations of such a comparison have to be noted. First, SPF uncer-
tainty refers to the GDP deflator as opposed to CPI inflation since probability
forecasts for the CPI inflation rate are not available before 2007. Moreover, a
number of assumptions have to be made to derive an uncertainty measure from
SPF forecast histograms (see, for instance, D’Amico and Orphanides, 2008, Rich
15 The survey-based measures iqrs and ents are also highly correlated with SPF uncertainty,
which may be explained by the fact that these measures are also derived from a professional
forecasters’ survey. For detailed results and a graphical representation, see Figure 1.9 in
appendix 1.C.
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and Tracy, 2010). Furthermore, changes in the survey design concerning, for ex-
ample, the number and the width of histogram bins may distort the signal.
Overall, SPF uncertainty is very likely subject to idiosyncratic measurement er-
ror – as any other measure – which may explain a temporary divergence of SPF
uncertainty and PC1 (also compare Batchelor and Dua, 1993, 1996).
1.4 The Link between Inflation and Inflation
Uncertainty
The link between inflation and inflation uncertainty has recently gained renewed
relevance with the call for temporary higher inflation rates to mitigate the prob-
lem of debt overhang. From a theoretical point of view, Friedman (1977) ar-
gues that high inflation rates are less predictable than lower rates. Ball (1992)
formalizes the idea stating that inflation uncertainty increases in the event of
higher inflation because the policy response is harder to predict (Friedman-Ball
hypothesis). In contrast, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that the link
is from inflation uncertainty to inflation. In a Barro-Gordon framework, they
claim that, with highly uncertain agents, the central bank has an incentive to
create surprise inflation to lower unemployment.
We use both PC1 and the individual measures to investigate the link between
inflation and inflation uncertainty. If we are able to remove the idiosyncratic
component from the individual measures, PC1 should yield a more precise and
robust estimate of the relation between inflation and inflation uncertainty since
it summarizes the information in the individual measures. To further examine
whether PC1 is a valid measure of uncertainty, we analyze the sign of the relation
between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Note that both theories, Friedman-
Ball and Cukierman-Meltzer, suggest that both variables co-move over time.
Although it is impossible to directly show that PC1 retraces the movements of
the unobserved “true” inflation uncertainty, we should be able to establish a
positive link if PC1 is a valid measure of inflation uncertainty.
First, we test the inflation-inflation uncertainty link by means of a Granger
causality test. To this end, we estimate bivariate VAR models containing infla-
tion and one uncertainty measure. As we deal with monthly data, the lag length
is set to 12. Results of a Granger causality test are presented in Table 1.3. The
p-values reveal a strikingly inconclusive picture. rmses and iqrf seem to be
Granger caused by inflation, yet not vice versa, whereas for iqrs Granger causal-
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ity appears to hold for both directions. For ents, entf , and garch, we find no
dynamic relation to inflation. In the case of rmsef and ucsv, uncertainty is fol-
lowed by inflation. When the same test is conducted for the change of inflation,
we obtain similar results. Overall, it appears that the choice of the measure is
crucial. Thus, using individual measures entails the risk that results are driven
by idiosyncratic movements that are unrelated to inflation uncertainty.
Table 1.3: Granger Causality Test for Inflation Uncertainty and Inflation
PC1 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.58 0.07 0.07 0.91
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.39 0.01 0.31 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.01 0.50 0.03
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.64 0.07 0.01 0.90
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.29 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.02
Notes: Granger causality tests are performed for inflation π as well as the monthly change of
inflation ∆π and inflation uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality test
performed by means of a joint F-Test. The lag length of each VAR model is set to 12. Sample
ranges from 1990M09 to 2009M12.
Using PC1 to measure inflation uncertainty, we find that inflation Granger
causes inflation uncertainty but not vice versa. Although Granger causality
is only a prerequisite for economic causality, such a result is in favor of the
Friedman-Ball hypothesis. The same result is obtained if we consider the change
in inflation.16 Most notably, results in Table 1.3 suggest that PC1 provides an
insurance against idiosyncratic measurement error attached to the individual
measures.
Second, we assess the sign of the effect of an exogenous increase in inflation
on inflation uncertainty. We take a dynamic perspective and calculate impulse
response functions from the bivariate VAR models introduced above. Orthog-
onal shocks are identified using a Cholesky ordering such that uncertainty in-
stantaneously reacts to a shock to inflation.17 This is motivated by the fact
that uncertainty may move quickly when agents encounter new macroeconomic
information whereas inflation is comparatively slow-moving.
The left panel of Figure 1.7 presents the response of the uncertainty indica-
tor PC1 to a one standard deviation shock to inflation. Following an inflation
16 The result is robust to the choice of the lag length of the VAR according to BIC, which
suggests two lags. Furthermore, it is robust if we exclude the recent crisis and end the
sample in 2007:M8, which is roughly when the U.S. subprime crisis started to spill over into
other sectors of the economy.
17 We also checked the reverse ordering of variables, which does not affect the results in a
significant way.
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shock, we observe that uncertainty experiences an initial significant decline for
about two months. In other words, directly after the shock, a forecast for sub-
sequent periods seems to be less uncertain. This may be due to the fact that
– given the sluggishness of inflation – a forecast is relatively easy in the period
directly following the inflation shock. Let us consider an inflation shock that
is the result of a sudden increase in oil prices. Having observed the shock, this
very likely decreases uncertainty associated with future inflation. The reason is
that forecasters may be relatively sure to observe an increase in inflation rates
during the first few months after the shock. In the following periods, inflation
uncertainty displays a hump-shaped pattern. It quickly increases and becomes
significantly positive about five months after the shock occurred. Thus, the more
time that has elapsed since the shock, the more uncertainty is attached to the
future course of inflation. Again, let us consider a sudden increase in oil prices.
In this case, uncertainty accumulates over time because the long-term effects of
such an inflation shock – e.g. via second round effects – are less clear-cut. The
response of uncertainty to a shock to oil price inflation (wti) is depicted in the
right panel of Figure 1.7. The pattern of the impulse response function very
much resembles the response of PC1 to an innovation in inflation. Hence, the
plot confirms the hypothesis that the short-term impact of increasing oil prices
seems to be relatively clear-cut, whereas longer lasting effects on the inflation
rate are uncertain.18
Turning to Figure 1.8, we observe that a shock to core inflation (πcore) also
induces a rise in uncertainty. Here, it takes about four months until uncertainty
increases. In contrast to CPI inflation, a shock to core inflation does not induce
a fall in uncertainty in the first periods. We take this as further evidence that the
initial decrease in uncertainty after a shock to CPI inflation is traceable to the
energy component in CPI. That is, once an energy price shock has materialized,
the short-run impact of this shock on inflation seems to be well known, and
consequently reduces forecast uncertainty. In the long run, however, the rise in
uncertainty is even more pronounced after a shock to CPI inflation than after
a core inflation shock. Notably, following a one-time increase in core inflation,
uncertainty persistently remains on a higher level.
18 See appendix 1.E for results obtained from monetary VARs containing output, inflation,
a short-term interest rate, and uncertainty. Our results remain unaffected when a larger
VAR is employed. Furthermore, the impulse response is qualitatively the same when we
estimate the bivariate VAR on a sample ending in 2007:M8; this result is available upon
request.
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Figure 1.7: Response of Inflation Uncertainty to Inflation and wti
5 10 15 20 25
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PC1 (innovation in π)
 
 
95% CI
90% CI
68% CI
Point Estimate
5 10 15 20 25
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PC1 (innovation in wti)
Notes: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian,
1998).
We document a significant increase of inflation uncertainty following an infla-
tion shock. That is, PC1 co-moves with inflation. We highlight that the increase
is probably due to growing uncertainty about the transmission of a shock. In
addition, increased inflation uncertainty may also be the result of rising uncer-
tainty about the reaction of the central bank. The latter scenario is very much in
the spirit of Friedman (1977), who recognizes that, given rising rates of inflation,
economic agents become more and more uncertain about the timing and pace
at which inflation will return to lower levels again. Overall, PC1 delivers results
consistent with standard theory on the inflation-inflation uncertainty link. Such
a finding provides evidence to support the claim that PC1 is a valid measure. In
contrast, when we repeat the exercise for each individual uncertainty measure,
we find that the response of uncertainty is rather heterogeneous.19 Hence, the
link from inflation to inflation uncertainty is not revealed in a conclusive way if
we rely on a single measure.
Finally, we analyze whether the contribution of inflationary shocks to PC1
is meaningful in an economic sense. To this end, Table 1.4 presents the forecast
error variance decomposition associated with the bivariate VAR models shown
in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. We find that an inflation shock explains roughly 21% of
the forecast error variance of inflation uncertainty after 15 months. With a value
of only 7.7% after 15 months, core inflation (πcore) explains less than headline
inflation suggesting that the energy component in the CPI is a major determi-
nant of inflation uncertainty. Likewise, the contribution of oil price inflation
19 Only two of the responses (iqrs and rmsef ) are similar to the response of PC1. The
individual impulse responses are presented in Figure 1.10 in appendix 1.D.
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Figure 1.8: Response of Inflation Uncertainty to Core Inflation
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Notes: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian,
1998).
(wti) peaks in the longer run at about 22%, which confirms the importance of
oil price movements for uncertainty.
Table 1.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
horizon 1 5 10 15 20 25
π 3.2 6.8 14.0 20.6 15.2 10.7
wti 0.1 2.8 11.8 22.2 21.6 19.8
πcore 0.4 1.5 4.7 7.7 7.4 7.6
Notes: Numbers (as % of total variance) give the part of the variance of inflation uncertainty
explained by a shock to the respective economic variable. The respective values are derived
from bivariate VAR models. Variance decompositions are presented for a horizon of 1, 5, 10,
15, 20, and 25 months.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
After analyzing various measures of inflation uncertainty, we document that in-
flation uncertainty has risen significantly in the aftermath of the recent financial
crisis. This finding, together with the recent calls for higher inflation to miti-
gate the problem of debt overhang, highlights the importance of understanding
the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. However, empirical
results derived from different measures are ambiguous. An explanation is that
each individual measure is derived from different assumptions which are very
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likely not fulfilled completely. Hence, individual measures may be contaminated
by idiosyncratic measurement error.
We use common information in different uncertainty measures to eliminate
the idiosyncratic measurement error. To this end, we calculate survey-based
measures as well as measures derived from time series models, and we propose
a forecast-based approach. We find that all measures – including disagreement
– are driven by a common component, which we interpret as an indicator for
inflation uncertainty. Notably, the indicator helps to overcome the idiosyncratic
measurement error problem, and the underlying signal should be revealed with
greater precision. Moreover, we find that the loadings of the individual measures
on the common component are approximately equal. Therefore, taking a simple
average over the individual measures is a viable alternative which delivers a
robust indicator of inflation uncertainty.
Our indicator does not completely explain the variation in the data. In
general, individual measures tend to differ more during turbulent times. From
the idiosyncratic dynamics not captured by the common component, we infer
that a researcher may be confronted with survey respondents sticking to the
consensus when macroeconomic risk is high, which induces a downward bias in
survey disagreement. In contrast, forecast-based disagreement might overstate
“true” inflation uncertainty. Hence, using only one individual disagreement
measure is a risky strategy.
Subsequently, we use the proposed uncertainty indicator to analyze the in-
flation - inflation uncertainty link. It appears that Granger causality tests are
in favor of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. We also study the dynamic response
of uncertainty to an inflation shock. We document that uncertainty initially
decreases and shows a swift increase in subsequent periods. This behavior is
traceable to the energy component in CPI inflation. A sudden rise in the oil
price, for instance, is followed by an initial decrease in inflation uncertainty. In
the longer run, uncertainty eventually rises because long-term effects of these
oil price increases appear to be harder to predict. Overall, we demonstrate that
higher inflation is followed by higher uncertainty. However, we are aware of the
difficulty of inferring causality by empirical testing only. In future research, it
would certainly be fruitful to increase the effort to integrate inflation uncertainty
into a structural macroeconomic model in order to establish a causal economic
relationship.
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Appendix
1.A Dataset to Estimate Forecast-Based
Measures
Table 1.5: Variables Used to Forecast Inflation
Variable Transformation
Average hourly earnings (nonfarm payroll) change of growth rate
Building permits for new private housing units growth rate
Capacity utilization (manufacturing) growth rate
Crude oil index change of growth rate
Employment (non-agricultural industries) gap measure
Federal funds effective rate growth rate
Interest rate spread –
M3 change of growth rate
New orders (manufacturing) growth rate
Nominal narrow effective exchange rate growth rate
OECD composite leading indicators growth rate
Personal income growth rate
Retail sales growth rate
Total production gap measure
Unemployment rate gap measure
Notes: “gap measure” denotes series that have been detrended with the HP-filter; “interest
rate spread” is defined as the difference between interest rate on government bonds and federal
funds rate.
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1.B Description of Variables
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1.C Comparison of Individual Uncertainty
Measures to SPF Inflation Uncertainty
Figure 1.9: Yearly Individual Uncertainty Measures and SPF Uncertainty
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Notes: Correlation coefficients of the yearly individual uncertainty measures and SPF
uncertainty are, respectively, 0.48 (iqrs), 0.50 (ents), 0.27 (rmses), 0.29 (iqrf ), 0.39 (entf ),
0.22 (rmsef ), 0.36 (garch), and 0.33 (ucsv).
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1.D Impulse Responses of Individual
Uncertainty Measures
Figure 1.10: Impulse Responses of Individual Uncertainty Measures
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Notes: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure
(Kilian, 1998).
1.E Alternative VAR Specifications
In the following, we analyze whether the response of uncertainty to an inflation
shock is robust to alternative VAR specifications. To this end, we specify a
larger VAR model which is standard for monetary policy analysis. It includes
monthly data on industrial production, consumer prices, the federal funds rate,
and inflation uncertainty. Note that inflation uncertainty is ordered last. We
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consider two alternatives. First, all variables except the interest rate enter in log-
levels. Second, we include production growth and inflation instead of production
and the price level. The resulting impulse response functions are presented
in Figure 1.11. Our results remain unaffected by the inclusion of additional
variables.
Figure 1.11: Response of Inflation Uncertainty to a CPI Shock (left) and to
an Inflation Shock (right) in a 4-Variable VAR
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Notes: Confidence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian,
1998).
CHAPTER 2
Time-Varying Business Volatility, Price Setting, and the
Real Effects of Monetary Policy
Does time-varying business volatility affect the price setting of firms and thus the
transmission of monetary policy into the real economy? To address this question,
we estimate from the firm-level micro data of the German IFO Business Climate
Survey the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on the price setting behavior of
firms. In a second step, we use a calibrated New Keynesian business cycle model
to gauge the effects of time-varying volatility on the transmission of monetary
policy to output. Heightened business volatility increases the probability of a
price change, though the effect is small: the tripling of volatility during the
recession of 08/09 caused the average quarterly likelihood of a price change to
increase from 31.6% to 32.3%. Second, the effects of this increase in volatility
on monetary policy are also small; the initial effect of a 25 basis point monetary
policy shock to output declines from 0.347% to 0.341%.
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2.1 Introduction
Does time-varying business volatility affect the price setting of firms and thus
the real effects of monetary policy? A fundamental result of New Keynesian
macroeconomics is that, due to price stickiness, changes in monetary policy
affect real variables in the short run. If heightened volatility or uncertainty were
to change the degree of price rigidity, this would directly influence monetary
policy transmission. This channel is potentially important as price flexibility
seems to be countercyclical in the data. This is shown by Vavra (2014) for
U.S. consumer price data, and we confirm this finding with producer price data
from the West German manufacturing sector. This means that prices seem to
become more flexible and, possibly, monetary policy less effective in times when
monetary stabilization is perhaps most needed.
Against this backdrop the contribution of this paper is threefold. We con-
struct firm-specific expectation errors from the micro data of the West German
manufacturing part of the IFO survey and use their absolute values as well as
rolling-window standard deviations as proxies for idiosyncratic business volatil-
ity. Second, we demonstrate that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility is a statisti-
cally significant, albeit economically somewhat modest determinant in the price
setting behavior of firms. Third, we show in a New Keynesian dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that monetary policy has smaller real
effects in highly volatile times. We also show that this effect on monetary policy
transmission is quantitatively small.
The impact of volatility and uncertainty on the macroeconomy and macroe-
conomic policy-making, in particular monetary policy, is a question of long-
standing interest. An early debate started with the seminal contribution by
Brainard (1967) that investigates how model (or parameter) uncertainty should
influence monetary policy. While the so-called Brainard Principle prescribes cau-
tion in policy making when encountering uncertainty (see also Zakovic, Wieland,
and Rustem, 2007, for a more recent contribution), other authors using min-
max analysis (e.g., Sargent, 1999) find that increases in economic uncertainty
should lead to more aggressive responses by the policymaker. Another strand
of the literature has investigated the consequences of another type of volatil-
ity/uncertainty, namely, heteroskedasticity in the shock processes affecting the
macroeconomy. An early contribution here is Bernanke (1983). More recently,
since the beginning of the financial crisis in the U.S., there has been a renewed
interest in the consequences of volatility/uncertainty for economic activity start-
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ing with Bloom (2009). This growing literature, to which this paper broadly be-
longs, mostly deals with the interaction of uncertainty and investment decisions
of firms, where the propagation mechanisms discussed are physical adjustment
frictions (e.g., Bloom, 2009, Bachmann and Bayer, 2013, 2014, Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012), financial frictions (e.g., Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014, Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek, 2014, Arellano,
Bai, and Kehoe, 2012), or agency problems within production units (e.g., Narita,
2011, Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012). Another part of this literature studies
the macroeconomic effects of interest rate volatility (e.g., Fernández-Villaverde,
Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramı́rez, and Uribe, 2011) and fiscal policy volatility
(e.g., Born and Pfeifer, 2014, Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester,
and Rubio-Ramı́rez, 2012, Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2013).
The consequences of heightened volatility for the price-setting decisions of
firms and thus, by extension, for monetary policy, however, have remained
largely unexplored. In a recent contribution, Vavra (2014) matches an Ss price-
setting model to CPI micro data and shows that idiosyncratic volatility affects
the level of price rigidity and, through it, leads to time-varying effects of mone-
tary policy.20 Theoretically, heightened business volatility can have two effects.
First, to the extend that volatility also constitutes uncertainty for firms and
adjusting prices is subject to some degree of irreversibility, firms may want to
“wait and see”, refrain from adjusting their prices and, thus, prices become
endogenously more sticky. Second, higher volatility makes price adjustment of
firms more likely as firms on average are hit by larger shocks. Hence, the sign of
the relationship between firm-level volatility and likelihood of price adjustment
is an empirical question which has thus far not been studied in the literature.
This paper fills this gap. Vavra (2014), in the context of a calibrated Ss price-
setting model, analyzes the importance of both effects and shows that in his
calibration the volatility effect dominates. Heightened volatility would therefore
trigger an increase in the frequency of price adjustment and would make mon-
etary policy less effective. In a related paper, Baley and Blanco (2013) build a
pricing model with endogenous uncertainty generated by an information friction
at the firm level and learning. Specifically, firms have imperfect information
about their nominal costs which they have to forecast. The authors show that
an increase in uncertainty makes firms learn more, makes them more responsive
20 The focus on idiosyncratic (i.e., firm-specific) rather than aggregate volatility is justified
as Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009), Golosov and Lucas (2007) as well as Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008) show that idiosyncratic shocks are the most important factor in explaining
price dynamics at the micro-level.
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to new (noisy) information and, hence, leads them to adjust their prices more
frequently.21
The novel contribution of this paper is to compute measures of firm-specific
volatility and to estimate and quantify directly the impact of heightened firm-
level volatility on the firms’ price setting behavior. These business volatility
measures are constructed from the confidential micro data in the IFO Business
Climate Survey (IFO-BCS). Survey micro data are well-suited for our research
question as they are based on statements from actual decision-makers at the
firms as opposed to, for example, outside analysts. This means that our measures
of business volatility will also capture uncertainty at the firm level and thus allow
the “wait-and-see” effect caused by uncertainty to shine through. Survey data
are also less likely to suffer from strategic behavior, such as, e.g., public earnings
announcements, as they are highly confidential and can only be accessed under
strict non-disclosure agreements. The unique feature of the German IFO-BCS
is that it allows us to construct firm-specific volatility measures and that it
contains information on the price setting behavior of the same firms. It also
allows us to use a rich set of firm-level covariates to help us isolate the effect of
volatility on firms’ price setting.
We use two strategies to construct the firm-specific volatility measures. The
first one follows Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) and Bachmann and Elst-
ner (2013). Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) construct expectation errors
at the firm level, based on qualitative survey questions. We use the absolute
value of these expectation errors as one of our measures for instantaneous id-
iosyncratic volatility. The advantage of this qualitative measure is that it can be
constructed for a relatively large sample of firms. However, they only allow us to
evaluate the sign of the relationship between volatility and price setting at the
firm-level. Therefore, we compute for a subset of firms a quantitative volatility
measure in line with Bachmann and Elstner (2013) from firm statements about
capacity utilization. With this quantitative volatility measure we then assess the
magnitude of the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on the price setting behavior of
firms and use this elasticity as an input into a fully calibrated structural model.
The second strategy is based on the same qualitative and quantitative expec-
tation errors but, instead of the absolute expectation error, uses a firm-specific
rolling window standard deviation as in Comin and Mulani (2006) and Davis,
Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2006). We show that volatility measures
21 This result is also in line with the “rational inattention”-literature (see, e.g., Mackowiak
and Wiederholt, 2009, forthcoming), which finds that more volatile environments lead to
more frequent updating of prices.
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based on either procedure are highly correlated and that our substantive results
are robust across these different specifications.
In order to assess to what extent heightened firm-level volatility affects the
frequency of price adjustment, we estimate a probit model on a panel of (on
average) 2,500 German firms from January 1980 to December 2011. Our results
confirm that heightened volatility increases the frequency of price changes. For
example, the tripling of volatility during the recession of 08/09 – an increase
of about 6 standard deviations – caused the average quarterly likelihood of a
price change to increase from 31.6% to 32.3%. This means that we confirm the
theoretical predictions from Vavra (2014), Baley and Blanco (2013), and the
rational inattention literature directly in the data.
After having established the link between price setting and idiosyncratic
volatility in our survey data, we use an off-the-shelve New Keynesian DSGE
model (see, e.g., Gaĺı, 2008), where price setting is constrained à la Calvo (1983),
to flesh out the impact of heightened volatility on the effectiveness of monetary
policy. Using the uncovered empirical relationship between an increase in firm-
specific volatility and the probability of a price change, we then capture a change
in firm-specific volatility through a change in the Calvo parameter.
Our results show that, even though idiosyncratic volatility was at the trough
of the 08/09-recession roughly three times higher than on average before, the
resulting effect on the frequency of price adjustment is small. During this time,
a monetary stimulus of a 25 basis point cut in the nominal interest rate, would
have lost about 1.6 percent of its effect on real output, with the impact effect
decreasing from 0.347% to 0.341%. However, while heightened business volatility
in isolation would not have led to a large increase in price flexibility in the
08/09-recession, we observe an overall increase in the average share of firms
adjusting their price by about 7 percentage points in the same time period.
Such a sizable increase in price flexibility would have translated into a decline
in the output impact effect of a 25 basis point monetary policy shock from
0.346% to 0.289%, a decrease of almost 17 percent. Hence, while changes in
price flexibility over the business cycle are potentially an important issue for
the conduct of monetary policy, we find little evidence that they are driven by
changes in firm-level volatility.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section de-
scribes the IFO-BCS and the construction of the business volatility measures
from it. In Section 3 we introduce the microeconometric framework and present
the effects of changes in volatility on the price setting of firms. Section 4 outlines
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the New Keynesian DSGE model and discusses the baseline results. We provide
robustness checks in Section 5. The last section concludes.
2.2 Measuring Idiosyncratic Volatility
In this section we describe the construction of idiosyncratic volatility measures
from IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) data.
2.2.1 IFO Business Climate Survey
Table 2.1: Questionnaire
No. Label Question Response categories
Monthly Questions
Q1 Production Our domestic production activity with
respect to product XY have . . .
increased roughly stayed
the same
decreased
Q2 E(Production) Expectations for the next 3 months: Our
domestic production activity with
respect to product XY will probably . . .
increase remain virtually
the same
decrease
Q3 Price Our net domestic sales prices for XY
have . . .
increased remained about
the same
gone down
Q4 E(Price) Expectations for the next 3 months: Our
net domestic sales prices for XY will . . .
increase remain about
the same
decrease
Q5 Business
Situation
We evaluate our business situation with
respect to XY as . . .
good satisfactory unsatisfactory
Q6 Business
Expectations
Expectations for the next 6 months: Our
business situation with respect to XY
will in a cyclical view . . .
improve remain about
the same
develop
unfavourably
Q7 Orders Our orders with respect to product XY
have . . .
increased roughly stayed
the same
decreased
Quarterly and Supplementary Questions
Q8 Capacity
Utilization
The utilization of our production
equipment for producing XY currently
amounts to . . . %.
30% ,40%,. . . ,70%,75%,. . . ,100%, more than 100%
Q9 Technical
Capacity
We evaluate our technical production
capacity with reference to the backlog of
orders on books and to orders expected
in the next twelve months as . . .
more than
sufficient
sufficient less than
sufficient
Q10 Employment
Expectations
Expectations for the next 3 months:
Employment related to the production of
XY in domestic production unit(s) will
probably . . .
increase roughly stay
the same
decrease
Notes: This table provides the translated questions and response possibilities of the IFO-BCS
for manufacturing. For the production questions Q1 and Q2 firms are explicitely asked to
ignore differences in the length of months or seasonal fluctuations. For Q8 customary full
utilization is defined by 100%.
The IFO Business Climate index is a much-followed leading indicator for
economic activity in Germany. It is based on a firm survey which has been
conducted since 1949 (see Becker and Wohlrabe, 2008, for details). Since then
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the survey design of the IFO Business Climate index has been adopted by other
surveys such as the Confederation of British Industry for the UK manufacturing
sector or the Tankan survey for Japanese firms. Due to longitudinal consistency
problems in other sectors and the unavailability of micro data in a processable
form before 1980 we limit our analysis to the manufacturing sector from 1980
until 2011. Our analysis excludes East German firms.
An attractive feature of the IFO-BCS is the relatively high number of par-
ticipants. The average number of respondents at the beginning of our sample is
approximately 5,000; towards the end, the number is about half that at 2,300.22
Participation in the survey is voluntary and there is some fraction of firms that
are only one-time participants. However, conditional on staying two months in
the survey, most firms continue to participate each month. In terms of firm size,
about 9.4% of firms in our sample have less than 20 employees, roughly 32.0%
have more than 20 but less than 100 employees, 47.3% employed between 100
and 1000 people, and 11.3% have a workforce of more than 1000.
The IFO-BCS, in its core, is a monthly qualitative business survey where
firms provide answers that fall into three qualitative categories: Increase, De-
crease, and a neutral category. The monthly part of the survey is supplemented
on a quarterly basis with some quantitative questions, e.g., with respect to firms’
capacity utilization. In our analysis we make use of a wide range of explanatory
variables that might be relevant to the pricing decision of a firm. Table 2.1
summarizes these questions.
2.2.2 Construction of Qualitative Volatilty Measures
The construction of ex-post forecast errors combines past responses of the pro-
duction expectation question (Q2) with current responses of realized production
changes vis-à-vis last month (Q1). We follow Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims
(2013). To fix ideas, imagine that the production expectation question in the
IFO-BCS, Q2, was asked only for the next month instead of the following three
months. In this case, when comparing the expectation in month τ − 1 with the
realization in month τ , nine possibilities arise:23 the company could have pre-
dicted an increase in production and realized one, in which case we would count
this as zero forecast error. It could have realized a no change, in which case, we
22 The IFO-BCS is technically at the product level, so the number of participants does not
exactly conform to the number of firms, though we will use that terminology throughout
the paper.
23 In this section, the time index refers to a month and is denoted by τ .
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would quantify the expectation error as −1 and, finally, it could have realized
a decrease, which counts as −2. Table 2.2 summarizes the possible expectation
errors.
Table 2.2: Possible Expectation Errors (One-Month Case)
Realization in τ
Expectation in τ − 1 Increase Unchanged Decrease
Increase 0 -1 -2
Unchanged +1 0 -1
Decrease +2 +1 0
Notes: Rows refer to past production change expectations. Columns refer to current produc-
tion change realizations.
In actuality, the production expectation question in the IFO-BCS is for three
months ahead. Suppose that a firm stated in month τ − 3 that its production
will increase in the next three months. Suppose further that in the next three
months one observes the following sequence of outcomes: production increased
between τ − 3 and τ − 2, remained unchanged between τ − 2 and τ − 1, and
production decreased between τ − 1 and τ . Due to the qualitative nature of
the IFO-BCS we have to make assumptions about the cumulative production
change over three months. As a baseline we adopt the following steps. First,
we define for each month τ a firm-specific activity variable as the sum of the
Increase instances minus the sum of the Decrease instances between τ − 3 and
τ from Q1. Denote this variable by REALIZi,τ . It can obviously range from
[−3, 3]. The expectation errors are then computed as described in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Possible Expectation Errors (Three-Month Case)
Expectation in τ − 3 REALIZi,τ FEquali,τ
Increase > 0 0
Increase ≤ 0 (REALIZi,τ − 1)
Unchanged > 0 REALIZi,τ
Unchanged = 0 0
Unchanged < 0 REALIZi,τ
Decrease < 0 0
Decrease ≥ 0 (REALIZi,τ + 1)
Notes: Rows refer to production expectations in the IFO-BCS (Q2) in month τ − 3.
Notice that the procedure in Table 2.3 is analogous to the one month case.
Our final expectation error FEquali,τ ranges from [−4, 4], where for instance −4
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indicates a strongly negative forecast error: the company expected production
to increase over the next three months, yet every single subsequent month pro-
duction actually declined. In our study we use the absolute value of FEquali,τ+3
as a measure of idiosyncratic volatility in period τ of firm i.24 We denote this
variable by ABSFEquali,τ :
ABSFEquali,τ =
∣∣∣FEquali,τ+3∣∣∣ . (2.1)
The timing assumption here means that firms realizing large expectation errors
in period τ + 3 face high uncertainty in period τ , i.e., the timing assumption
allows the “wait-and-see” effect of high volatility to shine through.
We also compute a measure of firm-level volatility based on Comin and Mu-
lani (2006) as well as Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2006). Using a
firm i’s expectation errors we can define a symmetric 3-quarter rolling window
standard deviation as
STDFEquali,τ =
1
3
√∑
k
(
FEquali,τ+3+k − FE
qual
i,τ+3
)2
(2.2)
where FE
qual
i,τ+3 is the average of FE
qual
i,τ+3+k for k = {−3, 0, 3}.
2.2.3 Construction of Quantitative Volatility Measures
Bachmann and Elstner (2013) argue that the supplementary question about
capacity utilization (Q8) allows – under certain assumptions – the construction
of quantitative production expectations. To illustrate this we start from the
following production relationship of an individual firm i:
yacti,τ = ui,τy
pot
i,τ (2.3)
24 The use of the absolute forecast error as a volatility proxy is motivated by the stochas-
tic volatility model (see, e.g., Shephard, 2008, Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana,
and Rubio-Ramı́rez, 2010, Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramı́rez, and
Uribe, 2011). In this model, the time-varying log standard deviations evolve according to
σt = (1− ρ) σ̄ + ρσt−1 + ηεt, where εt is an iid volatility innovation, often distributed as
standard normal. The forecast error is then given by eσtνt, where the level shock νt is
independent of εt. The higher the relative importance of volatility shocks εt compared to
level shocks νt, the closer are volatility and absolute forecast error linked. In the extreme
case of νt only having realizations −1 or +1, eσt and |eσtνt| coincide.
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where yacti,τ denotes the firm’s actual output, y
pot
i,τ its potential output level, and
ui,τ the level of capacity utilization. Only ui,τ is directly observable in the IFO-
BCS. Taking the natural logarithm and the three-month difference, we get25
∆ log yacti,τ = ∆ log ui,τ + ∆ log y
pot
i,τ . (2.4)
Under the assumption that potential output remains constant, i.e., ∆ log ypoti,τ =
0, percentage changes in actual output can be recovered from percentage changes
in capacity utilization.26 To implement this idea we restrict the analysis to firms
for which we can reasonably expect that they did not change their production
capacity in the preceding quarter, making use of the questions concerning ex-
pected technical production capacity (Q9) and employment expectations (Q10).
The existence of non-convex or kinked adjustment costs for capital and labor
adjustment as well as time to build (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, as well
as Doms and Dunne, 1998) make this a reasonable assumption. To be conser-
vative we require a firm to satisfy both criteria in τ − 3 for us to assume that
its production capacity has not changed between τ − 3 and τ . In this case, we
use the quarterly percentage change in capacity utilization in τ as a proxy for
the quarterly percentage change in production in τ .
If the production capacity can be assumed not to have changed in the pre-
ceding quarter, and if, in addition, no change in production was expected three
months prior, a change in capacity utilization, ∆ log ui,τ , is also a production
expectation error of firm i in month τ . We thus consider only firms which state
in period τ−3 that their production level (Q2), employment level, and technical
production capacity will remain the same in the next three months.27 We then
25 Time intervals are again months. For us to construct an expectation error in τ , we need an
observation for capacity utilization in τ and τ − 3.
26 It should be clear that the volatility proxies that we can derive from this procedure refer
to any shock process that affects production, but leaves the potential output of a firm
unchanged.
27 We also clean our sample from firm-quarter observations with extreme capacity utilization
statements, i.e., those that exceed 150%, and from firm-quarter observations with “incon-
sistent” production change statements. To determine the latter we consider the realized
production question (Q1) concerning actual production changes in the months τ , τ−1, τ−2.
We drop all observations as inconsistent in which firms report a strictly positive (negative)
change in ∆ log ui,τ and no positive (negative) change in Q1 in the last 3 months. For firms
that report ∆ log ui,τ = 0, we proceed as follows: Unless firms in Q1 either answer three
times in a row that production did not change, or they have at least one “Increase” and
one “Decrease” in their three answers, we drop them as inconsistent. In our sample we
have 389, 546 firm level observations for ui,τ . The number of outliers is quite small and
corresponds to 242 observations. With the remaining observations we are able to compute
349, 531 changes in capacity utilization, ∆ log ui,τ . For 181, 158 observations we can assume
that their ypoti,τ has not changed during the last three months, due to Q9 and Q10. In the
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compute ∆ log ui,τ three months later in τ . The resulting measure ∆ log ui,τ
constitutes our definition of a quantitative production expectation error, which
we denote by FEquani,τ .
28
We then take the absolute value of FEquani,τ+3:
ABSFEquani,τ =
∣∣FEquani,τ+3∣∣ (2.5)
where ABSFEquani,τ denotes our quantitative idiosyncratic volatility measure of
firm i in period τ . Note that we can compute quantitative volatility measures
only for firm level observations with constant production expectations as the
question concerning production expectations (Q2) is qualitative. The quantita-
tive nature of this measure allows us to give a quantitative interpretation of the
relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and the price setting of firms that
we can use for our quantitative theory work.
We also compute a 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation denoted by
STDFEquani,τ . Note, however, that for STDFE
quan
i,τ the number of observations
drops by 75% compared to the sample size for ABSFEquani,τ , because we need to
observe a firm’s quantitative expectation error three times in a row.
2.2.4 Discussion of Volatility Measures
How do our measures of idiosyncratic volatility/uncertainty relate to each other
and to other such measures in the literature, e.g., from Bachmann, Elstner,
and Sims (2013). The upper panel of Figure 2.1 plots the cross-sectional mean
of ABSFEquali,τ , i.e., MEANABSFE
qual
τ , together with the cross-sectional dis-
persion of expectation errors (see Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2013) defined
as
FEDISP qualτ = std
(
FEquali,τ+3
)
. (2.6)
For comparison with the volatility measures based on the quantitative forecast
errors, we only plot the last month of each quarter for the volatility measures
based on the qualitative (three-months-ahead) forecast errors, which we have at
end, we classify 71, 437 observations as “inconsistent” and drop them. Our final sample
consists of 109, 721 observations for ∆yacti,τ .
28 Firms are asked about their capacity utilization in March, June, September, and December,
allowing us to compute quantitative forecast errors between March and June, June and
September etc. For the qualitative forecast errors, we could, in principle, compute a three-
month-ahead forecast error every month. In the baseline regression analysis, however, we
only consider forecast errors based on qualitative production expectations in those same
months. As robustness checks, we also run regressions using the (larger) monthly qualitative
sample.
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Figure 2.1: Measures of Idiosyncratic Volatility
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Notes: The upper panel shows the quarterly time-series of the average absolute ex-post
forecast errors, MEANABSFEqualτ and of the standard deviation of ex-post forecast er-
rors FEDISP qualτ . The middle panel depicts the quarterly time series of the average absolute
ex-post forecast errors, MEANABSFEqualτ and of the average 3-quarter rolling window stan-
dard deviation MEANSTDFEqualτ . The lower panel plots the quarterly values of the average
absolute ex-post qualitative forecast errors, MEANABSFEqualτ and the average absolute ex-
post quantitative forecast errors, MEANABSFEquanτ . Monthly series are transformed to the
quarterly frequency by selecting the last month of each quarter. The sample period is I/1980 -
IV/2011. Each series has been demeaned and standardized by its standard deviation. All time
series are seasonally adjusted. Shaded regions show recessions as dated by the Economic Cy-
cle Research Institute (ECRI, www.businesscycle.com): I/1980 - IV/1982, I/1991 - II/1994,
I/2001 - III/2003 and II/2008 - I/2009.
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the monthly frequency. The upper panel of Figure 2.1 shows that both time
series display similar properties - they rise in the wake of the fall of the Berlin
Wall – a clear turning point in the evolution of volatility following the calm
1980s, again around 2001, and at the start of the global financial crisis, where
they remain elevated with the onset of the European debt crisis. All in all, we
see a close link between both idiosyncratic volatility measures. The visual evi-
dence is supported by the high time-series correlation coefficient of 0.94 between
FEDISP qualτ and MEANABSFE
qual
τ .
The middle panel of Figure 2.1 shows the cross-sectional mean of
STDFEquali,τ , i.e., MEANSTDFE
qual
τ , together with MEANABSFE
qual
τ . Both
time series comove closely with a high positive time-series correlation coef-
ficient of 0.89. This relationship also holds at the firm level: here we find
a Spearman correlation coefficient between ABSFEquali,τ and STDFE
qual
i,τ of
0.52.29 The strong comovement between FEDISP qualτ , MEANABSFE
qual
τ ,
and MEANSTDFEqualτ shows that at least in an average sense large absolute
forecast errors at the firm-level are not simply the result of mere wrongness of
individual firms about their forecasts, but rather the result of heteroskedasticity,
i.e., of time-varying distributions.
The link between the qualitative and the quantitative absolute expec-
tation error is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 2.1 where we plot
the cross-sectional mean of ABSFEquani,τ (MEANABSFE
quan
τ ) together with
MEANABSFEqualτ . Both measures of idiosyncratic volatility move reasonably
close to each other. The unconditional time-series correlation coefficient be-
tween MEANABSFEquanτ and MEANABSFE
qual
τ is 0.62. At the firm level
we find a pooled Spearman correlation coefficient between ABSFEquali,τ and
ABSFEquani,τ of 0.65. MEANABSFE
qual
τ and MEANABSFE
quan
τ are also
positively correlated with FEDISP qualτ . Furthermore, all measures are coun-
tercyclical: their pairwise time-series unconditional correlation coefficients with
quarter-to-quarter growth rates of production, total hours worked and employ-
ment in the West German manufacturing sector are negative (see Table 2.4).
Further evidence for the appropriateness of our measures comes from disag-
gregating the time series and analyzing the time-series correlation coefficients for
13 manufacturing industries and 5 firm-size classes separately. The results are
summarized in Table 2.14 in Appendix 2.A. Columns 2 and 3 report correlations
for MEANABSFEqualτ and FEDISP
qual
τ . All industrial sectors and firm-size
29 For the quantitative expectation errors we find a Pearson correlation coefficient between
ABSFEquani,τ and STDFE
quan
i,τ of 0.75.
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Table 2.4: Cross-Correlations
FEDISP qual ABSFEqual STDFEqual ABSFEquan STDFEquan
∆ logProduction -0.21 -0.26 -0.35 -0.44 -0.25
∆ logHours -0.24 -0.30 -0.37 -0.25 -0.23
∆ logEmployment -0.41 -0.44 -0.47 -0.26 -0.25
FEDISP qual 1.00 0.94 0.83 0.55 0.16
ABSFEqual 1.00 0.89 0.62 0.36
STDFEqual 1.00 0.69 0.52
ABSFEquan 1.00 0.53
STDFEquan 1.00
Notes: This table shows the pairwise unconditional time-series correlation coefficients of var-
ious activity variables in West German manufacturing together with different measures of
idiosyncratic volatility. For notational brevity, we shortened MEANABSFE
qual/quan
τ and
MEANSTDFE
qual/quan
τ to ABSFEqual/quan and STDFEqual/quan, respectively. Volatil-
ity measures based on the qualitative forecast errors, which are in principle available at the
monthly frequency, are transformed to the quarterly frequency by selecting the last month
of each quarter, even for those correlations that only involve qualitative volatility measures.
The activity variables are quarter-on-quarter growth of production (∆ logProduction), total
hours worked (∆ logHours) and employment (∆ logEmployment). The data sources are the
Federal Statistical Office and Eurostat. All variables are seasonally adjusted. The sample
period is I/1980 - IV/2011.
classes feature correlation coefficients that are around 0.9 or higher. The last
two columns compare MEANABSFEqualτ and MEANSTDFE
qual
τ . Here, the
strong relationship decreases somewhat at the disaggregate level, however, most
correlations are still in the range of 0.6 and 0.8.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we analyze the (conditional) effects of heightened idiosyncratic
volatility on the average frequency of price adjustment. We first explain the
construction of the other regression inputs and specify the empirical model. We
then present the results.
2.3.1 Construction of Price Variables
Although the IFO-BCS includes price statements at the monthly frequency,
other variables used in this approach such as capacity utilization are only avail-
able on a quarterly basis. We therefore estimate a quarterly model as the base-
line. Thus, we need to transform the monthly price statements to a quarterly
frequency. The quarterly price variable is based on question Q3 from Table 2.1.
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Table 2.5: Business Cycle Properties of Frequency of Price Changes
Dependent variable: Share of price change
PPI CPI
Non-Recession Mean 0.3128*** 0.4366***
(0.0054) (0.0091)
Recession Dummy 0.0271*** 0.0459***
(0.0096) (0.0158)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.3215 0.4517
Observations 128 88
Adj. R-squared 0.052 0.078
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Each column presents the results of a regression of the quarterly share of price changes
on a constant and a recession dummy (with standard errors in parentheses). All data is
seasonally adjusted using quarterly dummies. The PPI sample is based on the survey of West-
German manufacturing firms and spans the period 1980Q1-2011Q4 while the CPI sample is
based on a survey of West-German retail firms and is available for the period 1990Q1-2011Q4.
Recessions are as dated by ECRI (see notes to Figure 2.1).
Price changei,t takes the value one if firm i states at date t that it changed its
price in at least one of the previous three months, and zero otherwise.30
The PPI column of Table 2.5 provides evidence for the countercyclicality of
the frequency of price changes. Here, we regress the seasonally adjusted share
of price changes in a given quarter on a constant and a recession dummy. On
average, the frequency of price changes is somewhat higher in recessions (33.99%)
than in normal times (31.28%).
We analyze qualitative price statements of manufacturing firms that are con-
ceptually close to the producer price index (PPI). While the IFO-BCS has data
concerning retail firms that would be closer to consumer prices, the micro data
do not allow us to compute volatility proxies that are comparable to those of
the manufacturing part of the survey. Nonetheless, it is instructive to compare
the business cycle properties of the price setting in the two sectors. Due to data
availability in the retail part of the survey, our sample only starts in 1990. Retail
firms feature a higher probability to reset their prices: on average 45 percent
of all retail firms adjust their prices each quarter compared to 32 percent in
manufacturing. The frequency of price adjustment of the retail sector increases
in recessions by 4.6 percentage points on average.31
30 From now on, time is measured in quarters and denoted by t.
31 We report these numbers as a bridge to the results in Vavra (2014) and Berger and Vavra
(2011). At the monthly frequency, we find for our data that during recessions the frequency
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2.3.2 A First Look at the Link between Price-setting
Frequency and Business Volatility
Before proceeding with our baseline empirical model, we find it useful to have
a first look at the relationship between a firm’s price-setting behavior and the
idiosyncratic volatility it faces. To this end, we compute for each firm the
average frequency of price changes and the average idiosyncratic volatility mea-
sured by our volatility proxies. For each of our volatility proxies, we then run
a least-squares regression of average frequency of price changes on the average
idiosyncratic volatility, where we also include sector-specific dummies. The re-
sults presented in Table 2.6 show (with one exception) a significant positive
relationship between a firm’s average frequency of price change and its average
idiosyncratic volatility. In the remainder of this section we investigate whether
this positive link is simply the result of averaging or is likely to reflect an un-
derlying relationship of firm-level decision making.
2.3.3 Specification of the Empirical Model
We use a quarterly probit model32 to estimate the probability of observing a
price change, i.e.,
P (yi,t = 1 |xi,t ) = Φ(xi,tb) , (2.7)
where yi,t is the dependent variable, the vector xi,t includes all explanatory
variables, b is the coefficient vector, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution.33
Table 2.7 lists the variables used in the estimation procedure. At the heart of
the empirical analysis are the volatility measures described in detail in Section
2.2. We use two qualitative volatility measures (ABSFEqual and STDFEqual)
and two quantitative ones (ABSFEquan and STDFEquan).34 Taylor dummies
of price adjustment is 1.6 percentage points higher. This is in line with the findings of Vavra
(2014) who finds that during recessions the frequency of price adjustment is 1.2 percentage
points higher for U.S. monthly CPI data (see also Berger and Vavra, 2011). He also reports
an average monthly price change frequency of 15.0% which corresponds well to our monthly
average of 17.6%.
32 We also estimated logit and panel-fixed-effects logit models with essentially the same results.
33 As asymmetries might be important in firms’ price setting, we also estimate two specifica-
tions which separately model the probability of a price increase and a price decrease. We
find that heightened volatility leads to a rise in price dispersion, i.e., it increases both the
probability of an increase and that of a decrease. Detailed results are presented in Appendix
2.C.
34 Recall that for the construction of volatility measures based on quantitative expectation er-
rors we had to restrict our sample to firms with constant production expectations. However,
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Table 2.6: Average Price-Change Frequency and Average Volatility
Dependent variable: Average frequency of price change of a firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ABSFEquali 0.060***
(0.006)
ABSFEquani 0.127***
(0.026)
STDFEquali 0.096***
(0.008)
STDFEquani 0.067
(0.046)
Observations 8,897 6,894 7,822 3,251
R2 0.062 0.085 0.084 0.121
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table reports OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Included in the
OLS model but not shown in the table are sector-specific dummies. Each column represents a
separate regression employing one of our volatility proxies. Averages are taken for each firm
over time. ABSFEquali : average qualitative idiosyncratic volatility; ABSFE
quan
i : average
quantitative idiosyncratic volatility; STDFEquali : average 3-quarter rolling window standard
deviation of a firm’s qualitative expectation errors; STDFEquani : average 3-quarter rolling
window standard deviation of a firm’s quantitative expectation errors.
(Taylor1− Taylor8) account for the fact that some firms adjust their prices at
fixed time intervals. For example, Taylor2 takes a value of one if the last time
a firm adjusted its price was two quarters ago. We also add time dummies for
each quarter (Time-fixed effects) to capture aggregate shocks which influence
all firms’ prices in the same way, to control for aggregate variables that might
influence prices and volatility at the same time, and to account for seasonal
patterns in the price-setting behavior of firms.
One of the advantages of the IFO-BCS is that it includes many firm-specific
variables that allow us to control for first-moment effects. Capacity Utilization
and Business Situation comprise information on the current state of a specific
firm. To control for confidence and news aspects (see, e.g., Barsky and Sims,
2012) we include the forward-looking variables Business Expectation, Technical
this does not seem to be very restrictive as the correlation of the frequency of price changes
between the entire sample and the one based on qualitative expectation errors (ρ = 0.92),
the entire and the quantitative (ρ = 0.80), and the qualitative and the quantitative samples
(ρ = 0.91) is very high. We also ran the estimation using ABSFEqual on the restricted
sample that we use in the regressions with ABSFEquan, and the results are robust.
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Table 2.7: Description of Variables
Label Variable Response Scale
Taylor dummies Taylor1− Taylor8 Binary
Sector dummies Sector1− Sector14 Binary
Capacity Utilization Capacity utiliz. 30%, 40%. . . 70%,
75%, 80%. . . 100%. . .
Interval
Cost of Input Goods ∆Costs −0.42. . . 0.87 Interval
Business Situation Statebus+ good Binary
Statebus− unsatisfactory Binary
Business Expectation Expbus+ increase Binary
Expbus− decrease Binary
Orders Order+ increase Binary
Order− decrease Binary
Technical Capacity Tech.capacity+ more than sufficient Binary
Tech.capacity− less than sufficient Binary
Expected Employees Expempl+ increase Binary
Expempl− decrease Binary
Time-fixed effects Time1 . . . Binary
Qualitative idiosyncratic
volatility
ABSFEqual Ordinal
Quantitative idiosyncratic
volatility
ABSFEquan Interval
Qualitative idiosyncratic
volatility
STDFEqual Interval
Quantitative idiosyncratic
volatility
STDFEquan Interval
Price change in last 3 months Price change change Binary
Capacity, and Expected Employees.35 Changes in input costs are included to
capture supply shocks. Lein (2010) emphasizes the important role of interme-
diate goods costs as a determinant of its price setting. Orders are important
to account for a possible indirect effect of uncertainty on price setting through
demand, insofar this effect is not already captured by the time-fixed effects in
the regression, i.e., the possibility that heightened uncertainty may lead to the
postponement of projects in other firms, which would decrease the demand for
certain goods in the economy.
The qualitative firm-specific variables Business Situation, Business Expecta-
tions, Orders, Technical Capacity, and Expected Employees have three possible
response categories (see Table 2.1), e.g., firms can appraise their current state of
business as good, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. To account for possible asym-
35 Note that in the construction of the volatility measures based on quantitative forecast
errors, we have to restrict our sample to firms that report no change in Technical Capacity
and Expected Employees. Therefore these variables are not included in the regressions when
we use the quantitative volatility measures.
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metric effects we include these variables with both positive and negative values
separately. For example, the variable Business Situation is divided into two sub-
variables. If firm i at time t reports its state as good, the variable Statebus+i,t is
equal to one, and the variable Statebus−i,t is equal to zero. If the firm answers
that its state is unsatisfactory, Statebus+i,t is equal to zero, and Statebus
−
i,t is
equal to one. If the firm believes that its state is satisfactory, both Statebus+i,t
and Statebus−i,t are equal to zero, which is the baseline. We proceed analogously
with Business Expectations, Orders, Technical Capacity, and Expected Employ-
ees.
The IFO-BCS contains no direct information about input costs, which is why
we construct a variable that proxies the change in the cost of input goods for
each sector k for each time period (∆Costsk,t) following Schenkelberg (2014).
∆Costsk,t for each sector is calculated as the weighted average of net price
changes of (input) goods from all sectors. The weights are derived from the
relative importance of the sectors in the production of goods in sector k.36
Before the first price change of an individual firm we do not know how much
time elapsed since the last price change. This poses a problem if time-dependent
pricing is important for price setting. We, therefore, drop all observations of a
firm prior to the first price change. In addition, whenever an observation in
the price change variable is missing in the period between two price changes,
the whole period is discarded from the sample as we do not know whether the
missing observation is associated with a price change (see, e.g., Loupias and
Sevestre, 2013).
2.3.4 Baseline Results
The estimation results of the pooled probit benchmark models with Price change
as the dependent variable are presented in Table 2.8. The first four models –
Columns (1) to (4) – include a set of sector, Taylor and time-fixed effects dum-
mies and a constant. The other four models – Columns (5) to (8) – contain,
in addition, the set of firm-specific variables described in Table 2.7. Each of
the eight models includes one volatility measure. Models (1) and (5) use the
absolute qualitative forecast error, ABSFEqual, (2) and (6) the absolute quan-
titative forecast error, ABSFEquan, (3) and (7) the 3-quarter rolling window
standard deviation of firms’ qualitative expectation errors, STDFEqual, and (4)
and (8) the 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of firms’ quantitative
expectation errors, STDFEquan.
36 See Appendix 2.B for a detailed description.
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Table 2.8: Benchmark Results (Pooled Probit Model) for Price Change
Dependent variable: Price change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ABSFEqual 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002)
ABSFEquan 0.097*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.024)
STDFEqual 0.040*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
STDFEquan 0.235*** 0.182**
(0.076) (0.077)
Capacity utiliz. 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Costs 0.224*** 0.313*** 0.068*** 0.168***
(0.021) (0.037) (0.020) (0.065)
Statebus+ 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
Statebus- 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.039*** 0.077***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.021)
Expbus+ 0.018*** 0.019** 0.013*** 0.027
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.018)
Expbus- 0.057*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.013
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.017)
Orders+ 0.076*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.054***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.013)
Orders- 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.051***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012)
Tech. capacity+ 0.013*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Tech. capacity- 0.050*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.006)
Expempl+ 0.029*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.005)
Expempl- 0.030*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004)
Observations 249,363 62,982 231,332 16,239 198,297 55,370 184,756 14,458
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.131 0.124 0.162 0.133 0.137 0.134 0.167
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table reports marginal effects. Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors
are in parentheses. Included in the pooled probit model but not shown in the table are time-
fixed effects for each quarter, sector-specific dummies, and Taylor dummies. Models (5) and
(7) include, in addition, all firm-specific variables described in Table 2.7. Model (6) and (8)
include the same firm-specific variables except Technical Capacity and Expected Employees.
Monthly series are transformed to the quarterly frequency by selecting the last month of
each quarter. ABSFEqual: qualitative idiosyncratic volatility; ABSFEquan: quantitative
idiosyncratic volatility; STDFEqual: 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of a firm’s
qualitative expectation errors; STDFEquan: 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of
a firm’s quantitative expectation errors.
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The table reports marginal effects. Quantitative variables (Capacity utiliz.,
∆Costs, ABSFEqual, ABSFEquan, STDFEqual, and STDFEquan) are eval-
uated at their respective sample averages. Qualitative variables are eval-
uated at zero, i.e., “satisfactory” (Statebus+, Statebus−), “remain about
the same” (Expbus+, Expbus−, Expempl+, Expempl−), “roughly stayed the
same” (Orders+, Orders−), or “sufficient” (Tech. capacity+, Tech. capacity−).
Marginal effects for the dummy variables are calculated as the difference in the
probability of a price change as the dummy switches from 0 to 1.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, costs of intermediate goods are the most important
determinant of firms’ pricing decisions. Both good and unsatisfactory current
business situations, increasing and decreasing business expectations and order
levels as well as a higher capacity utilization lead to a higher probability of price
change.
The takeaway from Table 2.8 for our research question is the following:
regardless of the way volatility is measured and regardless of whether firm-
specific variables are included, higher volatility increases the probability of a
price change. The signs of the marginal effects of ABSFEqual show that higher
volatility increases the probability of a price change in both specifications (see
Columns (1) and (5)). However, the size of the marginal effects of ABSFEqual
is difficult to interpret. In contrast, the marginal effects for ABSFEquan imply
that prices are about 0.1 percentage points more likely to change when the cor-
responding measure of volatility changes by one percentage point. To put this
into perspective, in the recent financial crisis we observed that business volatility
increased by 7.6 percentage points.
Turning to the rolling window proxies, we find that the marginal effects
for STDFEqual are also positive as are the marginal effects for STDFEquan.
The point estimate for the elasticity is about twice as high as the elasticity for
ABSFEquan, which, however, is largely explained mechanically by the lower
overall variability of STDFEquan.
One might argue that our results are potentially driven by first-moment
shocks. There are three points that will mitigate this concern. First, including
a number of firm-specific variables to control for first-moment effects does not
change our results. As can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2) to columns
(5) and (6), the estimation excluding and including firm-specific variables yields
similar marginal effects. Second, using the rolling window standard deviation
proxy, which has a built-in mean correction, yields similar results to the case
with the absolute forecast error as volatility proxy. Third, estimating monthly
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models separately for price increases and price decreases, we find that heightened
volatility increases the probability of both price increases and price decreases
(see Appendix 2.C). This increase in price dispersion is exactly what one would
expect after a second-moment shock.
To sum up, we find that idiosyncratic volatility is a statistically significant
determinant of the price setting behavior of firms. Economically, however, the
effects are small.
2.4 Model Evidence
2.4.1 New Keynesian DSGE model
Our empirical results show that an increase in firm-specific volatility leads to an
increase in the probability of a price change. To assess the quantitative conse-
quences of this finding for the effectiveness of monetary policy, we use a standard
New Keynesian DSGE model (see, e.g., Gaĺı, 2008) where price setting is con-
strained à la Calvo (1983). The induced price rigidities are the only source of
monetary non-neutrality and are captured by the Calvo parameter which fixes
the probability of a price change for a given firm. Given the uncovered empirical
relationship between an increase in firm-specific volatility and the probability
of a price change, we model a change in firm-specific volatility through an un-
foreseen, permanent and once-and-for-all change in the Calvo parameter. Of
course, this mapping between our empirical results and the model is not perfect.
We view our simple model exercise as a first-pass, back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion of what the effects of changing firm-level volatility on the effectiveness of
monetary policy could quantitatively be. Given that the model is standard, our
exposition is kept short.
Households
We assume that a representative household chooses a composite consumption
good, Ct, and supplies labor, Lt, in order to maximize
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ
− ψ L
1+φ
t
1 + φ
]
(2.8)
where ψ ≥ 0 scales the disutility of labor, σ defines the constant relative risk
aversion parameter and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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Given the aggregate price index Pt, the household faces the following budget
constraint
Ct +
Bt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Lt +
Bt−1
Pt−1
Rt−1
πt
+ Ξt (2.9)
where income from supplying labor, Lt, at wage Wt, from investment in the
nominal bond, Bt−1, at the risk free rate Rt−1, and from the profits of the
intermediate goods firms, Ξt, is spent on consumption, Ct, and purchases of new
bonds, Bt. All variables are deflated by the consumer price; the overall inflation
rate is defined as πt = Pt/Pt−1.
Final Good Firms
Competitive final good firms bundle intermediate goods into a final good, Yt.
Using i ∈ [0, 1] to index intermediate goods, the CES aggregation technology of
final good firms is given by
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
ε−1
ε
it di
] ε
ε−1
(2.10)
where ε measures the substitution elasticity between intermediate goods and,
in equilibrium, Ct = Yt. Expenditure minimization implies the aggregate price
index
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
. (2.11)
Intermediate Good Firms
Intermediate goods are produced under imperfect competition according to the
production technology
Yit = AtL
1−α
it (2.12)
where Lit measures the amount of labor employed by firm i and At denotes
aggregate productivity.
Price setting is constrained à la Calvo (1983), i.e., each period, an intermedi-
ate firm is able to re-optimize its price with probability 1− θ, 0 < θ < 1. Given
this possibility, a generic firm i sets Pit in order to maximize its discounted
stream of future profits
max Et
∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,t+k
[
Pit
Pt+k
−MCri,t+k
]
Yi,t+k (2.13)
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subject to the demand for its variety Yi,t+k =
(
Pit
Pt+k
)−ε
Yt+k. Here, Λt,t+k denotes
the stochastic discount factor and MCri,t+k are the firm’s real marginal costs.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule that responds to infla-
tion
Rt
R
=
(πt
π
)γ
vt (2.14)
where R and π are the steady state real interest rate and inflation rate,
respectively. The innovation to monetary policy follows an AR(1)-process
log vt = ρv log vt−1 + ε
m
t where ε
m
t is a zero mean white noise process.
Calibration
We calibrate the log-linearized model using standard values from Gaĺı (2008).
Table 2.9 presents the calibrated parameter values. The model period is one
quarter. The parameter ψ is chosen such that the representative household
devotes one third of her time to work. For the experiments following in the next
subsection, we use the period prior to the Great Recession, i.e., from 1980Q1
to 2008Q1, to calibrate the steady-state price frequency of the model. In this
time span, on average 31.56% of firms adjust their price in a given quarter,
corresponding to a Calvo parameter, θ, of 0.6844.
Table 2.9: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Steady state inflation rate π 1
Discount Factor β 0.99
Constant relative risk aversion σ 1
Inverse elasticity of labor supply φ 1
Labor disutility ψ 5
Elasticity of substitution ε 6
Calvo parameter (baseline) θ 0.684
Returns to scale 1− α 0.67
Taylor rule coefficient of inflation γ 1.5
AR(1)-coefficient of monetary shock ρv 0.5
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2.4.2 Volatility, Price Setting, and the Effectiveness
of Monetary Policy
Using this New Keynesian business cycle model, we are now able to conduct a
number of experiments to flesh out the connection between firm-level volatility,
price flexibility, and the effectiveness of monetary policy. In our baseline econ-
omy, a 25 basis point monetary policy shock leads, on impact, to a 0.3465 percent
deviation of output from its steady state (solid black line in Figure 2.2), which
is in line with the findings of, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007). During the 08/09-recession, the average share of
firms adjusting their price in a given quarter increased by 7.04 percentage points
to 38.6%,37 translating to a θ of 0.614. In this environment, a 25 basis point mon-
etary policy shock has an impact multiplier of 0.289, i.e., monetary policy loses
almost 17% of its effect on output compared to the pre-08/09-recession base-
line scenario (dashed red line in Figure 2.2). In other words, had the increase
in observed price flexibility been entirely due to increased business volatility,
time-varying volatility would indeed be a quantitatively important determinant
of the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Our microeconometric analysis enables us to quantify how much of this loss
in effectiveness is directly attributable to an increase in firm-level volatility.
Our quantitative volatility measure, ABSFEquan, has a pre-recession sample
(1980Q1-2008Q1) mean of 4.7. In the third quarter of 2008, right at the height
of the financial crisis, our measure reaches its sample maximum of 12.3, an in-
crease of 7.6 percentage points.38 We can use our empirical model to compute the
change in the probability of a price-adjustment due to this increase in business
volatility and translate it into an unforeseen, permanent, and once-and-for-all
reduction in the model’s Calvo parameter of 0.007.39 The dotted magenta line
in Figure 2.2 shows the response of output in this high-volatility environment
to a 25 basis point monetary policy shock. The response is essentially indistin-
37 We arrive at this number, which we highlight in the introduction, by fitting a regression
of the seasonally adjusted frequency of price changes on a constant and an 08/09-recession
dummy.
38 These numbers explain why we speak of a tripling of volatility in the abstract and the
introduction.
39 Specifically, we first re-estimate the empirical baseline model on the 1980Q1-2008Q1 sample.
We then compute the marginal effects of volatility at the non-recession mean of 4.7 and
the 08/09-recession peak of 12.3, thus taking nonlinearities into account. The difference in
marginal effects then directly translates into the change of the Calvo parameter. To get
an upper bound of the volatility effect, we use the point estimates of the empirical model
without firm-specific effects (Column 2 in Table 2.8) for the experiments as they are slightly
larger than those with the firm-specific effects included.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to 25 Basis Point Monetary Policy Shock
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(estimate with timing at realization of forecast error) (θ = 0.672); dashed red line: increased
price flexibility in 08/09 recession (θ = 0.614); solid blue line with squares: large price flexibil-
ity change counterfactual where price flexibility increases by 18 percentage points (θ = 0.502).
The horizontal axis indicates quarters; the vertical axis measures percentage deviations from
steady state.
guishable from the response of the baseline model. The impact multiplier is now
0.3409, only 1.6% lower than in the baseline environment. We conclude that it
does not appear to be the volatility channel that is at the heart of the increase
in price flexibility and the subsequent loss in effectiveness of monetary policy
during the 08/09-recession.
In the next section, we will conduct a number of robustness checks. We find
the largest overall effect for ABSFEquan on the Calvo parameter for the specifi-
cation where we change the timing structure such that the realized expectation
error is contemporaneous with the pricing decision. This specification maxi-
mizes the impact of the volatility effect relative to the “wait-and-see” effect and
thus it is no surprise to see this increase in the effect on the frequency of price
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setting. Repeating the above experiment on the basis of this estimate yields
an implied reduction of the Calvo parameter of 0.012. The dash-dotted green
line in Figure 2.2 shows the model response for this case. The impact multiplier
declines to 0.337, which is 2.9% lower than in the baseline case. This decline
still accounts for only one sixth of the unconditional price effect (the 17% loss
mentioned above).
We also compute a (counterfactual) scenario where we take the difference
between a time of very low price flexibility (1998Q3) and a time when firms
were changing prices much more rapidly (2008Q3) and feed this 18 percentage-
point change in the Calvo parameter into the model. We use this number to
get a rough estimate of the maximum change in monetary non-neutrality over
our sample. The resulting impulse response function of output to a 25 basis
point monetary policy shock for this case is shown in Figure 2.2 (solid blue line
with squares). The impact deviation of output from its steady state is now only
0.2015, almost 42% lower than in our baseline calibration. This number is close
to the 55%-loss in the effectiveness of monetary policy that Vavra (2014) finds
between times of high and low volatility.
2.5 Robustness Checks
The results of the econometric baseline model show that the probability of price
adjustment increases by 0.092 percentage points when business volatility rises
by one percentage point as measured by the absolute expectation errors (see the
sixth column in the upper panel of Table 2.10). We now conduct a battery of
robustness checks for the empirical exercise.
The first robustness check (Table 2.10, middle panel) concerns the timing of
the firm-specific volatility measures, especially for ABSFEqual and ABSFEquan.
The idea behind our baseline timing assumption is that a realized expectation
error in quarter t + 1 means also that a firm was uncertain at the time of
expectation formation t. In this robustness check, we change the timing structure
such that the realized expectation error is contemporaneous with the pricing
decision. This timing assumption is likely to make the volatility effect relatively
stronger compared to the wait-and-see effect and indeed for ABSFEqual and
ABSFEquan we find marginal effects that are twice as large as those of the
baseline model.
The second robustness check (Table 2.10, lower panel) deals with the possi-
bility that some price changes today were already planned in the past. Today’s
58 Chapter 2. Time-Varying Business Volatility
prices may not, therefore, react to current events. Some firms have long-term
contracts with their buyers (see, for instance, Stahl, 2010); these contracts might
fix prices for some time or change them each period in pre-defined steps. Firms
may, therefore, rely on some form of pricing plan. As a robustness check, we
drop all observations where price changes were putatively set in the past. These
price changes are identified with the help of Q4 – the survey question relating
to price expectations for the next 3 months (see Table 2.1).40 Thus, in this
exercise, we focus on price changes that are unexpected and see whether they
react to idiosyncratic volatility. With a value of 0.068, the marginal effect of
ABSFEquan is somewhat smaller than that in the baseline model.
We also check whether our estimated coefficients differ between recession and
non-recession times. This is not the case as Table 2.11 shows. 41
For the construction of the quantitative volatility measures, we imposed a
number of restrictions on our sample. First, we only looked at firms that had
constant production expectations in order to capture production expectation
errors. Since our baseline results show that the volatility effect dominates em-
pirically, we also check whether we get the same results if we focus on production
changes as opposed to production expectation errors, thus eliminating pure un-
certainty effects. Table 2.12 (upper panel) says yes. If, in addition, we relax the
assumption of constant potential output, i.e., we now simply base our volatil-
ity measures on utilization changes, the results are still robust (see Table 2.12,
middle panel). Finally, we do a similar exercise for the volatility measures based
on qualitative production expectation errors (see Table 2.12, lower panel). To
be specific, we use REALIZi,t instead of FE
qual
i,t in Equation 2.1. Our results
remain essentially unchanged.
One might be concerned that measurement error contaminates our produc-
tion forecast error measures. To deal with this problem, we use the so-called
control function approach (see Rivers and Vuong, 1988, Wooldridge, 2002, Im-
bens and Wooldridge, 2007), a two-stage instrumental variable procedure that
can also be applied to nonlinear models. In the first stage we regress each fore-
cast error type on the level of capacity utilization, the change of input costs,
two dummies for the business situation, two dummies for the change of orders
(see Table 2.7),42 plus Taylor and sector dummies, and time-fixed effects. Since
40 To be concrete, we only include price changes where firms stated a quarter before that they
do not expect a price change.
41 We also run our baseline regression year by year and find mostly positive marginal effects
which show no clear cyclical pattern.
42 Of course, these regressors are excluded in the second stage.
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firms by definition do not react to measurement error, the idea behind this first
stage is to extract that component of the measured forecast error to which firms
react with observable actions and thus the true forecast error. In the second
stage we estimate our baseline probit model which includes our volatility mea-
sures on the right hand side (plus Taylor and sector dummies and time-fixed
effects), and the residual from the first stage regression as an additional control
variable. Including the residual from the first stage directly controls for any
potential endogeneity in our volatility measures. The results are essentially un-
changed (see Panel (a) of Table 2.13). Also, the second-stage coefficient of the
first-stage residual is statistically not distinguishable from zero, which means
that endogeneity issues do not appear to be a problem.
In the next exercise we increase the rolling window from 3 to 5 quarters
to diminish further the potential problem of capturing first moment shocks by
the proxies. The estimation results are shown in Panel (b) of Table 2.13. The
coefficient on STDFEquan is now statistically insignificant, though essentially
unchanged in terms of the magnitude of the point estimates. This is likely due to
the fact that the number of observations decreases for STDFEquan from 14,458
to 6,239 for the model specification including all firm-specific variables.
The final two robustness checks only concern the qualitative measures of
volatility, ABSFEqual and STDFEqual. Unlike for the volatility measures based
on quantitative expectation errors, there is nothing that prevents us from com-
puting these volatility measures at a monthly frequency. Hence, we redo our
baseline estimations also for the monthly frequency with basically unchanged
results (see Panel (c) of Table 2.13).43 In the last exercise, we construct a bi-
nary firm-level volatility measure that just takes the value one at time t if there
is a realized expectation error in t+ 1. Again, our results remain the same (see
Panel (d) of Table 2.13).
43 Of course, we exclude the quarterly variables Capacity Utilization, Technical Capacity, and
Expected Employees.
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Table 2.10: Robustness I
Dependent variable: Price change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline results (pooled probit model)
ABSFEqual 0.012*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002)
ABSFEquan 0.097*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.024)
STDFEqual 0.040*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
STDFEquan 0.235*** 0.182**
(0.076) (0.077)
Volatility proxy at time of realization (pooled probit model)
ABSFEqual 0.022*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
ABSFEquan 0.187*** 0.111***
(0.021) (0.020)
STDFEqual 0.017*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
STDFEquan 0.031 0.006
(0.019) (0.012)
Unexpected price changes (pooled probit model)
ABSFEqual 0.008*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
ABSFEquan 0.083*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.016)
STDFEqual 0.028*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002)
STDFEquan 0.218*** 0.202***
(0.064) (0.072)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents marginal effects. Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors are
in parentheses. First panel: baseline results; second panel: alternative timing where realized
expectation error is contemporaneous with the pricing decision; third panel: we only consider
price changes that are putatively unexpected. Included in all models but not shown in the table
are time-fixed effects for each quarter, sector-specific dummies, and Taylor dummies. Mod-
els (5) and (7) include, in addition, all firm-specific variables described in Table 2.7. Model
(6) and (8) include the same firm-specific variables except Technical Capacity and Expected
Employees. ABSFEqual: qualitative idiosyncratic volatility; ABSFEquan: quantitative id-
iosyncratic volatility; STDFEqual: 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of a firm’s
qualitative expectation errors; STDFEquan: 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of
a firm’s quantitative expectation errors.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Checks II: Sample-Split into Non-Recession and Re-
cession Samples
Dependent variable: Price change
Non-recession Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ABSFEqual 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
ABSFEquan 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.078** 0.064
(0.015) (0.014) (0.032) (0.041)
STDFEqual 0.028*** 0.012*** 0.045*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
STDFEquan 0.228*** 0.148** 0.120 0.106
(0.077) (0.069) (0.137) (0.136)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table reports marginal effects. Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors
are in parentheses. Included in the pooled probit model but not shown in the table are time-
fixed effects for each quarter, sector-specific dummies, and Taylor dummies. Models (3)-(4)
include, in addition, all firm-specific variables described in Table 2.7, except Technical Capacity
and Expected Employees for the quantitative models; ABSFEqual: qualitative idiosyncratic
volatility; ABSFEquan: quantitative idiosyncratic volatility; STDFEqual: 3-quarter rolling
window standard deviation of a firm’s qualitative expectation errors; STDFEquan: 3-quarter
rolling window standard deviation of a firm’s quantitative expectation errors.
62 Chapter 2. Time-Varying Business Volatility
Table 2.12: Robustness Checks III
Dependent variable: Price change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility based on production changes
ABSquan 0.100*** 0.095***
(0.017) (0.021)
STDquan 0.151*** 0.108**
(0.049) (0.053)
Volatility based on capacity utilization changes
ABSquan 0.120*** 0.101***
(0.010) (0.012)
STDquan 0.211*** 0.154***
(0.018) (0.019)
Qualitative production change
ABSqual 0.028*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.002)
STDqual 0.049*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents marginal effects. All estimations are based on the pooled probit
model. First panel: volatility measure based on production changes as opposed to production
expectation errors; second panel: volatility measure based on capacity utilization changes;
third panel: qualitative production realization as volatility measure (i.e., REALIZi,t replaces
FEquali,t in Equation 2.1). Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses.
Included in all models but not shown in the table are time-fixed effects for each quarter,
sector-specific dummies, and Taylor dummies. Models (3) and (4) include, in addition, all firm-
specific variables described in Table 2.7, except Technical Capacity and Expected Employees
in the specification of the first panel.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Checks IV
Dependent variable: Price change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Control function approach
ABSFEqual 0.012*** –
(0.002)
ABSFEquan 0.099*** –
(0.024)
(b) 5-quarter rolling window standard deviation
STDFEqual 0.035*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.002)
STDFEquan 0.191 0.032
(0.132) (0.132)
(c) Monthly model
ABSFEqual 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
STDFEqual 0.012*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
(d) Volatility measure as dummy variable
ABSFEqual 0.017*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents marginal effects. All estimations are based on the pooled probit
model. First panel: control function approach where the second stage includes time-fixed
effects, sector dummies, Taylor dummies, and the residual of the first stage; second panel:
5-quarter rolling window instead of the baseline 3-quarter one; third panel: volatility mea-
sure computed from monthly three-month-ahead qualitative production forecast errors; fourth
panel: binary volatility measure that takes the value one at time t if there is a realized expecta-
tion error in t+1. Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors are in parentheses. Included
in the pooled probit model but not shown in the table are time-fixed effects, sector-specific
dummies, and Taylor dummies. Models (3) and (4) include, in addition, all firm-specific
variables described in Table 2.7 except Capacity Utilization, Technical Capacity and Expected
Employees for the monthly model which are all at a quarterly frequency and except Tech-
nical Capacity and Expected Employees for the quantitative models. Taylor dummies in the
monthly model are defined with respect to the last month in which a firm resets its price, e.g.,
Taylor2 takes a value of one if the last time a firm adjusted its price was two months ago. As
in the quarterly specifications, we include two years worth of Taylor dummies.
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2.6 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Using micro data from West Ger-
man manufacturing firms provided by the IFO-BCS, we construct measures of
firm-level volatility, which, in addition, are also meant to capture firm-level un-
certainty. Specifically, we compute firm-specific expectation errors and use their
absolute values and rolling-window standard deviations as measures of idiosyn-
cratic business volatility. Second, we find that the frequency of price adjust-
ment increases in idiosyncratic volatility and thus confirm theoretical predic-
tions from various literatures about the sign of the relationship between volatil-
ity/uncertainty and the frequency of price changes. Third, the total quantitative
impact of firm-level volatility on the frequency of price adjustment of firms is
small. Monetary policy therefore does not appear to lose much of its effective-
ness in the stabilization of real output in times that are characterized only by
high idiosyncratic volatility.
This last point is particulary important for economic decision makers. Recent
evidence points to volatility/uncertainty playing a role in the decision-making
process of central bankers (e.g., Jovanovic and Zimmermann, 2010, Bekaert, Ho-
erova, and Lo Duca, 2013, Kohlhas, 2011). Our analysis, however, indicates that
the role of heightened volatility (and of uncertainty) might be of minor concern
for the conduct of traditional monetary policy. Of course, the monetary policy
part of our analysis is somewhat dependent on the specific model environment
that we chose to translate predicted changes in the frequency of price changes
due to heightened firm-level volatility into price flexibility (or lack thereof) in
the model, but at the very least our empirical estimates provide a new elasticity
between volatility and price change frequency that any model of price setting
should satisfy in order to speak quantitatively about the link between volatility
and the effectiveness of monetary policy. Also, our analysis is mute on issues
like the interaction of volatility/uncertainty with financial frictions, a channel
a growing recent literature has emphasized, and which might become more im-
portant as monetary policy is viewed as increasingly responsible for ensuring
financial stability. More generally, it seems important to understand why price
rigidities seem to change so significantly over the business cycle and which con-
sequences for monetary policy these fluctuations in the extensive margin of price
setting might have.
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Appendix
2.A Link between MEANABSFE,
MEANSTDFE, and FEDISP
Table 2.14: Time Series Correlation Coefficients between MEANSTDFEqualτ ,
MEANABSFEqualτ , and FEDISP
qual
τ
Correlation between
MEANABSFEqualτ and
FEDISP qualt
Correlation between
MEANABSFEqualτ and
MEANSTDFEqualτ
Group of Firms raw data seasonally raw data seasonally
adjusted adjusted
Manufacturing 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.90
Industry
Transport Equipment 0.92 0.90 0.67 0.69
Machinery and Equipment 0.94 0.94 0.81 0.81
Metal Products 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.78
Other non-metallic Products 0.90 0.90 0.65 0.69
Rubber and Plastic 0.85 0.85 0.63 0.67
Chemical Products 0.88 0.89 0.59 0.62
Elect. and Opt. Equipment 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.78
Paper and Publishing 0.91 0.91 0.81 0.81
Furniture and Jewelery 0.89 0.90 0.49 0.53
Cork and Wood Products 0.93 0.93 0.68 0.74
Leather 0.91 0.91 0.53 0.60
Textile Products 0.93 0.93 0.67 0.68
Food and Tobacco 0.89 0.88 0.74 0.78
Firm Size
less than 50 employees 0.94 0.94 0.79 0.78
between 50 and 199 employees 0.93 0.92 0.80 0.87
between 200 and 499 employees 0.94 0.94 0.77 0.79
between 500 and 999 employees 0.94 0.95 0.73 0.75
more than 999 0.94 0.94 0.73 0.74
Notes: This table provides in the first two columns time-series correlation coefficients between
MEANABSFEqualτ and FEDISP
qual
t for specific groups of firms i with similar firm level
characteristics, i.e., firm size and industrial affiliation. In the last two columns we do the
same for MEANABSFEqualτ and MEANSTDFE
qual
τ . Correlation coefficients are computed
for the raw data as well as for the seasonally adjusted time series. We leave out the oil
industry, since they have only very few observations. Numbers are provided for the qualitative
definition of the expectation error. The construction of MEANABSFEqualτ , FEDISP
qual
t ,
and MEANSTDFEqualτ is explained in Section 2.2.
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2.B Description of the Input Cost Variable
To compute a proxy for the cost of input goods, Costsk,t in sector k, we follow
the approach outlined in Schenkelberg (2014). In this approach, a weighted price
variable of all sectors K that provide input goods for each production sector k
is computed. This procedure follows three steps. First, we compute the weights
of inputs for each sector k. To this end, we use data from input-output tables
from the German Statistical Office. This data provides for each sector k the
cost of input goods from each sector l (including from its own sector). Data is
available for the years 1995 to 2007. For each year we calculate the cost share
of the respective sector l used in the production process of sector k. Finally, we
average these shares across time. Second, from the IFO-BCS we know whether
a firm i from sector l changes its price in period t. We compute the net balance
of price changes within a given sector l for each period t. That is, we subtract
all price decrease from all price increases. We, therefore, need to assume that
price increases (decreases) are similar across different firms within a sector. This
gives us a proxy of the price of input goods from sector l. Third, we combine
the weights of input goods from sector l in the production in sector k (from step
one) with the respective price of goods from sector l at period t (from step two).
The resulting time series is a proxy for input costs which sector k faces for each
time period t.
To check our procedure we calculate a different proxy for input costs based on
producer prices, Costsppik,t , which the German Federal Statistical Office publishes
for all sectors. The problem with this in principle superior measure is that the
data are only consistently available since 1995 on. We proceed as above. We
compute the quarterly inflation rates of the producer prices for each sector k.
We combine the weights of input goods form sector l in the production process
in sector k with the respective producer prices inflation rate from sector l. We
get a time series of input costs for each sector k for each time period. Time series
correlation coefficients between Costsk,t and Costs
ppi
k,t for the period of overlap
are shown in Table 2.15. In almost all sectors we find high correlations which
lends credence to the use of Costsk,t since producer prices at sectoral level are
not fully available before 1995.
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Table 2.15: Time Series Correlation Coefficients of Input Costs for Each Sector
Correlation between
Industry Costsk,t and Costs
ppi
k,t
Transport Equipment 0.74
Machinery and Equipment 0.67
Metal Products 0.65
Other non-metallic Products 0.77
Rubber and Plastic 0.68
Chemical Products 0.37
Elect. and Opt. Equipment 0.33
Paper and Publishing 0.38
Furniture and Jewelry 0.87
Cork and Wood Products 0.90
Leather 0.58
Textile Products 0.74
Food and Tobacco 0.51
Notes: This table provides correlation coefficients at the firm level between the input cost
measure calculated with IFO-BCS net price balances, Costsk,t, and the input cost measure
based on sectoral producer price data, Costsppik,t . Sectoral producer price data are only fully
available since 1995. The oil industry is omitted due to very few observations.
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2.C Asymmetric Price Responses
Higher volatility increases the probability of price adjustments as we have shown
in the main text body. In this appendix, we investigate whether this is also
reflected in higher probabilities of both price increases and price decreases. The
two price variables are calculated in the following way: If firm i states at date t
that it increased (decreased) its price the dependent variable Price increasei,t
(Price decreasei,t) takes the value one, and zero otherwise.
We then estimate probit models in the spirit of the estimations in the main
part of the paper, with the corresponding price increase and price decrease vari-
ables as dependent variables. We focus on ABSFEqual and STDFEqual as only
these volatility measures are available at the monthly frequency. We use a spec-
ification at the monthly frequency because this makes the definition of a price
increase and a price decrease unambiguous. The results are presented in Table
2.16. Heightened volatility increases the probability of both price increases and
price decreases. This is another indication that the volatility effect dominates
the wait-and-see effect. That is, price changes are more dispersed in times of
higher volatility.
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Table 2.16: Pooled Probit Model with Price Increase/Decrease (Monthly
Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Price increase
ABSFEqual 0.002 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
STDFEqual 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Dependent variable: Price decrease
ABSFEqual 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
STDFEqual 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001)
Observations 756,814 695,782 750,623 203,222
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The table presents marginal effects. Robust and clustered (by firm) standard errors are
in parentheses. Included in the pooled probit model but not shown in the table are time-fixed
effects for each month, sector-specific dummies, and Taylor dummies. Models (3)-(4) include,
in addition, all firm-specific variables described in table 2.7. Taylor dummies are defined with
respect to the last month in which a firm resets its price, e.g., Taylor2 takes a value of one if the
last time a firm adjusted its price was two months ago. As in the quarterly specifications, we
include two years worth of Taylor dummies. ABSFEqual: qualitative idiosyncratic volatility;
STDFEqual: 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation of a firm’s qualitative expectation
errors.

CHAPTER 3
Uncertainty Shocks and Credit Spreads in Bank-Based and
Market-Based Financial Systems
This paper takes an empirical and theoretical look at the relationship be-
tween uncertainty and credit spreads. Innovations in uncertainty increase credit
spreads; we confirm this result from the literature for spreads on corporate
bonds both for the United States and for Germany. In contrast, credit spreads
on bank loans increase much less. Decomposing these two type of spreads, we
document a new stylized fact: following a sudden increase in uncertainty, cor-
porate bond yields increase, whereas bank loan rates decrease. We show that a
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with costly state
verification produces increasing lending rates in response to surprise increases
in uncertainty. Therefore, this model replicates the dynamics in corporate bond
markets. By introducing relationship lending into a partial equilibrium model
with costly state verification, we show that bank loan rates are comparatively
lower in a high-uncertainty environment.
71
72 Chapter 3. Uncertainty Shocks and Credit Spreads
3.1 Introduction
A recent strand of the literature on uncertainty argues that financial frictions are
a channel through which uncertainty affects the real economy. Gilchrist, Sim,
and Zakrajsek (2014) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) suggest that
higher uncertainty about idiosyncratic productivity increases the probability
of firm default, which in turn raises the risk premium on firm loans. As it
becomes more expensive to take on loans, investment drops and so does output.44
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) present empirical support for the United
States using corporate bond yields as measure for the cost of external financing.
However, firms in the Euro Area rely heavily on banks for financing instead of
on the capital market.45 The relationship between firms and banks is different
(compared to that between firms and the capital market) because banks are able
to form long-term relationships with their borrowers (see, e.g., Boot, 2000, Boot
and Thakor, 2010, Diamond, 1984, Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Sharpe, 1990). To
preserve these relationships, banks smooth loan rates over the business cycle to
protect firms from fluctuations in market rates (Berger and Udell, 1992).46
The paper makes four contributions to the field. First, using uncertainty
proxies calculated from survey data, we empirically confirm the result of
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) that credit spreads on corporate bonds in-
crease in response to surprise increases in uncertainty, both for the United States
and for Germany. In contrast, credit spreads on bank loans increase much less in
Germany and do not increase at all in the United States. Second, decomposing
these two type of spreads, we document a new stylized fact: following a sudden
increase in uncertainty, corporate bond yields increase, whereas bank loan rates
decrease. This explains why spreads on corporate bonds increase more than do
spreads on bank loans. Third, we show in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
44 Other studies that look at the relationship between uncertainty and different types of fi-
nancial frictions include Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012), Bonciani and van Roye (2013),
Chugh (2014), Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008), Fendoglu (2014), Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), Grimme and Siemsen (2014), and Hafstead and Smith (2012).
45 Comparing the liability side of U.S. and German nonfinancial firms (using Germany as
an example of a country in the Euro Area), the following results emerge. For U.S. firms,
corporate bonds make up about 20% of their liabilities compared to 3% in Germany. In
contrast, (bank) loans cover about 4% of U.S. firm liabilities whereas in Germany the
corresponding number is almost 30%. Figure 3.12 in the Appendix presents the liability
side of nonfinancial corporations in the United States and in Germany. De Fiore and Uhlig
(2011) find that the ratio of bank loans to debt securities is around eight times larger in
the Euro Area than in the United States.
46 Sticky loan rates in the context of monetary policy are discussed by Gerali, Neri, luca Sessa,
and Signoretti (2010), Güntner (2011), Hülsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser (2009), and
Scharler (2008).
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rium (DSGE) model with costly state verification (CSV), a model extensively
used in the literature on uncertainty and financial frictions, that lending rates
increase after an uncertainty shock. Therefore, this theoretical model replicates
the empirical fact of increasing corporate bond yields but not that of decreasing
loan rates. Fourth, we implement in a simple partial equilibrium model with
CSV the notion of relationship banking and demonstrate that this model pre-
dicts that bank loan rates are relatively lower than lending rates on the capital
market in times of uncertainty. Therefore, this model suggests that relationship
lending could be an explanation for the different behavior of corporate bond
yields and bank loan rates in response to uncertainty shocks.
In the empirical part of the paper, we rely on vector autoregressions (VARs)
to analyze the relationship between uncertainty and credit spreads in the United
States and Germany. To construct idiosyncratic uncertainty measures, we follow
the strategy of Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) and use survey data from
the Philadelphia Fed’s Business Outlook Survey (BOS) for the United States
and from the IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) for Germany. This is in
contrast to Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014), who use U.S. financial data.47
The drawback of financial data is that it limits the analysis to large firms,
whereas survey data encompass firms of all sizes – at least, in the IFO-BCS.
Furthermore, survey data capture the mood of actual decision-makers at the
firms in contrast to, for example, financial analysts (Bachmann, Elstner, and
Sims, 2013). From the survey data, we calculate the cross-sectional dispersion
of expectations about future business activity for each country and use it as
a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty, respectively. We examine the effect of
shocks to uncertainty on two types of credit spreads: the spread on corporate
bonds which is the difference between corporate bond yields and government
bond yields and the spread on bank loans which is the difference between bank
loan rates and government bond yields.
A robust result we find is that an increase in uncertainty increases corporate
bond spreads more than bank loan spreads. This phenomenon is due to the fact
that corporate bond yields increase and bank loan rates decrease. These results
are found both for the United States and Germany. The United States can
47 To derive a measure for idiosyncratic uncertainty, Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) use
daily stock returns for U.S. nonfinancial corporations. In a first step, they remove the
forecastable variation in idiosyncratic excess returns. In a second step, they compute the
quarterly firm-level standard deviation of the estimated residuals from the first step. In
a third step, it is assumed that this standard deviation follows an AR1 process with firm
fixed effects, a firm-specific term and time fixed effects. The series of time fixed effects is
used as an aggregate proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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be characterized as a market-bases financial system because U.S. firms borrow
heavily from capital markets. In contrast, banks are the primary lenders to
German firms. Therefore, the corporate bond spread is a good proxy for the
financial conditions in the United States; bank loan spreads better proxy the
tightness of financial conditions in Germany. From this it follows, that after
a sudden increase in uncertainty, firms in market-based systems are hit harder
than in bank-based systems with respect to their financing costs.
The theoretical section of the paper consists of two parts: first, we check
whether a DSGE model, which incorporates a CSV problem à la Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and an uncertainty process along the lines of
Fernández-Villaverde (2010), produces increasing or decreasing lending rates
after an innovation in uncertainty. We employ two calibration strategies. First,
we calibrate the model to German data and use the IFO-BCS data for cali-
bration of the uncertainty process. Second, we use a sensible range for each of
the parameter values so as to include different combinations of parameter val-
ues found in the uncertainty literature. Under both strategies, we find that the
model supports the capital market story: increasing lending rates follow hikes
in uncertainty. In response to an uncertainty shock, capital market participants
are compensated for the increased default probability by demanding a higher
risk premium.
In contrast, the empirical results suggest that banks reduce loan rates in
times of uncertainty and, therefore, are not sufficiently compensated for the
increased default risk; bank profits are temporarily reduced. We formulate a
stylized partial equilibrium model with CSV that includes the possibility for
banks to form relationships with their borrowers. Banks are better at acquiring
disclosed information about firms than the capital market (see, e.g., Boot and
Thakor, 2010). Reducing these informational asymmetries ties the bank and
their borrowers closer together, a lending relationship is formed. In contrast,
capital markets rely on publicly available information about the firm (Fama,
1985), each market participant is atomistic, has smaller stakes in the firms and
is less specialized in monitoring the borrower (Boot, 2000). Therefore, the capital
market is denied the possibility to form lending relationships with firms in our
model.
In the partial equilibrium model, we assume an asymmetric information prob-
lem in the spirit of Townsend (1979): lenders cannot costlessly observe the payoff
of borrowers’ investment projects. Thus, banks have an incentive to form re-
lationships with borrowers in order to facilitate monitoring and attenuate the
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problem of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Having
formed a lending relationship, the bank faces lower monitoring costs, which
make a firm’s default less costly for the bank. Therefore, the bank can charge
relatively high lending rates compared to the capital market. If the reduction
in expected monitoring costs is sufficiently large, the relationship bank has an
incentive to offer relatively low lending rates in periods of high uncertainty. A
low rate counteracts the increase in the probability of borrower default due to
uncertainty, which, in turn, makes it more likely that the bank can exploit the
borrower in the future (after uncertainty vanished) by demanding comparatively
high rates. The larger the expected reduction in asymmetries due to the rela-
tionship, that is, the larger the future benefits from establishing a relationship,
the lower is the bank loan rate relative to the lending rate on the capital market
during the uncertainty event.
Section 2 presents the construction of the idiosyncratic uncertainty proxies
and describes the measures for credit spreads. Section 3 empirically investigates
the effects of uncertainty shocks on credit spreads, corporate bond yields, and
bank loan rates; robustness tests are also presented. In the first part of Section 4,
we present results from the DSGE model with CSV; the second part introduces
the partial equilibrium model. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Measuring Uncertainty and Credit Spreads
This section presents the construction of the idiosyncratic uncertainty proxies
and describes the measures for credit spreads.
We follow Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) in constructing the idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty proxies for Germany and the United States. For Germany,
we rely on the responses from manufacturing firms to the IFO-BCS, which is
conducted on a monthly basis. The uncertainty proxy FDISPGER is calculated
as the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations about future production.48 For
the United States, we use data from the BOS, which is conducted monthly by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The uncertainty proxy FDISPUS is
calculated as the dispersion of firms’ forecasts about the general business out-
look. Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) treat FDISPGER and FDISPUS
as proxies for idiosyncratic uncertainty for Germany and the United States,
respectively.
48 A more detailed description of the proxies is presented in Appendix 3.A.
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Figure 3.1: Uncertainty and Credit Spread
Using Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: All series are at a monthly frequency. The uncertainty proxy for Germany,
FDISPGER, is obtained from the IFO-BCS; that for the United States, FDISPUS , is from
the BOS. Both uncertainty proxies are standardized. For Germany, the credit (market) spread
is the difference between the corporate bond yield from outstanding bonds and the one-year
government bond yield; for the United States, it is the difference between the three-year
investment grade rated corporate bond yield and the three-year treasury bond yield. The
(bank) spread for Germany is the difference between the one-year loan rate of new loans to
non-financial corporations and the one-year government bond yield; for the United States, it
is the difference between the prime rate charged by banks and the three-year treasury bond
yield.
For both countries, we compute two credit spreads, respectively. The first
type of spread is derived from corporate bond yields. For Germany, we rely
on yields from outstanding bonds issued by German nonfinancial corporations.
These include securities with a maturity of more than four years, the yields
of the individual securities are weighted by the amounts outstanding at market
prices. To our knowledge other indexes are not available because of the relatively
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small market for German corporate bonds. As riskless rate, we use the German
government bond yield with a maturity of one year. This means that we face
some bias in the spread due to a maturity mismatch (Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakra-
jsek, 2014), but it allows us to be consistent with the spread on bank loans.49
The second type of spread is calculated from bank loan rates. For Germany, we
use the loan rate of new loans to nonfinancial corporations in Germany with a
maturity of one year.50 This series is part of the MFI interest rate statistics and
is collected monthly by the Deutsche Bundesbank from a representative sample
of 200-240 banks in Germany. The reported interest rates are weighted with
the respective volume of new business loans, which are also reported by the
banks, to form an average interest rate. Loans with a maturity of one year cover
around 82% of all new loans to nonfinancial corporations. Using only loans with
a one-year maturity allows for a consistent comparison with a government bond
yield of the same maturity. The rest of new loans either have a maturity of one
to five years or a maturity longer than five years. In 2003, the national interest
rate statistics of all countries in the Eurozone were harmonized. The difference
in the methodology of figuring the interest rate statistics before and after 2003
makes it difficult to compare the loan rates (see Bundesbank, 2004); therefore,
this paper only looks at the time period since 2003.
For the United States, we use the corporate bond yield for maturities between
one and three years for the calculation of the first type of spread. The yield
tracks the performance of outstanding bonds issued by investment grade U.S.
corporations. As the corresponding riskless rate, we rely on the government
bond yield with a one-year maturity.51 For the second type of spread, we take
the prime rate charged by banks. This rate is the rate charged by the majority of
the largest 25 U.S. commercial banks on many of their (short-term) commercial
loans and is an indicator for many other loan rates. This is the only loan rate
available at a monthly frequency. A drawback of the prime rate is that it is
the rate banks charge their most creditworthy borrowers. However, the prime
rate and the quarterly loan rate of all commercial and industrial loans with a
49 Results remain robust with respect to using government bond yields with a maturity of
either 4 years, 5 years or 10 years.
50 In the robustness section we show that the results do not change if we use the loan rate of
outstanding loans to nonfinancial corporations in Germany with a maturity of one year. To
our knowledge, for the United States, only loan rates of new loans are available, therefore
we use loan rates of new loans throughout the baseline.
51 Alternatively, we use government bond yields with a three-year maturity. The results are
quantitatively similar.
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maturity of up to one year from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending are
highly correlated; the correlation coefficient is 0.99.
The upper two panels of Figure 3.1 show the uncertainty proxy and the
corporate bond credit spread – that is, the difference between the corporate
bond yield and the government bond yield – for Germany and the United States
for the time period 2003-2013. In each country uncertainty and the market
spread co-move; for Germany the correlation coefficient is 0.74, for the United
States it is 0.40.
The lower two panels of Figure 3.1 plot the uncertainty proxy and the bank
loan credit spread – that is, the difference between the bank loan rate and
the government bond yield – for Germany and the United States. Uncertainty
and the bank spread co-move in both countries, respectively; the correlation
coefficient is 0.49 for Germany; for the United States it is 0.26.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
To analyze how credit spreads respond to surprise increases in uncertainty,
we use standard vector autoregressions (VARs). We take data both for the
United States and Germany to discover whether the responses differ between
economies characterized by firms relying heavily on capital market financing
(United States) and bank-based financing (Germany).
3.3.1 Baseline Results
The baseline VARs consist of three variables: a proxy for uncertainty, a mea-
sure for the cost of external finance and the government bond yield. The cost
of external finance is either the corporate bond yield or the bank loan rate. The
sample period is from 2003:M1 to 2013:M12. As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, interest rates in the Eurozone before 2003 are conceptually different from
those after 2003, which is why the sample starts in 2003. We use the same sam-
ple period for the United States so as to make the analysis consistent. The VARs
are at a monthly frequency and estimated with a constant and three lags.52 Un-
certainty is ordered before the interest rate variables in a recursive identification.
52 In the baseline estimations the BIC and the AIC criterion suggest 1 lag for Germany; for
the United States the BIC criterion finds 2 lags to be optimal, the AIC criterion finds 3
lags. Estimating the Baseline-VARs with either 6 or 12 lags does not change the qualitative
results. In the robustness section, variables are added to the baseline VARs; to keep the
estimation feasible due to the relatively short sample period, we use 3 lags throughout the
paper if not stated otherwise.
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Innovations in uncertainty, therefore, have an immediate impact on the inter-
est rate variables.53 The government bond yield is ordered before the cost of
external finance. In the following, we consider unit shocks to the standardized
uncertainty series to ensure that possible differences in the impulse responses
between Germany and the United States can be traced back to differences in
the transmission mechanism and not to differences in the shock size.
Figure 3.2 plots the impulse responses from the four separate VARs for
Germany and for the United States after an innovation to FDISPGER and
FDISPUS, respectively. The impulse response of the spread-variable is calcu-
lated as the difference between the response of the external finance cost and
the riskless rate. The responses in the first two rows are estimated with cor-
porate bond yields. The results for Germany are depicted in the first row, the
second row covers the responses for the United States. In Germany the spread
increases by 20 basis points on impact and reaches a maximum of 40 basis points
five months after the initial shock. Afterward, the spread decreases very slowly.
The response of the spread in the United States is very similar. After an in-
crease of 25 basis points on impact, the spread reaches a maximum of 45 basis
points after six months; the following decrease is gradual. Looking at the two
components of the spread separately, one sees that corporate bond yields and
government bond yields move in opposite directions. In both countries the gov-
ernment bond yield decreases – the two series reach their minimum after about
one and a half years. In contrast, the corporate bond yield increases in the two
countries. In Germany the yield reaches a maximum of about 20 basis points
after three months; in the United States it is 35 basis points after six months.
The corporate bond yield in the United States reverts back more slowly than it
does in Germany.
The last two rows in Figure 3.2 plot responses from models with bank loan
rates instead of corporate bond yields. The results for Germany are shown in
the first row, the second row depicts the responses for the United States. In
Germany the credit spread increases but not as much as the spread calculated
from corporate bond yields. The maximum increase is 10 basis points and is
reached after seven months. The return to steady state is gradual. In the United
States the increase in the spread is even smaller than in Germany; the spread
increases insignificantly by two basis points on impact; afterward the response
remains insignificant. Decomposing the spread into its two parts, it is noted
53 A similar ordering can be found in Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) and Leduc and Liu
(2015).
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that bank loan rates and government bond yields move in the same direction.
Loan rates in Germany have decreased by 35 basis points after 15 months. In
the United States the loan rate reaches its minimum of roughly 10 basis points
after a year. The return to steady state is sluggish in both countries.
As discussed in the introduction, firms in the Euro Area still finance a large
share of their projects with bank loans. Therefore, in bank-based financial sys-
tems, the bank loan rate comes closer to the true financing costs than corporate
bond yields. Therefore, comparing the corporate bond spread for the United
States and the bank loan spread for Germany, we find that spreads in market-
based financial systems (U.S.) increase more than those in bank-based systems
(Germany) after a surprise increase in uncertainty. This can be explained by
the fact that loan rates fall while corporate bond yields rise.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock for Germany and the
United States
Baseline with Corporate Bond Yields
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Baseline with Bank Loan Rates
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 3-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. The responses in the first two rows are estimated
from corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first and
third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States. To
identify the uncertainty shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered first.
The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and FDISPUS ,
respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is the point
estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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3.3.2 Robustness
The results from the baseline model reveal that loan rates behave differently
than corporate bond yields after innovations in uncertainty. We now conduct a
battery of tests to check the robustness of the baseline results.54
In the first robustness check we include a real variable (log of production) in
the baseline VAR with the purpose of discovering whether changes in production
due to the uncertainty shock result in different interest rate dynamics. The
activity variable is ordered first, reacting to uncertainty with a lag. Figure 3.3
presents the impulse responses of the interest rates and the spread for Germany
and for the United States. The qualitative picture remains the same: the spread
increases in both countries, government bond yields fall, corporate bond yields
increase, and loan rates drop. The U.S. corporate bond spread increases more
than the German bank loan spread.
In the second robustness check we use an alternative measure of economic
activity (log of employment instead of log of production). Figure 3.4 shows
that the results of this variation are qualitatively very similar to the baseline
results. In the case of the United States, we find that the the bank loan spread
temporarily declines.
The next test adds a policy rate measure to the four-variable VAR from
the first robustness check so as to control for the possibility that monetary
policy reacts to uncertainty shocks by decreasing the policy rate in order to
stimulate the economy. The policy rate is ordered last, reflecting the idea that
uncertainty has an immediate effect on short-term interest rates (Gilchrist, Sim,
and Zakrajsek, 2014).55 For Germany we use the Euro OverNight Index Average
(EONIA) as a monetary policy measure; for the United States it is the effective
federal funds rate. The impulse responses are plotted in Figure 3.5. Compared
to the baseline, the impulse responses are qualitatively the same. Uncertainty
shocks are followed by corporate bond yield increases and loan rate decreases.
The increase in the bank loan spread in Germany is smaller than the rise in the
corporate bond spread in the United States.
In the next robustness check we change the ordering of the variables in the
VAR. In all prior tests, uncertainty is ordered before the interest rate variables,
implying that surprise changes in uncertainty have a contemporaneous effect.
54 The responses of the variables that are added to the baseline VARs are as expected, however,
they are not presented here to not overdo the number of plots.
55 Ordering the policy rate before the corporate bond yield, reflecting the idea that the latter
may react on impact to innovations in uncertainty, does not change the results.
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Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2013) and Popescu and Smets (2010) argue
that when forming beliefs, agents use all current macroeconomic information
available and, therefore, uncertainty may react contemporaneously to changes
in interest rates. We modify the baseline 3-variables VAR accordingly and order
uncertainty last. Impulse responses are shown in Figure 3.6. Ordering uncer-
tainty last does not change the qualitative results. However, the quantitative
responses of the models with the corporate bond yield are much smaller. For
the United States, the maximum increase in the spread is 15 basis points com-
pared to 45 basis points in the VAR from the baseline. In the case of Germany,
the respective number is 30 basis points compared to 40 basis points from the
baseline. The maximum increase in the corporate bond yield is cut in half
in both countries compared to the baseline. This result goes in the direction of
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014), who find that U.S. corporate bond spreads
do not react significantly to hikes in uncertainty when the credit spread variable
is ordered before uncertainty.
In the next exercise we check whether using different bank loan rates has
implications for the impulse responses. For Germany we now use the loan rate
on outstanding loans (with a maturity of one year) instead of new loans to check
whether banks also decrease interest rates on loans that were already granted.
For the U.S. we used the bank prime rate so far, which might be problematic.
The prime rate is used to price short-term business loans that have a maturity
of less than a year; there could be a maturity mismatch with the corresponding
riskless rate. Furthermore, the prime rate is usually charged to relatively low-
risk firms. Therefore, we replace the prime rate with the (quarterly) loan rate to
nonfinancial corporations with a maturity of up to one year. This series is part
of the Survey of Terms of Business Lending and is collected quarterly from a
random sample of about 300 U.S. banks (Brady, English, and Nelson, 1998). Due
to the lower frequency, we linearly interpolate to be able to perform the analysis
at a monthly frequency. Figure 3.7 shows that the responses for Germany and
the United States remain qualitatively the same as in the baseline. The result
for Germany is particularly interesting. Even if the bank has already granted the
loan with a corresponding loan rate, an increase in uncertainty leads the bank
to reduce the loan rate of the existing loan. This is additional evidence in favor
of the relationship story and against the risk-shifting motive that is discussed in
Section 3.4.3. Therefore, the bank tries to accommodate the negative effects of
the shock on the firm by reducing the lending rate.
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All the VARs used to this point are estimated with three lags. The Breusch-
Godfrey test does not reject the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation in
all these models. However, there remains the concern as to whether the relatively
low number of lags truly captures the system’s dynamics, especially since it is
estimated on a monthly frequency. Estimation with 12 lags is not feasible due
to the short sample period. Implementing 12 lags, however, is possible using a
Bayesian framework and assuming appropriate priors. We estimate the baseline
3-variables and 5-variables system with 12 lags including additional information
in the form of a Minnesota-type prior. For technical details on the Bayesian
VAR (BVAR), see Section 3.C in the Appendix. For the uncertainty series we
impose the prior belief of white noise; for the other variables that of a random
walk. The impulse responses are depicted in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. The results
of decreasing loan rates and increasing corporate bond yields continue to hold.
However, the responses from the BVARs are less persistent in both countries. In
the two countries the median responses of the corporate bond spread are back
in equilibrium after one to two years compared to roughly three years in the
baseline VARs. A similar result is found for the bank loan spread in Germany.
Loan Rates in the United States are significantly below steady state for about
half a year compared to one and a half years in the baseline VAR.
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Figure 3.3: Robustness I: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Four
Variables for Germany and the United States
With Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 4-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. The responses in the first two rows are estimated
from corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first
and third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States.
The additional variable (compared to the baseline) is production. To identify the uncertainty
shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered second after the activity
variable. The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and
FDISPUS , respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is
the point estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 3.4: Robustness II: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Four
Variables (Employment Instead of Production) for Germany and the United
States
With Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 4-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. The responses in the first two rows are estimated
from corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first and
third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States. The
additional variable (compared to the baseline) is employment. To identify the uncertainty
shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered second after the activity
variable. The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and
FDISPUS , respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is
the point estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 3.5: Robustness III: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Five
Variables for Germany and the United States
With Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 5-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. The responses in the first two rows are estimated
from corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first
and third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States.
The additional variables (compared to Robustness I) are the EONIA rate for Germany and
the Fed Funds rate for the United States. To identify the uncertainty shock, a Cholesky
decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered after the activity variable; the policy rate is
ordered last. The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER
and FDISPUS , respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid
line is the point estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 3.6: Robustness IV: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with
Three Variables for Germany and the United States; Uncertainty Ordered After
the Interest Rate Variables
With Corporate Bond Yields
GER
10 20 30
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Corp Bond Yield      
Months
10 20 30
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Bond Yield           
Months
10 20 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Spread               
Months
US
10 20 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Corp Bond Yield      
Months
10 20 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Bond Yield           
Months
10 20 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Spread               
Months
With Bank Loan Rates
GER
10 20 30
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Loan Rate            
Months
10 20 30
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Bond Yield           
Months
10 20 30
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Spread               
Months
US
10 20 30
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Loan Rate            
Months
10 20 30
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Bond Yield           
Months
10 20 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Spread               
Months
Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 3-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. The responses in the first two rows are estimated
from corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first and
third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States. To
identify the uncertainty shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered last.
The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and FDISPUS ,
respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is the point
estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 3.7: Robustness V: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Three
Variables for Germany and the United States (Different Bank Loan Rates)
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 3-variables monthly VAR system for
Germany and the United States, respectively. For Germany, we use the loan rate on out-
standing loans with a maturity of one year. For the United States, we use the loan rate to
nonfinancial corporations with a maturity of up to one year; to transform the series from a
quarterly to a monthly frequency, the series is interpolated. To identify the uncertainty shock,
a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered first. The shock is a unit shock to
the standardized uncertainty series FDISPUS . The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12.
The black solid line is the point estimate, the gray shaded areas are 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 3.8: Robustness VI: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with
Three Variables for Germany and the United States from a Bayesian VAR with
12 Lags
With Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 3-variables monthly Bayesian VAR
system with 12 lags and a constant. The responses in the first two rows are estimated from
corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first and
third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States. To
identify the uncertainty shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered first.
The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and FDISPUS ,
respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is the point
estimate, the gray shaded areas are 68% error bands.
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Figure 3.9: Robustness VII: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with
Five Variables for Germany and the United States from a Bayesian VAR with
12 Lags
With Corporate Bond Yields
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Notes: The responses are obtained from estimating a 5-variables monthly Bayesian VAR
system with 12 lags and a constant. The responses in the first two rows are estimated from
corporate bond yields, the last two rows are estimated from bank loan rates. The first and
third row show responses for Germany; the second and fourth row for the United States.
To identify the uncertainty shock, a Cholesky decomposition is used. Uncertainty is ordered
second. The shock is a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER and
FDISPUS , respectively. The sample period is from 2003M1-2013M12. The black solid line is
the point estimate, the gray shaded areas are 68% error bands.
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3.4 Theoretical Model
The empirical part of this paper reveals that uncertainty events are accompanied
by increases in the corporate bond yield and decreases in the bank loan rate. The
current section has two parts. In the first part, we check whether a DSGE model
of the type used in the literature on uncertainty and financial frictions implies
increasing or decreasing lending rates after an innovation in uncertainty. The
model predicts increasing rates; therefore, in the second part, we use a partial
equilibrium model and show that the introduction of relationship lending can
explain the different responses of banks and the capital market to uncertainty
shocks.
3.4.1 DSGE Model with Financial Frictions and
Uncertainty Shocks
The model we rely on is basically the model used in much of the literature on
uncertainty and financial frictions (see Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo,
2014, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2010, 2014, Chugh, 2014, Dorofeenko,
Lee, and Salyer, 2008, Fendoglu, 2014, Fernández-Villaverde, 2010, Hafstead and
Smith, 2012) and thus we describe it only briefly here. The model is based on
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) with the addition of an idiosyncratic un-
certainty process as in Fernández-Villaverde (2010). It includes a representative
household, a representative final good producer, a continuum of monopolisti-
cally competitive intermediate good producers, a representative capital good
producer, a continuum of entrepreneurs, a financial intermediary (henceforth
called a bank), and a central bank. Financial frictions are introduced through an
asymmetric information problem between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders
(the bank) in the form of CSV. We implement idiosyncratic uncertainty by as-
suming that each entrepreneur draws an idiosyncratic productivity shock from
a distribution with time-varying volatility. For more details on the model, see
Appendix 3.D.
Calibration
The model is simulated based on two calibration strategies. The first exercise
is specifically set up for the case of Germany. In the second variant, we check
whether the results also hold using a sensible range for each of the parameters.
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Calibration I The time unit is a quarter. Table 3.1 summarizes the parameter
values for the first calibration exercise. The discount factor β is set to 0.995,
which is in line with the observed 2.0% annual yield on German government
bond yields with a maturity of one year. For the next few parameters we use
conventional estimates reported in the literature. The parameter for relative risk
aversion ϑ is set to 1.0 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply φ to
1.0. We set χ, the relative weight of labor in the utility function, to 6.727 so that
the household spends one-third of the time working in steady state. The capital
share in production α is set to 0.36. The elasticity of substitution across goods
ε is set to 6.0, implying a 20% price markup. Bachmann, Born, Elstner, and
Grimme (2013) estimate that on average 32% of German manufacturing firms
change their price each quarter, implying a Calvo price stickiness parameter θ
of 0.68.
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.995 Discount factor
ϑ 1.0 Relative risk aversion
φ 1.0 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
α 0.36 Capital share in production
ε 6 Elasticity of substitution between goods
θ 0.68 Calvo price stickiness
δ 0.023 Depreciation rate
φk 10 Investment adjustment cost
γr 0.95 Interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule
γπ 1.5 Weight on inflation in Taylor rule
γy 0.5 Weight on output in Taylor rule
µ 0.23 Monitoring costs
γe 0.978 Survival probability of entrepreneurs
ω̄ 0.3721 Steady state default threshold value
σω 0.3985 Steady state standard deviation of uncertainty
ρσ 0.82 Persistence in uncertainty shock
ησ 0.013 Volatility of uncertainty shock
The depreciation rate δ is computed from German national accounting data
(VGR) for nonfinancial firms. Following Bachmann and Bayer (2013), who
estimate a value of 9.4% on a yearly frequency, we use a value of 0.023 for δ.
We set the adjustment cost for capital φk to 10, implying an elasticity of the
price of capital with respect to the investment-to-capital ratio of 0.25 in steady
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state. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) state that the elasticity should
lie between 0 and 0.5.
The coefficients in the Taylor rule are the following: for the interest rate
smoothing parameter γr we use a value of 0.95, for the weight on inflation
γπ = 1.5, and for the weight on output γy = 0.5.
The remaining parameters (the monitoring cost µ, the fraction of en-
trepreneurs’ profit that is consumed (1 − γe), the default threshold ω̄, and the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity σω) are related to the credit
friction and are set so as to achieve reasonable steady state values for the en-
trepreneurial default rate, the leverage ratio, and the spread between the loan
rate and the riskless rate. The steady state default probability equals 4.5% per
year. Estimates for the Euro Area range between 3% (see von Heideken, 2009)
and 4.96% (see De Fiore and Uhlig, 2011). The steady state leverage ratio K/N
equals 1.6, which is the average value found for German nonfinancial corpora-
tions in the Euro Area Accounts for the time period 2003 to 2013. The steady
state spread is 145 basis points in annual terms, which is the historical average
between the spread of the loan rate of new loans to non-financial firms of one-
year maturity and the government bond yield of the same maturity. The steady
state values of selected variables and ratios are shown in Table 3.2.
To derive values for the idiosyncratic uncertainty process for Germany, we
fit an AR(1) process to the uncertainty series FDISPGER used in the em-
pirical part. FDISPGER is transformed to a quarterly frequency by taking
three-month averages. The persistence of uncertainty ρσω is estimated to be
0.82; the volatility of the uncertainty shock ησ is 0.013. Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012) estimate values of 0.76 and 0.049,
respectively, for the United States from the Census panel of manufacturing es-
tablishments. Using firm-level data for 7,000 large U.S. manufacturing plants,
Chugh (2014) estimates a persistence parameter and a standard deviation of
0.83 and 0.0033, respectively. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) estimate values of
0.58 and 0.0037, respectively, using firm-level data for almost the entire Ger-
man nonfinancial private business sector; however, the data are of an annual
frequency.56 Finally, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) estimate 0.91
and 0.041, respectively, for the Euro Area through Bayesian estimation using
macro-financial data. Therefore, our estimate of the persistence parameter is
most similar to that of Chugh (2014); our volatility estimate is larger than the
56 Fitting an AR(1) process to the uncertainty series FDISPGER, averaged to an annual
frequency, gives 0.46 and 0.018 for the persistence parameter and the standard deviation,
respectively. Chugh (2014) estimates 0.48 and 0.0276, respectively, at an annual frequency.
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Table 3.2: Selected Steady State Values and Ratios (from First Calibration
Exercise)
Variables Value Description
χ 6.727 Relative weight of labor in utility
C/Y 0.71 Household consumption relative to output
Ce/Y 0.10 Entrepreneurial consumption relative to output
K/Y 7.19 Capital relative to output
I/Y 0.18 Investment relative to output
µG(ω̄)RKK/Y 0.0061 Monitoring costs relative to output
Targeted Variables in Steady State
F (ω̄) 4,5% p.a. Default probability
K/N 1.6 Leverage
spread 145 bpts
(ann.)
Ratio of loan rate RB to riskless rate R
R 2.0 Riskless rate (annualized)
H 0.33 Steady state labor
values obtained by Bachmann and Bayer (2013) and Chugh (2014) but smaller
than those of Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) and Bloom, Floetotto,
Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012).
Calibration II To show that the results in the next section are not depen-
dent on calibrating the model specifically for Germany, we undertake a second
calibration exercise in which we define a sensible interval for each parameter.
Table 3.3 summarizes the parameter values.
The discount factor β is allowed to vary in the interval [0.985, 0.997], which
implies an annual steady state riskless rate between 1.2-6.2%. The range for the
parameter for relative risk aversion ϑ is set between [1, 4], that of the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply φ between [0, 4], and that of the capital
share in production α between [0.2, 0.5]. The elasticity of substitution across
goods ε is allowed to vary in the interval [5, 100], while the Calvo price stickiness
parameter θ is set between [0.6, 0.9]. The interval for ε implies that the price
markup will be between 1-25%; the range for θ means that the average quarterly
likelihood of a price changes is between 10-40%.
We allow for variation in the depreciation rate δ ∈ [0.01, 0.05] and the ad-
justment cost for capital φk ∈ [0.01, 12]. Together, these two parameter ranges
imply that the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment-
to-capital ratio will be between 0.0001 and 0.6.
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Table 3.3: Parameter Ranges (Second Calibration Exercise)
Parameter Value Description
β [0.985, 0.997] Discount factor
ϑ [1, 4] Relative risk aversion
φ [0, 4] Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
α [0.2, 0.5] Capital share in production
ε [5, 100] Elasticity of substitution between goods
θ [0.6, 0.9] Calvo price stickiness
δ [0.01, 0.05] Depreciation rate
φk [0.01, 12] Investment adjustment cost
γr [0.9, 0.99] Interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule
γπ [1, 3] Weight on inflation in Taylor rule
γy [0, 0.99] Weight on output in Taylor rule
ρσ [0.7, 0.9] Persistence in uncertainty shock
ησ [0.0033, 0.07] Volatility of uncertainty shock
F (ω̄) [0.03, 0.045] Default probability
K/N [1.2, 1.95] Leverage
spread [120, 300] Ratio of loan rate RB to riskless rate R
For the coefficients in the Taylor rule we set the following value ranges: the
interest rate smoothing parameter γr is allowed to vary between [0.9, 0.99], the
central bank’s response to deviations of inflation from steady state γπ is between
[1, 3], and the weight on output fluctuations γy varies between [0, 0.99].
The parameters related to financial friction in the model (the monitoring cost
µ, the exogenous fraction of entrepreneurial consumption (1 − γe), the default
threshold ω̄, and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity σω) are
set so that the target variables are in the following intervals. The steady state
default probability varies between [3.0%, 4.5%] in annual terms. The steady
state leverage ratio K/N is set between [1.2, 1.95], which is the maximum range
reported by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) for the Euro Area and the
United States. In line with the literature on the financial accelerator, the steady
state spread is allowed to vary between [120, 300] basis points.
Finally, the persistence of the uncertainty shock ρσω is restricted to the in-
terval [0.7, 0.9], while the volatility of the uncertainty shock ησ is set between
[0.0033, 0.07].
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Results
Figure 3.10 shows the impulse responses after a surprise increase in idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty for the first calibration variation. A higher dispersion of the
idiosyncratic shock distribution implies that some entrepreneurs will draw larger
idiosyncratic shocks and others smaller ones. This leads to a higher probability
of default. Lenders demand a risk premium as insurance against the borrowers’
higher default risk. As credit spreads increase, external financing becomes more
expensive for entrepreneurs and, therefore, they reduce their demand for capital.
Investment drops and so does output. Capital prices decrease, which has a de-
pressing effect on entrepreneurs’ net worth. Subsequently, leverage increases and
entrepreneurs need to deleverage. The reduction in aggregate demand pushes
down marginal costs and prices. Monetary policy attempts to counteract these
dynamics by cutting the policy rate.
In the model, the drop in the policy rate goes hand in hand with an increase
in the lending rate. In the previous section of the paper, we observe empiri-
cally that the policy rate decreases and corporate bond yields increase after an
innovation in uncertainty. Therefore, the DSGE model is able to replicate the
empirical findings for capital market behavior after an uncertainty shock. Cap-
ital market participants are confronted with a higher default risk on the part
of the entrepreneurs from whom they buy corporate bonds and demand a risk
premium, leading to an increase in bond yields.
In the remainder of this section we check whether the model’s finding of
increasing lending rates is robust with respect to calibration. This is where
the second calibration exercise, in which we define intervals for each parameter
and assume that values are uniformly distributed over the respective parameter
range, comes into play. We draw a value for each parameter and calculate im-
pulse responses. This procedure is repeated 10,000 times. Figure 3.11 presents
the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles. The impulse response of the lend-
ing rate is still positive across all combinations of parameter values. Therefore,
the stylized fact that corporate bond yields increase after an uncertainty shock
is a robust feature of the DSGE model with CSV.
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Figure 3.10: Uncertainty Shock in DSGE Model
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty using the cali-
bration for Germany (Calibration I).
Figure 3.11: Uncertainty Shock in DSGE Model: Sensitivity
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty (Calibration
II). Median, 16th and 84th percentiles of simulation with 10,000 draws. In each draw each
parameter is drawn from a sensible range of values. The first two plots are expressed in
percentage points; the third plot in basis points.
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3.4.2 Partial Equilibrium Model with Relationship
Lending
The previous section demonstrates that a DSGE model with CSV and uncer-
tainty can replicate the behavior of the capital market: a surprise increase in
uncertainty leads capital market participants to demand a higher risk premium
as compensation for the higher default risk, leading to an increase in the lending
rate. This section presents a simple partial equilibrium model with CSV and
the possibility for banks to form long-term relationships with borrowers. On the
one hand, this model replicates the finding that capital markets charge higher
lending rates in periods of high uncertainty. On the other hand, the model
shows that the bank’s ability to establish a relationship with borrowers implies
comparatively lower bank loan rates in response to an uncertainty shock.
When capital markets and banks act as lenders they face asymmetric infor-
mation problems vis-à-vis their borrowers. In contrast to the capital market,
banks are able to establish long-term relationships with their borrowers, which
have the effect of reducing these asymmetries over time. Reducing the infor-
mation asymmetry problem in terms of the CSV model means that the bank’s
costs of monitoring the borrower are lowered, which make a relationship-firm’s
default less costly for the bank. Lower bankruptcy costs enable the bank to
charge higher lending rates compared to the capital market.57 If this markup is
high enough, that is, if the reduction in bankruptcy costs is sufficiently large,
it is optimal for the bank to temporarily offer loan rates in times of high un-
certainty that are relatively lower than rates on the capital market, because the
uncertainty event is interpreted by the bank as a short-lived setback in the firm’s
prospects. Holding interest rates low, the bank hopes to keep the borrower out
of default, collect more information about the firm during the uncertainty pe-
riod and subsequently charge relatively higher rates in tranquil times and reap
profits.58
57 De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) present a model explaining the differences in corporate financing
between the United States and the Euro Area. They find that the best model fit is found for
lower levels of monitoring costs in the Euro Area compared to the United States. The Euro
Area and, in particular, Germany are characterized by large bank loan financing; therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that banks that have formed relationships face lower monitoring
costs.
58 The firm’s motivation for having a relationship with the bank is not explicitly modeled.
Our model implicitly assumes that switching costs are high enough that it is too expensive
for the firm to search for a different bank that offers more favorable lending terms. Another
reason could be that the firm hopes to obtain more favorable borrowing terms by revealing
proprietary information to the bank (see Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia, 1989).
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The basic setup of the model follows Williamson (1987) and Walsh (2003), to
which we add the notion of relationship lending. We assume there are two types
of agents, a continuum of borrowers (firms) and a lender (a relationship bank or
the capital market). The lender is risk neutral. Firms invest in a project with a
stochastic payoff x ∈ [
¯
x, x̄], which is uniformly distributed. Firms do not have
enough own resources for the investments they wish to undertake and thus need
resources from a lender. Following Townsend (1979), we assume an asymmetric
information problem between borrowers and the lender. The distribution from
which the payoffs are drawn is known to both agents. The actual draw, however,
is the firm’s private information; the lender can observe the (payoff) shock x only
by paying a monitoring cost c. This lump-sum cost is introduced to capture the
idea that borrowers have more information about their own projects than does
the lender.
The firm is able to pay back its debt whenever its revenue, x, is larger than
its debt, R×B, where R is the cost of the credit and B is the volume of credit,
which is normalized to 1 in the following: we assume that a firm needs one unit
of resources to undertake the project.59 For all x ≥ x̂, the firm is able to pay
back the loan, where the threshold level x̂ is the level at which the firm earns
just enough from the project to pay back its debt R. Therefore, x̂ = R has
to hold. After paying back its debt, the firm keeps the residual (x − R). The
firm defaults if x < x̂; the lender monitors the firm and seizes the share x − c.
Defaulting firms receive nothing. The firm only borrows from the bank if its
expected return is not smaller than zero:∫ x̄
R
(x−R) 1
x̄−
¯
x
dx ≥ 0 . (3.1)
The structural difference between banks and the capital market is that banks
are able to form long-term relationships with their borrowers, which reduces
the monitoring costs. In the following, we assume that relationship banks incur
monitoring costs c̃ in regard to firms with which they have formed a relationship.
Lending to a firm with no relationship leads to monitoring costs c where c > c̃
holds. c is also the value the capital market cannot retrieve from the borrower’s
insolvency mass in case of borrower default.
59 Allowing for a time-varying loan volume would dampen the reaction of the loan rate fol-
lowing an uncertainty shock. Comparatively low lending rates increase the demand for
loans, which increases the probability of firm default. This raises the loan rate relatively.
Therefore, producing relatively low bank loan rates after uncertainty shocks depends on
the interest rate elasticity of loan demand.
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In the following, we describe two model economies – one in which firms
rely on external financing through capital markets, one in which firms bor-
row from banks. We analyze what happens with the lending rate on the
capital market and the bank loan rate when the two economies are hit by
an uncertainty shock, respectively. We assume there are two periods: at the
beginning of each period lenders offer contracts to firms who invest in a risky
project. At the start of the first period, there is an exogenous increase in
uncertainty σ, which effects the return payoff x1 ∈ [
¯
x − σ, x̄ + σ] – that is,
the payoff is drawn from a wider distribution. At the beginning of the second
period, the uncertainty shock σ has completely abated, such that the project
yields a payoff x2 ∈ [
¯
x, x̄], again. Furthermore, we assume that firms which
default in the first period are replaced by new firms prior to the second period.60
Capital Market By assumption, the capital market cannot establish a long-
term relationship with a borrower. Therefore, the capital market solves a simple
static optimization problem. The expected return to the lender in the first
period is∫ RC1
¯
x−σ
(x− c) 1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx+
∫ x̄+σ
RC1
RC1
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx (3.2)
where RC1 denotes the rate charged by the capital market (the bond yield) in
the first period. The first term of Equation (3.2) is the expected return to the
lender if the borrower defaults, which occurs whenever x < RC1 . In this situation,
the lender receives the total payoff of the project x net bankruptcy costs c. The
second term is the expected return to the lender if the borrower does not default,
which holds whenever x ≥ RC1 . In this case, the lender receives the payment RC1
from the borrower. Maximizing Equation (3.2) with respect to the lending rate
RC1 subject to the borrowers’ participation constraint (Equation (3.1)) leads to
61
RC1 = x̄− c+ σ . (3.3)
60 Due to the simple structure of the model, there is no steady state. Therefore, in response
to an uncertainty shock, we can only compare the different reactions of the lending rates
on the capital market and the bank market with each other.
61 The complementary slackness condition implies that the borrower’s participation constrain
(Equation (3.1)) is only binding for c = 0. Since we work with a model of asymmetric
information, c > 0, and we can drop the Lagrange parameter in the following analysis.
This holds for both periods.
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An increase in uncertainty σ increases the lending rate RC1 . Therefore, capital
market participants demand to be fully compensated for the rise in default
risk. This results is in line with the prediction of the full-fledged DSGE model
discussed in the previous section.
In period 2 the component σ of the payoff of the project exogenously vanishes
(σ = 0). The rate charged by the capital market in period 2, RC2 , equals
62
RC2 = x̄− c . (3.4)
Bank In contrast to the capital market, the bank is able to try to form a rela-
tionship with its borrowers in the first period in order to reduce the asymmetric
information problem in the second period.63 The bank solves an inter-period
maximization problem, in which its decision in the first period effects the out-
come in the second period. The expected discounted return to the bank in
period 1 is:∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
(x− c) 1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx+
∫ x̄+σ
RB1
RB1
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
+ β
{
1−
∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
}{∫ RB2
¯
x
(x− c̃) 1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+
∫ x̄
RB2
RB2
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx
}
+ β
{∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
}{∫ R̂B2
¯
x
(x− c) 1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+
∫ x̄
R̂B2
R̂B2
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx
}
(3.5)
where RB1 denotes the loan rate charged by the bank in period 1 and β is the
discount factor. The first term in line 1 is the expected return to the bank if the
borrower defaults, the second term is the expected return to the lender if the
borrower does not default; in the latter case, the bank receives the payment RB1 .
62 The expected return in period 2 is
∫ RC2
¯
x
(x− c) 1x̄−
¯
xdx+
∫ x̄
RC2
RC2
1
x̄−
¯
xdx.
63 We consider a bank which faces the choice of establishing a new relationship when uncer-
tainty is high. Alternatively, one could think of relationship lending as an “equilibrium
phenomenon”, i.e. the uncertainty shock hits a steady state of the model in which the
bank has already established relationships with borrowers. The bank enjoys an informa-
tional advantage compared to the capital market, therefore the steady state bank loan rate
is relatively higher than the capital market rate. An increase in uncertainty results in a
reduction in the loan rate if the bank values the long-run benefits of continuing the rela-
tionship higher than the short-run benefits of increasing the loan rate at the expense of a
higher probability of firm default. Therefore, introducing steady state relationship lending
would complicate the analysis, while keeping the qualitative results unchanged.
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In contrast to the capital market’s maximization problem, the bank takes into
account the effect its choice of RB1 will have on the expected discounted return
in period 2, which is represented by lines 2 and 3 in Equation (3.5).
Line 2 describes the expected discounted return if a borrower does not default
at the end of the first period, which depends on the magnitude of the loan rate
RB1 in the first period. This is represented by the term in the first parenthesis:
a low value of RB1 reduces the probability of borrower default and, therefore,
increases the probability that a relationship can be formed between the bank
and the firm. Given a firm does not default in period 1, the relationship is
formed and the bank collects information about the firm, which reduces the
monitoring costs from c to c̃. In case of borrower default in the second period,
the bank seizes a higher share of the firm’s return, x − c̃ > x − c. Otherwise,
the bank charges the loan rate RB2 in period 2.
Line 3 of Equation (3.5) describes the expected discounted return if a bor-
rower defaults at the end of period 1 and no relationship is formed. The proba-
bility of this event is denoted by the term in the first parenthesis. In this case,
the bank lends to another firm at loan rate R̂B2 . The bank has not more infor-
mation about the new firm than the capital market; thus, the bank faces the
full asymmetric information problem and monitoring costs are c.
The problem the bank needs to solve is picking the loan rate RB1 charged
in period 1, the rate RB2 charged in period 2 to “relationship” firms that did
not default in period 1, and the rate R̂B2 charged in period 2 to a new firm if
a “relationship” firm defaulted, that will maximize Equation (3.5). The firms’
participation constraints need to be fulfilled for all three loan rates.64 The first
order conditions are:
RB1 = x̄− c+ σ − β(c− c̃)
{
1− 1
2
1
x̄−
¯
x
(c+ c̃)
}
(3.6)
RB2 = x̄− c̃ (3.7)
R̂B2 = x̄− c (3.8)
where RB2 and R̂
B
2 in Equation (3.6) are already replaced by Equations (3.7) and
(3.8). Equation (3.7) denotes the loan rate charged in period 2 if a relationship
is successfully formed from the first to the second period. This rate is higher
compared to the rate charged by the capital market (Equation (3.4)) and is the
64 The full maximization problem is shown in Appendix 3.E. As long as c > 0, c̃ > 0, c− c̃ > 0,
and 2(x̄−
¯
x) > c+ c̃, the complementary slackness conditions imply that the participation
constraints are not binding and all three Lagrange parameters equal zero.
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reason why the bank tries to form a relationship in the first period. Equation
(3.8) describes the case when the firm defaults in period 1 and the bank lends
to a new firm in the second period. In such a situation, the bank charges the
same rate as the capital market (Equation (3.4)), because the bank does not
have more information about the new firm than the capital market. Equation
(3.6) denotes the loan rate charged by the bank in period 1. Using Equation
(3.3), Equation (3.6) can be written as:
RB1 = R
C
1 − β(c− c̃)
{
1− 1
2
1
x̄−
¯
x
(c+ c̃)
}
.
The difference between the bank loan rate RB1 and the lending rate on the
capital market RC1 equals the expected gain from the relationship – the difference
between the monitoring cost for new firms c and relationship firms c̃. If the bank
does not try to form a relationship, the degree of asymmetric information in the
second period is the same for both the bank and the capital market (c̃ = c) and
the bank behaves like the capital market: an increase in uncertainty leads to an
increase in the lending rate. However, if the bank decides to form a relationship
with the borrower in order to reduce the monitoring costs, the bank charges a
rate in period 1 that is lower than the rate demanded by the capital market. The
larger the difference in monitoring costs, c − c̃, the lower is the bank loan rate
relative to the capital market rate. Therefore, if the bank expects the benefits
of a relationship to be relatively large, it cushions the effects of uncertainty on
the firm’s default probability by keeping the loan rate relatively low, thereby
offsetting the increase in the probability of borrower default. The bank suffers
(expected) losses in the first period, however, this is optimal for the bank because
it increases the probability that the bank will be able to lend to the same firm
in the next period. The bank can use its informational advantage in the second
period and charge relatively high rates.
The model shows that the capital market increases its lending rate in response
to an uncertainty event. By taking into account relationship lending, the model
predicts that the larger the expected reduction in information asymmetries, the
lower is the bank loan rate during periods of uncertainty.
3.4.3 Discussion: Compositional Changes and Collateral
Relationship lending is one explanation why capital market participants and
banks respond differently to surprise increases in uncertainty. There could be
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other channels, for example the portfolio composition effect. Lenders could
react to uncertainty shocks by shifting their portfolio from risky to less risky
assets. Assume there are two types of borrowers: both types invest in risky
projects. However, only one type is hit by the uncertainty shock – let us call
it the “uncertain” type. The interest rate for (or the yield from) “uncertain”
firms rises due to their increased probability of default, whereas the interest rate
for (or the yield from) “certain” borrowers stays constant because this set of
firms is not hit by the uncertainty shock and thus the risk premium does not
move. What would we have to assume so that the risk-shifting channel explains
decreases in bank loan rates and increases in corporate bond yields?
Looking at new loans or newly issued bonds, risk shifting leads lenders to
extend less credit to the “uncertain” borrowers and more to firms with relatively
certain project outcomes. The average loan rate of the newly formed bank
portfolio falls only if the reduction in lending to “uncertain”-type borrowers
is sufficiently large. In contrast, the average corporate bond yield increases if
the capital market does not change its portfolio composition much. Therefore,
purchases of corporate bonds from “uncertain”-type firms are not much reduced
in uncertain times.65 These two requirements have to be fulfilled so that the
risk-shifting motive can explain both a decrease in the bank loan rate of new
loans and an increase in the corporate bond yield of newly issued bonds.
When we look at outstanding amounts of loans or bonds, the risk-shifting
motive is not applicable to explain the differences in the behavior of banks and
capital markets. In this case, the composition of the aggregate bank (or market)
portfolio cannot change. An increase in uncertainty raises the bank loan rate for
(or the yield from) “uncertain”-type firms because of the higher risk of default.
This increases the average loan rate (or the average yield), assuming that the
interest rate that “certain”-type borrowers have to pay does not change (their
default risk does not change). This is in contrast to the results from the fifth
robustness test in which we find that loan rates on outstanding loans decrease
in response to uncertainty shocks.
A second, and complementary, channel that could explain the different be-
havior of banks and the capital market is that banks can react to heightened
uncertainty not only by changing lending rates, but also by changing non-price
terms like collateral constraints. In the context of the risk channel of monetary
policy this point is made, for example, by Afanasyeva and Güntner (2014). They
argue that expansionary monetary policy leads banks to relax lending standards
65 For a detailed exposition of these points, see Appendix 3.F.
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such as collateral requirements for firms. Applied to the case of heightened
uncertainty, banks react by tightening collateral requirements in exchange for
not increasing lending rates. This does not present a pecuniary transfer from
borrowers to lenders but does influence the risk sharing between the two parties
(see Hainz and Wiegand, 2013). Banks are compensated for the higher default
risk by being able to extract more collateral in case of borrower default. Capital
markets do not have this instrument and can be compensated only by increas-
ing interest rates. However, this channel would probably only explain why bank
loan rates do not change in the face of heightened uncertainty, but not why they
fall.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper makes four contributions to the field. First, using uncertainty proxies
derived from survey data, we confirm that credit spreads increase in response to
innovations in uncertainty, both in the United States and in Germany. Second,
we find that uncertainty shocks increase credit spreads in market-based financial
systems (measured by corporate bond yields) more than in bank-based systems
(proxied by bank loan rates) due to increasing corporate bond yields, while
bank loan rates decrease. Third, a standard DSGE model with CSV predicts
increasing lending rates after surprise changes in uncertainty, which is consis-
tent with the reaction of capital market participants. Fourth, we use a partial
equilibrium model with CSV and relationship banking to explain the different
behavior of capital markets and banks during uncertainty events. Taking into
account relationship lending, the model predicts comparatively lower bank loan
rates in a high-uncertainty environment. The larger the reduction in information
asymmetries due the relationship, the lower is the loan rate.
The finding that credit spreads react less to heightened uncertainty in bank-
based economies is important for economic decision makers. Recent studies
argue that volatility/uncertainty is a determinant in the decision-making pro-
cess of central bankers (see Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca, 2013, Jovanovic and
Zimmermann, 2010, Kohlhas, 2011). Our analysis suggests that in bank-based
systems the effects of uncertainty on credit spreads are dampened to a large
extent by the banking system. If credit costs for firms do not increase much, un-
certainty transmitted through the credit cost channel might be less of a concern
for the conduct of monetary policy in bank-based systems. In the context of
sticky prices, Bachmann, Born, Elstner, and Grimme (2013) find that increases
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in volatility have only small effects on the frequency of firms’ price adjustments.
They argue that traditional monetary policy aimed at stabilizing real output in
uncertain times remains relatively effective. Our analysis introduces relationship
banking as another factor why monetary policy does not have to react strongly
to heightened uncertainty – at least in economies characterized by relationship
lending.
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Appendix
3.A Construction of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
Proxies
For Germany, we use the responses by manufacturing firms to the monthly IFO
Business Climate Survey (IFO-BSC). The Business Climate Index, which is
based on this survey, is a much-followed leading indicator for economic activity
in Germany. We focus on the following question from the survey:
Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic produc-
tion activities with respect to product X will (without taking into
account differences in the length of months or seasonal fluctuations)
increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.
Exp+t is defined as the fraction of firms that expect at time t an increase in
production activity in the future and Exp−t as the fraction of firms that expect a
decrease. Uncertainty is defined as the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations
about future production:
FDISPGERt =
√
Exp+t + Exp
−
t − (Exp+t − Exp−t )2 . (3.9)
For the United States, we use data from the Business Outlook Survey (BOS),
which is conducted on a monthly basis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia and surveys manufacturing firms in the Third Fed district. We focus on
the following question from the survey:
General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the
level of general business activity six months from now vs. [Current
Month]: decrease, no change, increase?
In contrast to what is available for the IFO-BSC, we do not have access to
detailed micro data from the BOS. However, the net balances Exp+t and Exp
−
t
are available. With the help of Equation (3.9), we calculate the U.S. uncertainty
proxy, FDISPUS, as the dispersion of firms’ forecasts about the general business
outlook.
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3.B Data
Figure 3.12: Liability Side of Nonfinancial Corporate Business
GER USA
0
20
40
60
80
100
in
 %
 o
f t
ot
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s
 
 
Loans
Corporate Bonds
Equity
Miscellaneous
Notes: Data are from 2012 and collected from the respective national central banks.
Table 3.4: Data Sources: Germany
Variable Description Source
FDISPGER Cross-sectional standard deviation of
production expectations, manufacturing
firms, seasonally adjusted with X-12 and
standardized
IFO & own
calculations
Production In manufacturing, seasonally adjusted,
constant prices
Federal Statistical
Office
Employment In manufacturing, seasonally adjusted Federal Statistical
Office
Loan rate Loan rate of loans other than revolving
loans and overdrafts, new business, up to 1
year, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
Loan rate
(outstanding)
Loan rate of loans other than revolving
loans and overdrafts, outstanding amount,
up to 1 year, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
Corp
bond yield
Yields on fully taxed bonds outstanding,
issued by non-financial corporations
Bundesbank
Government
bond yield
1 to 2 years of maturity, in % p.a. Bundesbank
EONIA Day-to-day money market rate, monthly
average, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
PPI Producer prices of industrial products,
seasonally adjusted
Federal Statistical
Office
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Table 3.5: Data Sources: United States
Variable Description Source
FDISPUS Cross-sectional standard deviation of
production expectations, manufacturing
firms, third FED district, seasonally
adjusted with X-12 and standardized
BOS & own
calculations
Production In manufacturing, seasonally adjusted,
constant prices
Federal Reserve
Board
Employment In manufacturing, seasonally adjusted BLS
Corporate
bond yield
effective yield of investment grade rated
corporate debt with maturity between 1
and 3 years
Merrill Lynch
Prime rate Charged by commercial banks, used to
price short-term business loans, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Loan rate Charged by commercial banks for all
commercial and industrial loans, up to 1
year, interpolated from quarterly to
monthly frequency, shifted*, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Government
bond yield 3y
3-year treasury bond yield Federal Reserve
Board
Government
bond yield 1y
1-year treasury bond yield Federal Reserve
Board
Federal
Funds Rate
Fed Funds Effective Rate Federal Reserve
Board
PPI Producer prices, finished goods, seasonally
adjusted
BLS
Notes: Shifted*: the monthly series is shifted by one month, because the original quarterly
data is collected during the middle month of each quarter.
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3.C Bayesian VAR Model
In this section we explain the Bayesian VAR (BVAR) estimation used in the
section on robustness in the main text.
Consider the VAR(p) model:
Yt = c+ A1Yt−1 + . . .+ ApYt−p + ut (3.10)
where Yt is n×1 vector of endogenous variables, c is n×1 vector of constants,
A1 . . . Ap is a set of matrices of coefficients, ut is n × 1 vector of normally dis-
tributed residuals with covariance matrix Σ. Equation (3.10) can also be written
as
Y = XB + U (3.11)
where Y = (Y1, . . . , Yt)
′, X = (X1, . . . , XT )
′, Xt = (Y
′
t−1, . . . , Y
′
t−p, 1)
′, B =
(A1, . . . , Ap, c)
′ and U = (u1, . . . , uT )
′. Note that B contains all coefficients
k = n(np + 1) of the model. In the following, we impose additional prior
beliefs on the parameters through a variant of the Minnesota prior suggested by
Litterman (1986). This prior captures the belief that variables characterized by
high persistence can be reasonably described by a random walk with drift. The
prior for variables that are believed to quickly revert to their respective mean
is white noise. In addition, the prior implies that recent lags are believed to
be more informative than more distant ones. The prior also incorporates the
belief that own lags are more insightful for a given variable than lags of other
variables.
Originally, Litterman (1986) assumes that the covariance matrix is diagonal.
Allowing for correlation among residuals, however, is essential for structural
analysis. Therefore, we follow Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) and rely on a
generalized version of the prior by imposing a normal inverted Wishart prior of
the form:
Σ ∼ IW (S0, α0) and vec(B)|Σ ∼ N (vec(B0),Σ⊗ Ω0) (3.12)
where the elements S0, α0, V0, and Ω0 are functions of hyperparameters,
which reflect the prior beliefs. We follow Banbura, Giannone, and Reich-
lin (2010) and implement the prior (Equation (3.12)) by adding the following
dummy observations to the original data:
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Yd =

diag(δ1σ1, . . . , δnσn)/λ
0n(p−1)×n
diag(σ1, . . . , σn)
01×n

Xd =
 diag(1, 2, . . . , p)⊗ diag(σ1, . . . , σn)/λ 0np×10n×np 0n×1
01×np ε

The hyperparameters δi, σi, ε, and λ are set as following. δi is set to 1 if vari-
able i is believed to be highly persistent, a value of 0 reflects the belief that the
variable is characterized by strong mean reversion. σi accounts for the different
scale and variability of the variables; it is set equal to the standard deviation of
a residual from a univariate autoregression of variable i. The number of lags is
set to 12; the sample period is the same as in the VAR. An uninformative prior
is chosen for the intercepts; therefore, ε is set to a very small number (10−4). λ
characterizes the tightness of the prior distribution and determines the relative
importance of the prior beliefs in the estimation. For λ→∞, the posterior ex-
pectations equal the OLS estimates and the prior is uninformative. For λ→ 0,
the posterior equals the prior and the estimates are not influenced by the data.
The artificial data Td are added to the original data T so that T∗ = T + Td.
Adding the artificial data to the original VAR (Equation (3.11)) leads to
Y∗ = X∗B + U∗ (3.13)
where Y∗ = (Y, Yd)
′, X∗ = (X,Xd)
′, and U∗ = (U,Ud)
′. Banbura, Giannone, and
Reichlin (2010) show that the posterior of the parameters is then a function of
the hyperparameters:
Σ|Y ∼ IW
(
Σ̂, T + n+ 2
)
and vec(B)|Σ, Y ∼ N
(
vec(B̂),Σ⊗ (X ′∗X∗)−1
)
where Σ̂ and B̂ are the covariance and the coefficients from an OLS regression
of Y∗ on X∗.
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The estimation procedure and the calculation of impulse responses is as fol-
lowing: First, we draw the covariance matrix Σ̃ from the inverted Wishart dis-
tribution and the corresponding vector of coefficients B̃ from the multivariate
Normal distribution. Second, we compute the Cholesky decomposition. Third,
66 For a forecast evaluation of different variants of the BVAR, see, e.g., Berg and Henzel
(forthcoming).
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we calculate impulse responses. Fourth, steps 1 to 3 are repeated 5,000 times.
Finally, we calculate for each variable the median response and the 16th and
84th percentiles at each point in time.
The hyperparameter λ is calibrated to 0.25, which is in line with Banbura,
Giannone, and Reichlin (2010), who set λ to 0.262 in a VAR with seven variables.
The hyperparameters δi are set to 1 for the interest rate and production variables,
reflecting the belief that these variables are better described as persistent rather
than as white noise in the estimation period. For uncertainty, we set δi equal to
0, assuming that uncertainty quickly reverts to its mean.
3.D Detailed Description of the DSGE Model
with Financial Frictions and Uncertainty
Shocks
The Model
This section describes the DSGE model used in the main text. The model is very
similar to the one outlined by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) with the
addition of an explicit uncertainty process based on Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
Variants of this setup can be found in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014),
Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2014), Chugh (2014), Dorofeenko, Lee,
and Salyer (2008), Fendoglu (2014), Hafstead and Smith (2012).
Household
There is a representative household that maximizes utility by choosing real con-
sumption Ct, nominal deposits Dt held at the bank, which pay the nominal
interest rate RNt . In addition, the household provides labor Ht to firms, which
pay a real wage Wt. Tt is the net transfer from ownership of the entrepreneurs.
The household’s utility and budget constraint are
max
{Ct,Ht,Dt}
Et
[
+∞∑
t=0
βt
{
C1−%t
1− %
− χH
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
}]
s.t.
Ct +
Dt
Pt
≤ WtHt +
RNt−1
Πt
Dt−1 + Tt
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where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate and Pt is the aggregate price
index. The first order conditions are
C−%t = λt
λtWt = χH
ϕ
t
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
RNt
Πt+1
]
Final Good Producer
The representative final good producer assembles a final good Yt by combining
intermediate goods Yit according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
ε−1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
where ε is the elasticity of substitution across goods. The final good producer
maximizes profits, PtYt −
∫ 1
0
PitYitdi, subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator,
taking intermediate goods prices Pit and the final good price Pt as given. The
demand for intermediate goods is:
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
where Yt is aggregate demand and the price level equals Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
.
Intermediate Good Producers
The intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive firms. The intermediate goods producers combine labor and capital
using a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce intermediate goods (pro-
duction is, therefore, constant returns to scale)
Yit = (Kit−1)
αH1−αit (3.14)
Capital is rented from entrepreneurs; labor is hired from households. Intermedi-
ate goods producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, they minimize
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real costs, WtHit + r
K
t Kit−1, subject to Equation (3.14) and taking factor prices
as given. rKt denotes the rental rate of capital. Cost minimization implies
Kit−1 =
α
1− α
Wt
rKt
Hit
Real marginal costs are:
MCt =
(
1
1− α
)1−α(
1
α
)α
W 1−αt
(
rKt
)α
In the second stage, intermediate goods producers choose the price, Pit, to
maximize discounted real profits. Prices can be changed with probability 1− θ
in each period. The maximization problem of firm i is
max
Pit
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
λt+k
λt
[(
Pit
Pt+k
−MCt+k
)
Yit+k
]
s.t.
Yit+k =
(
Pit
Pt+k
)−ε
Yt+k
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, P ∗it = P
∗
t , where P
∗
it is the optimal price
chosen by the intermediate goods producer i, results in the following equations:
x1t =
ε− 1
ε
x2t
x1t = λtMCtYt + βθEt(Πt+1)εx1t+1
x2t = λtP̃tYt + βθEt(Πt+1)ε−1
(
P̃t
P̃t+1
)
x2t+1
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 and P̃t = P
∗
t /Pt. The aggregate price index evolves as
1 = θ(Πt)
(ε−1) + (1− θ)(P̃t)1−ε
Capital Good Producer
The capital good producer buys the old non-depreciated capital stock (1−δ)Kt−1
from entrepreneurs. The existing capital is combined with investment It to pro-
duce new capital Kt, which is sold to entrepreneurs at real price Qt. The pro-
duction of new capital induces transformation costs φk(It/Kt−1)Kt−1. Buying,
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producing, and selling capital all takes place within period t. The maximization
problem of the capital good producer is
max
It
QtKt −Qt(1− δ)Kt−1 − It
subject to the law of motion for capital
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + φk
(
It
Kt−1
)
Kt−1.
The first-order condition equals
Qt =
[
1− φk
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)]−1
where φk(
It
Kt−1
) = It
Kt−1
− φk
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneur j buys Kjt at price Qt at the end of period t to be used for pro-
duction in period t+ 1. He finances these purchases with his net worth N jt and
real bank loans Bjt :
QtK
j
t = B
j
t +N
j
t
The average real return of capital RKt+1 depends on the real rental rate of capital
rKt+1 and the return from the non-depreciated capital stock, (1− δ)Kt,
RKt+1 =
rKt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
At the beginning of period t + 1, each entrepreneur j experiences an idiosyn-
cratic shock ωjt+1 that transforms capital into effective capital ω
j
t+1K
j
t . The
total ex-post return of entrepreneur j equals ωjt+1R
K
t+1QtK
j
t . The shock ω
j
t+1
is log-normally distributed across all entrepreneurs with a cumulative distri-
bution function denoted by F (ω) and an expected value of unity. The mean
and standard deviation of logωjt+1 are µω,t and σω,t, respectively. Following
Fernández-Villaverde (2010), idiosyncratic uncertainty σω,t evolves as
log σω,t = (1− ρσ) log σω + ρσ log σω,t−1 + ησεσ,t, εσ,t ∼ N(0, 1)
where σω is the steady state value of uncertainty.
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Following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), we assume an asymmetric
information problem between borrowers and lenders. The idiosyncratic shock is
private information to the entrepreneur; a bank can observe the shock only by
paying a monitoring cost, which is a fraction µ of the realized total return on
capital. The entrepreneur is able to repay his loan plus interest whenever his
revenue, ωjt+1R
K
t+1QtK
j
t , is larger than his debt, Z
j
tB
j
t , where Z
j is the loan rate
faced by entrepreneur j. This is the case for all ωjt+1 > ω̄
j
t+1 where the threshold
level ω̄jt+1 is the level at which the entrepreneur is just able to pay back the loan.
This threshold value is determined in a contract between the entrepreneur and
the bank. Therefore, there is a relationship between the loan rate Zj and the
threshold value ω̄jt+1
ω̄jt+1 =
ZjtB
j
t
RKt+1QtK
j
t
The entrepreneur defaults if ωjt+1 < ω̄
j
t+1; the bank monitors the entrepreneur
and the share (1 − µ)ωjt+1RKt+1QtK
j
t is seized by the bank. Defaulting en-
trepreneurs receive nothing.
The debt contract between the entrepreneur and the bank is set up so that
the lender receives an expected return equal to the riskless rate in all states of the
world while maximizing the expected return to capital to entrepreneurs. This
leads to a maximization problem for the entrepreneur, who chooses a schedule
of threshold values ω̄jt+1 and the loan volume B
j
t to maximize his return
max
ω̄jt+1,B
j
t
∫ ∞
ω̄jt+1
ωdF (ω)RKt+1QtK
j
t − [1− F (ω̄
j
t+1)]Z
j
t+1B
j
t
where the first term denotes the average return of a project when ωjt+1 > ω̄
j
t+1.
The second term describes the probability of loan repayment. The entrepreneur
needs to take into account the zero profit condition of the bank, which has to
hold in all states of the world
[1− F (ω̄jt+1)Z
j
t+1B
j
t + (1− µ)
∫ ω̄jt+1
0
ωdF (ω)RKt+1QtK
j
t = RtB
j
t (3.15)
where Rt is the (non-contingent) return of households with savings at the bank.
The first term on the left-hand side is the return if the loan is paid back; the
second term describes the revenue if the loan defaults. On the right-hand side is
the cost of funds, which is what the bank has to earn in each state of the world
to be able to repay back the household depositors.
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This gives rise to a function that relates the (expected) external finance
premium (EFP), EtRKt+1/Rt, to the net-worth-to-capital ratio N
j
t /QtK
j
t
Et
RKt+1
Rt
[1− Γ(ω̄t+1)] = Etλbt(ω̄t+1)
N jt
QtK
j
t
where Et [1− Γ(ω̄t+1)] is the expected share of total profits going to the en-
trepreneur67 and λbt(ω̄t+1) denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the zero profit
condition and equals
λbt(ω̄t+1) =
Γω(ω̄t+1)
Γω(ω̄t+1)− µGω(ω̄t+1)
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) point out that the assumption of con-
stant returns to scale in production leads to a linear relationship between N jt
and Kjt at the firm level and does not depend on idiosyncratic factors. This
facilitates aggregation enormously because it is not necessary to keep track of
the distribution over net worth.
To make sure that entrepreneurs do not accumulate enough net worth to
finance all projects on their own, we assume that an exogenous fraction (1 −
γe) of entrepreneurs’ share of profits is consumed in each period. Aggregate
entrepreneurial consumption equals
Cet = (1− γe) [1− Γ(ω̄t)]RKt Qt−1Kt−1
while aggregate net worth Nt evolves as
Nt = γ
e [1− Γ(ω̄t)]RKt Qt−1Kt−1.
Bank
The representative bank intermediates funds between households and en-
trepreneurs. It provides real loans Bt at rate Zt to entrepreneurs. Households
receive a (non-contingent) nominal rate RNt for their deposits Dt. The balance
sheet of the bank is: Lt = Dt.
67 Et [1− Γ(ω̄t+1)] equals
∫∞
ω̄jt+1
ωdF (ω)RKt+1QtK
j
t − [1 − F (ω̄
j
t+1)]Z
j
t+1B
j
t . The zero profit
condition of the bank (Equation (3.15)) can then be rewritten as
RKt+1
Rt
[Γ(ω̄t+1)−µG(ω̄t+1)] =
Bt
QtKt
, where G(ω̄t+1) =
∫ ω̄jt+1
0 ωdF (ω).
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Monetary Policy and Market Clearing
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate RNt according to a Taylor rule:
RNt
RN
=
(
RNt−1
RN
)γr [(
Πt
Π
)γπ ( Yt
Yt−1
)γy](1−γr)
where Rt = Et
(
RNt /Πt+1
)
, RN is the steady state nominal interest rate, Π is the
steady state inflation rate, γr generates interest-rate smoothing, and γπ and γy
control the response of the interest rate to deviations from steady state inflation
and steady state output.
The model is closed by the market clearing condition in the goods market
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + It + µG(ω̄t)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1
where µG(ω̄t)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1 denotes aggregate monitoring cost. The average pro-
ductivity of defaulting firms, G(ω̄t), equals
∫ ω̄jt
0
ωdF (ω).
Equilibrium conditions
Household
C−%t = λt
λtWt = χH
ϕ
t
λt = βEt
[
λt+1
RNt
Πt+1
]
Capital Good Producer
Qt =
[
1− φk
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)]−1
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Kt−1
[
It
Kt−1
− φk
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2]
Price index
1 = θ(Πt)
(ε−1) + (1− θ)(P̃t)1−ε
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Intermediate Firms
x1t =
ε− 1
ε
x2t
x1t = λtMCtYt + βθEt(Πt+1)εx1t+1
x2t = λtP̃tYt + βθEt(Πt+1)ε−1
(
P̃t
P̃t+1
)
x2t+1
Kt−1 =
α
1− α
Wt
rKt
Ht
MCt =
(
1
1− α
)(1−α)(
1
α
)α
W 1−αt
(
rKt
)α
Yt = K
α
t−1H
1−α
t
Entrepreneurs
Bt = QtKt −Nt
RKt =
[
rKt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
]
RKt+1
Rt
[Γ(ω̄t+1)− µG(ω̄t+1)] =
Bt
QtKt
Et
RKt+1
Rt
[1− Γ(ω̄t+1)] = Etλbt(ω̄t+1)
Nt
QtKt
λbt(ω̄t+1) =
Γ′(ω̄t+1)
Γ′(ω̄t+1)− µG′(ω̄t+1)
Nt = γe [1− Γ(ω̄t)]RKt Qt−1Kt−1
CEt = (1− γe) [1− Γ(ω̄t)]RKt Qt−1Kt−1
Monetary Policy and Market Clearing
RNt
RN
=
(
RNt−1
RN
)γr [(
Πt
Π
)γπ ( Yt
Yt−1
)γy](1−γr)
Rt = Et
RNt
Πt+1
Yt = Ct + C
e
t + It + µG(ω̄t)R
k
tQt−1Kt−1
Uncertainty Shock Process
log σω,t = (1− ρσ) log σω + ρσ log σω,t−1 + ησεσ,t
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Miscellaneous
F (ω̄t) = Φ
(
0.5σωt−1 + log(ω̄t)
σωt−1
)
G(ω̄t) = Φ
(
0.5σωt−1 + log(ω̄t)
σωt−1
− σωt−1
)
Γ(ω̄t) = ω̄t [1− F (ω̄t)] +G(ω̄t)
Γ′(ω̄t+1) = 1− F (ω̄t+1)
G′(ω̄t+1) = ω̄t+1 × F ′(ω̄t+1, σω,t)
F ′(ω̄t+1) = φ
(
0.5σωt + log(ω̄t+1)
σωt
)
σωt
ω̄t+1
EFPt = Et
RKt+1
Rt
spreadt = ω̄t
RKt
Rt−1
Qt−1Kt−1
Bt−1
RBt = ω̄t R
K
t
Qt−1Kt−1
Bt−1
EtΠt+1
levt =
QtKt
Nt
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf and φ(·) is the standard normal pdf. F (ω̄t)
is the default rate, EFPt is the expected external finance premium, spreadt
denotes the ratio of the loan rate to the riskless real rate, RBt is the loan rate,
and levt denotes leverage.
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3.E Maximization Problem of Relationship
Bank during Uncertainty Event
The expected return of the bank subject to the firm’s participation con-
straints is∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
(x− c) 1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx+
∫ x̄+σ
RB1
RB1
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
+ λB1
{∫ x̄+σ
RB1
(x−RB1 )
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx− 0
}
+ β
{
1−
∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
}
{∫ RB2
¯
x
(x− c̃) 1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+
∫ x̄
RB2
RB2
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+ λB2
[∫ x̄
RB2
(x−RB2 )
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx− 0
]}
+ β
{∫ RB1
¯
x−σ
1
(x̄+ σ)− (
¯
x− σ)
dx
}
{∫ R̂B2
¯
x
(x− c) 1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+
∫ x̄
R̂B2
R̂B2
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx+ λ̂B2
[∫ x̄
R̂B2
(x− R̂B2 )
1
x̄−
¯
x
dx− 0
]}
.
The resulting FOCs are
RB1 = x̄−
1
1− λB1
c+ σ − β 1
1− λB1
{
(c− c̃)− 1
2
1
x̄−
¯
x
[
1
1− λ̂B2
c2 +
1
1− λB2
c̃2
]}
RB2 = x̄−
1
1− λB2
c̃
R̂B2 = x̄−
1
1− λ̂B2
c .
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3.F Risk Shifting Motive
We assume there are two types of firms. Banks as well as the capital market
fund the two types. Both type of firms invest in risky projects. However,
only one type is hit by an uncertainty shock, which we denote in the following
as the “uncertain” type. Due to an asymmetric information problem between
borrowers and lenders, the interest rate riu, which “uncertain”-type firms have
to pay, increases, therefore ∂riu(σ)/∂σ > 0. i denotes either the banking sector
(B) or the capital market (CM). The interest rate of credit to (or the yield on
bonds from) firms that are “not uncertain” rnu stays constant because they are
not hit by the uncertainty shock and, thus, their default probability and their
risk premium does not change.
New Loans or Newly Issued Bonds Risk shifting means that lenders re-
duce their exposure to “uncertain”-type firms and increase lending to firms that
are “not uncertain”. Therefore, the amount of lending extended to the “uncer-
tain” type xiu decreases, ∂x
i
u(σ)/∂σ < 0, while the volume of lending given to
“not uncertain” firms xinu increases, ∂x
i
nu(σ)/∂σ > 0. The average (weighted)
interest rate (or yield) ri equals
ri =
1
xinu(σ) + x
i
u(σ)
{
xinu (σ) rnu + x
i
u (σ) r
i
u (σ)
}
. (3.16)
Assuming that the total amount of credit/bonds stays constant, xiu(σ)+x
i
nu(σ) =
x, Equation (3.16) becomes
ri = c
{[
x− xiu (σ)
]
rnu + x
i
u (σ) r
i
u (σ)
}
where c ≡ 1
xinu+x
i
u
is a constant.
Taking the derivative of the average interest rate (yield) ri with respect to
uncertainty σ leads to
∂ri
∂σ
= c
[
∂xiu
∂σ︸︷︷︸
<0
(
riu − rinu
)
+ xiu
∂riu
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
]
.
To use the risk-shifting motive as an explanation for decreasing loan rates and
increasing corporate bond yields, two requirements must be met. For the bank
∂rB
∂σ
< 0 has to hold – that is, the average interest rate on new loans rB has
to decrease following an increase in uncertainty σ. This can only be achieved if
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the reduction in lending to uncertain firms is relatively large (the reduction in
lending is counteracted by the increase in the loan rate to these firms, rBu , thus,
the drop in xBu needs to be sufficiently large). Therefore, banks need to carry
out relatively large shifts in their portfolio composition in uncertain times.
In contrast, for the corporate bond market ∂r
CM
∂σ
> 0 has to hold, implying
that capital markets need to reduce their purchases of bonds from “uncertain”
firms much less than banks do decrease their loans. Therefore, the average
yield on bonds only increases if the capital market hardly changes its portfolio
composition in periods of uncertainty.
These two conditions must be fulfilled before risk shifting can explain both a
decrease in the average bank loan rate and an increase in the average bond yield.
The different behavior of banks and capital markets would then be explained by
different credit supply elasticities in the two markets.
Outstanding Amounts of Loans or Bonds Looking at outstanding
amounts instead of new loans or newly issued bonds, Equation (3.16) becomes:
ri =
1
x̄inu + x̄
i
u
{
x̄inurnu + x̄
i
ur
i
u (σ)
}
where x̄inu and x̄
i
u imply that the loan and the bond volume are fixed, respec-
tively. Individual banks or capital market participants are able to make shifts
in their portfolio composition, at the aggregate level, however, the outstand-
ing amounts cannot change. Taking the derivative of the average interest rate
(yield) ri with respect to uncertainty σ leads to
∂ri
∂σ
= c
[
x̄iu
∂riu
∂σ︸︷︷︸
>0
]
.
The bank loan rate of loans to (or the yield on bonds from) “uncertain” firms
always increases, implying that the average loan rate (yield) ri always increases.
Therefore, for outstanding amounts the argument of risk-shifting is not applica-
ble to explain the different behavior in loan rates and bond yields.
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